Does climate change delegitimize political parties? How movement–party linkages in Germany, Austria, Slovakia, and Poland are reshaped

Russian parties and the political internet

Preface. PartI.Introduction. 1. The European Context. The Purpose and Organization of this Book. The Emergence of Today's Europe. European Integration. Describing Europe: Large and Small Countries. Describing Europe: Rich and Poor Countries. Social Development and Welfare in Europe. Development, Modernization, and Democracy. Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Europe. Further Democratization? 2. Democratic Political Culture and Political Action. The Cultural Foundations of Democracy. The Levels of a Political Culture. Participation and Democracy. The Public and Democracy. 3. European Interest Groups and Parties. The Types of Interest Groups. Interest Group Systems. Interest Groups and Policy Making. Parties and Party Competition. 4. Democratic Government and Public Policy in Europe. Constitutional Organization: Rules for Making Rules. Limiting and Dispersing Policymaking Power. Constitutional Organization: Electoral Rules. Government Formation and Policymaking. Democratic Policies and Welfare in Europe. The Rule of Law, Corruption, and Democracy. Introducing and Sustaining Democracy. Part II. The Established Democracies. 5. Politics in England. Current Policy Challenges. The Constraints of History. The Environment of Politics. The Structure of Government. Political Culture and Legitimacy. Political Socialization. Political Participation and Recruitment. Organizing Group Interests. Party System and Electoral Choice. Central Authority and Decentralized Delivery of Government Policies. Policy Outcomes and Changes in Society. 6. Politics in France. Current Policy Challenges. A Historical Perspective. Economy and Society. Constitution and Governmental Structure. Political Culture. Political Socialization. Recruitment and Style of Ethics. Interest Groups. Political Parties. Political Parties and Patterns of Voting. Policy Processes. The State and Territorial Relations. Performance and Prospects. 7. Politics in Germany. Current Policy Challenges. The Historical Legacy. Following Two Paths. Social Forces. The Institutions and Structure of Government. Remaking Political Cultures. Political Learning and Political Communication. Citizen Participation. Politics at the Elite Level. Interest Groups. The Party System. The Electoral System. The Policy Process. Policy Performance. Addressing the Policy Challenges. After the Revolution. 8. Politics in Spain. Policy Challenges. The Historical Legacy. Democracy and Spain's Historical Cleavages. Resolving the Center-Periphery Cleavage. Structure and Process of the Political System. Spanish Political Culture. Political Socialization. Interest Groups. Electoral Competition in Spain. Policy Performance and Outcomes. The Peaceful Disappearance of the Two Spains. Part III. Democratic Transitions. 9. Politics in Russia. Rebuilding Russia. Current Policy Challenges. Historical Legacies. The Contemporary Constitutional Order. Russian Political Culture in the Post-Soviet Period. Political Participation. Interest Articulation: From Statism to Pluralism. Parties and the Aggregation of Interests. The Politics of Economic Reform. Rule Adjudication:Toward the Rule of Law. Russia and the International Community. 10. Politics in Poland. Current Policy Challenges. The Making of Modern Poland. Structure of the Political System. Political Culture. Political Socialization. Political Participation. Leadership Recruitment. Interest Groups. The Party System. The Policymaking Process. Policy Outcomes. Conclusion. 11. Politics in Hungary. Current Policy Challenges. Contested Readings of the Hungarian Historical Story. Social Forces in Transition. The New Democratic Structures. A Democratic Political Culture in the Making? Political Socialization. Elite Level Politics. Interest Groups in Transition. New Politics Groups. Democratic Elections and the Emerging Party System. Policy Process and Performance. Paying the Price of Negotiated Revolution? Part IV. The International Dimension. 12. Politics in the European Union. Why Europe? Historical Origins. The Institutions. Governments as Actors. Political Parties. Interest Groups. Public Opinion--Does It Matter? The Policymaking Process. External Relations. Entanglement of the National and the European. Policy Performance. Policy Challenges. Appendix: A Guide to Comparing Nations. Index.

Seymour Martin Lipset and political sociology¹

Contemporary democracies face a trend toward the diffusion of the representational void left by under- legitimized political parties (Mair 2013). The essential functions of traditional political parties to organize and articulate political conflict and societal interests have been challenged both from the inside of the party system, by the emergence of populist habits of newcomers, and from the outside, by the progressive erosion of old political culture and corresponding increasing of hostility feeling. Intermediaries organizations of political and economic interests usually push their demands toward political actors in order to shape policy choices. What can happen when the traditional party system suffers from de- legitimation? In this paper, I will try to understand the level of concern of interest organizations toward the progressive detachment of civil society from political actors, in order to define if the risk of a void of representation is perceived as real and contingent. Thanks to a new original European dataset (the Comparative Interest Groups Survey), the analysis shows that different types of interest groups perceive the void to be real and with a possible impact on their activities and their own survival. As expected, in the regression model, differences emerge between countries with a traditional strong interests’ system and countries where groups activities are usually barely regulated. The results support the idea that the distance between civil society and political representatives should be considered a prominent focus of contemporary social and political investigation in order to understand the challenge for democratic life and the possible strategy of reaction.

Contemporary democracies face a trend toward the diffusion of the representational void left by under- legitimized political parties (Mair 2013). The essential functions of traditional political parties to organize and articulate political conflict and societal interests have been challenged both from the inside of the party system, by the emergence of populist habits of newcomers, and from the outside, by the progressive erosion of old political culture and corresponding increasing of hostility feeling. Intermediaries organizations of political and economic interests usually push their demands toward political actors in order to shape policy choices. What can happen when the traditional party system suffers from de- legitimation? In this paper, I will try to understand the level of concern of interest organizations toward the progressive detachment of civil society from political actors, in order to define if the risk of a void of representation is perceived as real and contingent. Thanks to a new original European dataset (the Comparative Interest Groups Survey), the analysis shows that different types of interest groups perceive the void to be real and with a possible impact on their activities and their own survival. As expected, in the regression model, differences emerge between countries with a traditional strong interests’ system and countries where groups activities are usually barely regulated. The results support the idea that the distance between civil society and political representatives should be considered a prominent focus of contemporary social and political investigation in order to understand the challenge for democratic life and the possible strategy of reaction.

Climate movements led by students and the youth worldwide (and in particular, those in richer economies) have been recognized as having a formidable voice and making important contributions towards a more radical societal transformation to face the climate crisis. However, little is said about the contribution of popular sectors, who have been mobilizing for decades and demanding broader structural transformations—with proposals that tackle environmental issues more broadly and the climate crisis in particular—but who are not directly involved in climate politics arenas, such as the United Nations Climate Change conferences. Usually portrayed as vulnerable, as those most affected by climate events, as victims and receivers of adaptation strategies, or, as resilient, rarely do popular sectors appear as agents of transformation. Critical scholars have advocated for understanding the climate crisis as part of multiple crises, including the biodiversity crisis, a crisis of care, and a crisis of democracy. Situating our article within this scholarship, we argue that the scholarly and societal debate on climate change will further benefit from broadening the scope of which social subjects are considered as part of the climate movement. Based on our research with rural popular feminist movements in Brazil, and in particular, the coalition Marcha das Margaridas, we address the following questions: how are their diagnostics of, and proposals to, overcome the climate crisis embedded in their broader project of transformation? Additionally, how does their political identity within class, gender, and rural categories of inequality inform their positions?

Climate change represents the most significant challenge facing the global community. The issue in question has an impact on the younger generation, whose prospects may be jeopardised. Both younger and older generations are participating in climate movements. An illustrious instance is the School Strike for Climate, which was orchestrated by the adolescent environmentalist, Greta Thunberg. The climate movements exhibit a range of objectives, actions and focus. Various social movements construct narratives that appeal to the youth demographic. The presence of a coherent narrative aids in the formation of personal identity and the establishment of a shared sense of self among individuals. Collectively, they have the potential to advocate for equitable treatment of the environment. Climate activism, although not regarded as religious, employs religious language and concepts. Research examining the climate movements’ impact on churches has revealed the presence of religious effects. Upon conducting research on the involvement of young individuals in churches and climate movements, specifically with regard to their agency, it has been observed that climate movements are fundamentally grounded in religious language and ideals. This article analyses the religious concepts found within youth climate movements and further investigates the correlation between youth climate activism and religion through the analysis of religious rhetoric.Interdisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: The interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary nature of this contribution is spread across the fields of theology and religion. The sub-disciplines of the youth in general, youth ministry and youth work, religious rhetoric, climate change, climate justice and environmental consciousness within the academic discourse of sustainability are studied.

How we have come to think about climate futures has predominantly been shaped by science- and expert-driven assessments. As research turns to the role of future visions as a driver of social change and overcoming political gridlock, political struggles are understood as conflicts over making (alternative) desirable futures socially performative. The recent advent of the new climate movements (NCMs) has given rise to the assumption that they could contribute to a re-politicization of climate politics by introducing alternative future visions. Their names and slogans articulate future expectations, such as futures “worth studying for” (Fridays for Future) or averting extinction (Extinction Rebellion). Yet, research on the politicizing qualities of the NCMs is inconclusive. I use a new framework for examining (de-)politicization dynamics to study public communication of German factions of both movements from 2019 to 2022. The results underscore climate movements’ strong affiliation to science from their inception, yet over time, increasing attempts to adhere to principles of climate justice. However, climate movements still struggle to re-politicize climate futures beyond dominant positive visions of modernization and negative visions of collapse. I argue that this bounded politicization is indicative of the broader discursive dynamics that have weakened the ability to formulate alternative visions and discuss to what extent the centrality of scientific imaginative logics and understandings of the science–policy interface act to inhibit the articulation of alternative visions.

Political parties play a fundamental role in the representative political systems of northern industrialized democracies. They connect civil and political society, advance the perceived interests of individuals, groups, and social strata while aiming consciously to develop these constituencies, and provide a link between society and the state, espousing the claims of the one and enforcing the rules of the other (Sakwa 1995, 169). Political parties provide representation and accountability, electoral pressure for partisan constituencies, and the basis for structuring political choice in the competition of interests in the political arena. In short, they serve as an integral aspect of representative democracies, and thus are perceived as the bedrock for the process of democratization. It is the argument of this article, however, that Russia's transition to democracy actually has been inhibited by the development of a dysfunctional and extremely unstable party system. An important starting point for understanding the woeful state of Russia's contemporary party system is examining the motivations surrounding the choices made by self-interested political elites. The desire of those who already possess power to maintain it and the desire to obtain the goods of political office--most notably power and personal enrichment--by those who seek them, have adversely impacted party system formation. These motivations also have had an impact on the structure of the institutions of government with which the parties interact, creating a political environment that reduces the importance of the role played by parties. In this regard, Russia's transition to democracy played a key role, because it served to enhance the freedom of action of the political elites, allowing them to better mold the political system according to their desires. This analysis emphasizes the profound impact of two factors on the development of Russia's party system: the course of the initial transition and the role of elites during and after the transition process. The sudden collapse of the Soviet system disrupted the development of the nascent party system, severing its connections to society and leaving it to be reconstituted from above by elites in circumstances that limited its connections with the society and the political system. In these circumstances, the parties became led by the elite. The later changes made to the overall political system during the 1993-95 and 1999-2000 election cycles have reinforced the party system's susceptibility to the behavior of the elite but at the expense of developing links between political and civil society. Those changes also shaped the incentives for elite action in ways that have led away from the development of a well-structured party system. Until the party system re-establishes its links with society and the incentives of party elite behavior are shaped by the need to promote societal interests rather than their own, Russia's party system will continue to be dysfunctional in the ongoing process of democratization. The remainder of this article is divided into five sections. Section one discusses how the collapse of the Soviet Union granted elites the leeway to fashion a party system and political institutions according to their own desires. Sections two and three describe the major developments in party system formation during the 1993-1995 and 1999-2000 election cycles, respectively. Section four draws on the historical evidence described in the preceding three sections to outline the principal factors that have contributed to the dysfunctional nature of Russia's political party system and its impact on the consolidation of Russian democracy. Section five offers general conclusions and prescriptions for the future. Impact of the Soviet Union's Collapse on the Emergence of a Nascent Multiparty System Competitive provoke party development, and this is one reason that founding elections are considered to be so important in transitions to democracy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 57). …

Foreword: Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Ahmed: Executive Secretary, OSSREA Abbreviations 1. Introduction: Evolution of African Political Parties: M. A. Mohamed Salih 2. Political Parties, Party Systems and Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Renske Doorenspleet 3. Power and competition: The institutional context of multi-party politics: Oda van Cranenburgh 4. Democratic Transition and the Crises of an African Nationalist Party, UNIP: Zambia: Jotham C. Momba 5. Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM): A Revolutionary Party in Transition, Tanzania: Paschal B. Mihyo 6. Inhibitions to Democratic Party Politics in Zimbabwe: John Makumbe 7. Political Parties and Democratic Sustenance in Ghana, 1992-2000: Kwame Boafo-Arthur 8. Sustainability of Political Parties in Kenya: Nick G. Wanjohi 9. Political Parties and Democracy in Independent Namibia: Tapera O. Chirawu 10. Multiparty Politics and Elections in Southern Africa: Realities and Imageries: Denis Venter 11. Party Politics and Political Culture in Ethiopia: Kassahun Berhanu 12. When Political Parties Fail: Sudan's Democratic Conundrum: Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Ahmed and Samia El Hadi El Nagar 13. Political Parties and Governance: Wil Hout 14. Political Parties and Democratic Governance in Botswana: Mpho G. Molomo 15. Political Parties and the Unfinished Quest for Democratic Governance, Zambia: Njunga-Michael Mulikita 16. Political Parties and Governance in Nigeria: Dele Olowu and Matthew Okotoni 17. Political Parties and Government: Petr Kopeck_ and Peter Mair: 18. Synthesis and Conclusion: M. A. Mohamed Salih Bibliography Note on Contributors Index

22 | International Union Rights | 26/4 FOCUS | CLIMATE CHANGE & TRADE UNIONS Climate change is a public health issue and workers’ rights issue The past three decades are characterised by an unprecedented rise in CO2 emissions as well as the gradual development of a global movement against climate change, which routinely surfaces in the runup to the ‘COP’ conferences.1 As the global community is still far off fulfilling the targets of the 2016 Paris Agreement, new kinds of environmental and climate movements, such as Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion, have emerged, using the slogan of ‘climate justice’. Recent school student strikes and large-scale climate change demonstrations are an expression of a deep feeling that large numbers of people in the Global North want to do something about climate change. Many of them are engaging in political action for the first time and understandably look towards the existing structures of climate activism in order to articulate their hopes. Yet, the there are numerous issues that limit the ability of the climate movement to involve a broader spectrum of workers and trade unionists in their movement. Many of these are related to the organising tactics but there are also wider politics at play… The ‘NGO-ization’ of climate politics Since the late 1990s mainstream NGOs have been mobilising their members and subscribers onto the streets before major summits of the G8, World Trade Organisation and the COP talks. At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, NGOs took the global stage with a massive presence. Since the mid-1990s, many multinational companies also run their own company-internal environmental campaigns and set their own environmental goals. It has become attractive to sign up to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, as environmental and social governance features higher on the agendas of institutional investors. From the Rio Earth Summit onwards, larger NGOs have suceeded in getting a ‘seat at the table’ on policy processes concerning the environment and climate change. Unlike trade unions that are financed by their membership dues, many NGOs are however structured like private business enterprises without any democratic leadership and are dependent either on government funding or large private donations (or both). Thus, they must always be able to showcase their successes and keep their donors satisfied. That offers one possible explanation as to why some NGOs have keenly promoted market-based mechanisms and technological ‘fixes’ currently being promoted by transnational corporations. Such NGOs may argue that without their involvement the climate would be in a far worse situation, but in doing so, they also seek to legitimise their participation in a highly ecologically ineffectual process. A group of critical NGOs formed a loose network under the banner of ‘Climate Justice Now’ when the COP13 in Bali failed in 2007. This network laid the basis for global justice activists and radical environmentalists to come together at the 2009 World Social Forum in Bélém to draft the Declaration for Climate Justice. This enabled various wings of the climate movement to mobilise huge numbers of people into campaigning, protesting, and letter writing. The subsequent 2009 Copenhagen climate summit was a turning point: it did succeed in building a strong foundation for a broad movement with a minimal consensus around the ubiquitous slogan of ‘climate justice’, which continues to inspire today’s school strikers. Nonetheless, the COP15 ended with no binding targets. The breakdown of the COP15 talks made it clear that lobbying and expert work had become obsolete. NGOs were no longer exerting the same influence as they had done for the previous fifteen years. Meanwhile, the radical wing of the climate movement spearheaded by ‘Reclaim Power’ was not able to delegitimise the UNFCCC process as they had hoped for. One possible explanation for this was the absence of trade unions and organised labour from their mobilisations. Indeed, trade unions have not yet realised their potential in exposing companies’ green-washing strategies and regulating capital through their collective agreements from below. Such approaches are more necessary than ever, as it is unlikely that the climate crisis will be solved through the free market. Even to this day policymakers and world leaders are hesitant to use the state to drive through...

Time to pay the piper: Fossil fuel companies’ reparations for climate damages

In the period of the transformation changes in various spheres in Ukraine (political, social, economic) civic organizations are active actor in the system of social relations. They are the basis power in the process of the development of civil society. According to sociological research, the level of citizen's trust to them is constantly increasing, in comparison with political parties. Civic organization is a self-governing association of people who want to reach public benefit. The activities of such organizations promote the unity of society, which, in turn, reduces the social tension in the country, calms the diverse needs of the population. In addition, non-government organization acts as a partner of public authorities and an actor in the system of state-government relations, which assumes a part of the tasks in the social sphere. Constructive way of cooperation and expedient elements in the process of establishing interaction between the third sector and authorities is the wide preparation of specialists of civic organizations in a specific field/high competence of the personnel. The main objective of such cooperation is assess the traditional approach to solving problems and to apply an innovative approach, and the direct involvement of representatives of different target groups in finding solutions to problems. In Ukraine, civic organizations have typical problems related with their functioning and effective activity. Firstly, the insufficient amount of resources (material and financial), and secondly, the low level of cooperation with public authorities, and thirdly, the need to improve the qualifications of members of organizations. It should be emphasized that the high general level of corruption in various spheres of public life, in public institutions in Ukraine also negatively affects the activities of civic organizations; because non-government organizations can be used by political parties, business groups, and individual government officials. Cooperation of public authorities with civil society institutes - public organizations, helps to solve more effectively the problems of an individual, a social group, a state.

Following Greta Thunberg’s school strike in Stockholm in August 2018 and the October 2018 ‘declaration of rebellion’ by activists in the UK, 2019 saw several climate protest movements rise to public attention, including Fridays for Future (FFF), Extinction Rebellion (XR), and the US Sunrise Movement. What is striking about them is that they rather bluntly refer to science in their campaigns. In this paper, we present an in-depth and comparative study of how the new climate protest movements relate to scientific evidence. Employing a narrative analysis of different types of data (websites, press releases, and media coverage), we study the movements’ understandings of ‘the science’ as well as of science’s role in policy processes. We find that the movements in their initial phase predominantly rely on science for their legitimation and adopt a scientific worldview with very little ‘green ambivalence’. Notably, FFF and XR hold a deficit model of existing climate communication and enact roles as science communicators.

Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion and Sunrise Movement are among the new climate movements that have come into the public spotlight since 2019. While their successes in agenda-setting are undisputed, conclusions vary on whether and how this re-politicizes climate discourses. This article presents a new framework to analyze the dynamics of (de-)politicization along the dimensions of vision, agency and process. Based on a narrative analysis, we compare US movement and media documents from 2019 and identify five key narratives, namely, ‘Evidence First,’ ‘Intergenerational Divide,’ ‘Climate Justice & Intersectionality,’ ‘System Change’ and ‘Political Fight.’ While all movements use politicizing notions, we find that tensions between the dimensions inhibit the articulation of alternative visions of the future. This overall depoliticizing tendency appears to be rooted in process understandings that originate in dominant discursive framings of climate change and of science–policy interfaces – a finding that is informative for climate discourses in general.