Does IBE Require a ‘Model’ of Explanation?

Abstract

Abstract In this article, I consider an important challenge to the popular theory of scientific inference commonly known as ‘inference to the best explanation’ (IBE), one that has received scant attention.1 The problem is that there exists a wide array of rival models of explanation, thus leaving IBE objectionably indeterminate. First, I briefly introduce IBE. Then, I motivate the problem and offer three potential solutions, the most plausible of which is to adopt a kind of pluralism about the rival models of explanation. However, I argue that (i) how ranking explanations on this pluralistic account of IBE remains obscure and (ii) pluralism leads to contradictory results. In light of these objections, I attempt to dissolve the problem by showing why IBE does not require a ‘model’ of explanation and by giving an account of what explanation consists in within the context of IBE. 1IBE and the Plentitude Problem2Three Potential Solutions 2.1Solution 1: Primitivism2.2Solution 2: Accomodationism2.3Solution 3: Pluralism3Two Problems for Pluralism 3.1Difficulties with ranking explanations3.2The inevitability of conflicting verdicts4Dissolving the Plentitude Problem 4.1The explanatory virtues screen-off the model of explanation4.2The virtue-centric conception of explanation5Concluding Remarks