Abstract
This research note examines the relations between judicial preferences, institutional concerns, and litigation outcomes. I found that in litigation before the Israeli High Court of Justice, the “haves” enjoyed only a limited advantage over “have nots” in litigation outcomes. I also found that when “have nots” were represented by legal counsel, the “haves” did not come out ahead. Ideological propensities of judges and considerations of institutional autonomy can ameliorate, to some extent, the inherent inferiority of “have nots” in litigation. It was also found that the mechanisms that worked in favor of “have nots” operated not only in litigation that reached final judicial disposition but also when the litigation was disposed through out-of-court settlements.
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