Do Indian companies' debt structures reflect debt specialisation

This paper examines the Capital Structure of companies classified based on nationality over two-time phases as 2008-09 to 2012-13 and 2013-14 to 2017-18 covering ten years. For each category of companies, the mean of three gearing ratios i.e., Total debt to Net worth ratio, Long term debt to Net worth ratio and Short term debt to Net worth ratio is assessed. The analysis is based on a randomized sample of 206 companies obtained from BT-500 (December, 2017) which are subcategorized on the basis of nationality as Indian Domestic Companies, Indian MNCs operating abroad and Foreign MNCs operating in India. The findings reveal that Domestic Indian companies are more inclined towards debt relative to Indian MNCs and Foreign MNCs over both the time phases. This signifies the importance of the nationality factor which must be contemplated while planning Capital Structure. Statistically significant differences in total and long-term debt ratios of Domestic Indian Companies and Indian MNCs between Phase I and Phase II highlight the significance of the time factor which should also be kept in mind before taking leverage decisions. Overall, the paper suggests the corporations to have beady eyes on the institutional environment of geographical territories in which they operate as well as the time variations before planning their debt structure. The disparities in the debt ratios across nationality and time warrant an empirical investigation of the causes behind them, so examining the determinants of Capital Structure of DCs and MNCs would be an interesting area of research in the future.

Economic policy makers traditionally hold the view that, because of imperfections in capital markets, a shortage of long-term finance acts as a barrier to industrial performance and growth. Long term finance is thought to allow firms to invest in more productive technologies, even when they do not produce immediate payoffs, without fear of premature liquidation. As a result, special state-supported term-lending institutions have been established, especially in developing countries. But some believe that short-term finance may offer better incentives because it allows suppliers of finance to monitor and control firms more effectively, thus improving the firms' performance. The authors empirically investigate the determinants and consequences of the term structure of debt. Using a rich panel of data on privately owned companies in India, they also examine the influence of debt maturity structures on those firm's performance, especially on productivity. The results are not conclusive, but seem to support conventional beliefs about the importance of long term finance to firm performance. Heavy leveraging, however, has a strong negative impact on productivity. They base their econometric evidence on estimates of a maturity equation and of a production function augmented by financial variables. The data on which these results are based have been generated by a financial system in which there is little competition, in which state-owned financial institutions are not guided by the profit motive and have no control over interest rates, so one cannot say whether short term finance would have been more beneficial in a less regulated system. Moreover, by the end of the 1980s, the capital base of India's government-owned financial institutions had been severely eroded and they carried a heavy burden of nonperforming assets. This means that the benefits of long term finance must be weighed against the costs.