Does Reason Tell Us What Moral Code to Follow and, Indeed, to Follow Any Moral Code at All?

Abstract

I propose to discuss the logical relationship between rationality and morality. I will start by summarizing the main conclusions of an earlier article of mine on this subject.' The concept of rational choice is, it seems to me, intrinsically a much clearer notion than the concept of morality. Utilitarianism can best be regarded as an attempt to clarify the concept of morality by reducing it to some form of rational choice. There are several models of rational choice in common use. The simplest one may be the means-ends model, which interprets rational choice as a choice of the best means to achieve a given end, goal, or objective. For example, a doctor will act rationally in treating a given headache with aspirin if aspirin is in fact the most effective medication to cure this type of headache.2 This model of rationality always depends on our knowledge of the causal laws of nature which will ensure the causal effectiveness of the chosen means in achieving the desired end. A more abstract, and typically noncausal, model of rationality is the criterion-satisfaction model, which interprets rational choice as a choice of an object satisfying a desired criterion. For example, under this model, if I want to visit the largest city in California, I will act rationally by visiting Los Angeles, which is in fact the largest city in the state. Of course, this statement is not based on any causal relationship: my visiting Los Angeles will not cause my visiting the largest city; rather, it will already be my visiting the largest city.