Do Conflict Managers Matter?: An Empirical Assessment of Interstate Security Disputes and Resolution Efforts, 1945-1974

Abstract

Previous studies of conflict management efforts do not empirically describe the importance of such activities in terms of interstate conflict behavior in general. Some address only particular management techniques; others are concerned only with particular managers. None empirically characterizes management activities with respect to interstate conflict generally. This paper establishes the context for such earlier studies by examining management efforts—including measures of collective security, peaceful change, pacific settlement, peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, mediation, and conciliation, both organizational and not—in light of a comprehensive survey of interstate security disputes. Empirical answers are sought to questions about the degree and type of “mattering” that such efforts have played with respect to interstate conflict behavior. Specifically, three questions are considered: the relevance of managers; their degree of influence, including which managers have been comparatively more influential; and the developmental potential shown by organizational management agents. This analysis finds that management efforts matter a great deal in terms of relevance, to a limited extent in terms of direct influence, and very little in terms of system development.