Do Moral Experts Exist?

Abstract

Peter G. McAllen and Richard Delgado present a judicious analysis of considerations for and against recognizing expert testimony in court on moral issues (Moral Experts in the Courtroom, Hastings Center Report, February 1984, pp. 27-34). Although they raise doubts about whether morality admits of expertise, they conclude that in some difficult cases persons posing as moral experts may offer useful testimony. I do not dispute that thoughtful individuals who have reflected on complex moral problems might assist judges in these cases. I would argue, however, that there is no such thing as moral expertise. Expertise presupposes a body of knowledge or technique recognized by a community of investigators or practitioners. Whether there is moral knowledge and how morally correct decisions are made and justified constitute issues of long-standing controversy in moral philosophy. For similar reasons, the authors' claim that there exists expertise in metaethics is also suspect. There is no consensus among philosophers regarding the nature of morality, the meaning of moral terms, and the logic of moral argument. (To be sure, philosophers may be experts in metaethics in the sense that they have a scholarly grasp of the various conflicting positions current in the field.) As in other areas of philosophy, this lack of consensus appears endemic; consequently, it is unlikely that moral expertise will emerge in the future. Finally, I suggest that the issue of the scope and limits of expertise deserves serious attention, since our society accords substantial authority to persons regarded as experts and to the institutions in which expertise is practiced. Franklin G. Miller, Ph.D. Washington, D.C.