Do the unusual resignations of independent directors affect auditors' professional judgment?

Abstract

In Kangmei's first trial judgment, where the independent directors faced significant joint and several liabilities, it triggered a "wave" of resignations among independent directors of listed companies. Auditors auditing financial reports of these companies might consider this a significant signal, raising the question: does this signal influence their professional judgment? The study examines the relationship between the resignation of independent directors and auditors' professional judgment in A-share listed companies, following Kangmei's initial trial. This examination is conducted across three dimensions: audit pricing, audit input, and audit opinion.The findings indicate that the unusual resignations of independent directors prompt uditors to pay increased attention to the risk of material misstatements by clients, primarily reflected in audit pricing. However, these resignations do not significantly impact audit input or the judgment of audit opinions. Furthermore, this research enriches the existing literature on audit pricing and the role of independent directors, while also unveiling the specific pathways through which the departure of independent directors impacts auditors' professional judgment.