Do Buddhists Have Emotions? The Mysterious Case of Vedanā

PurposeThe developing academic field of machine ethics seeks to make artificial agents safer as they become more pervasive throughout society. In contrast to computer ethics, machine ethics is concerned with the behavior of machines toward human users and other machines. This study aims to use an action-based ethical theory founded on the combinational aspects of deontological and teleological theories of ethics in the construction of an artificial moral agent (AMA).Design/methodology/approachThe decision results derived by the AMA are acquired via fuzzy logic interpretation of the relative values of the steady-state simulations of the corresponding rule-based fuzzy cognitive map (RBFCM).FindingsThrough the use of RBFCMs, the following paper illustrates the possibility of incorporating ethical components into machines, where latent semantic analysis (LSA) and RBFCMs can be used to model dynamic and complex situations, and to provide abilities in acquiring causal knowledge.Research limitations/implicationsThis approach is especially appropriate for data-poor and uncertain situations common in ethics. Nonetheless, to ensure that a machine with an ethical component can function autonomously in the world, research in artificial intelligence will need to further investigate the representation and determination of ethical principles, the incorporation of these ethical principles into a system’s decision procedure, ethical decision-making with incomplete and uncertain knowledge, the explanation for decisions made using ethical principles and the evaluation of systems that act based upon ethical principles.Practical implicationsTo date, the conducted research has contributed to a theoretical foundation for machine ethics through exploration of the rationale and the feasibility of adding an ethical dimension to machines. Further, the constructed AMA illustrates the possibility of utilizing an action-based ethical theory that provides guidance in ethical decision-making according to the precepts of its respective duties. The use of LSA illustrates their powerful capabilities in understanding text and their potential application as information retrieval systems in AMAs. The use of cognitive maps provides an approach and a decision procedure for resolving conflicts between different duties.Originality/valueThis paper suggests that cognitive maps could be used in AMAs as tools for meta-analysis, where comparisons regarding multiple ethical principles and duties can be examined and considered. With cognitive mapping, complex and abstract variables that cannot easily be measured but are important to decision-making can be modeled. This approach is especially appropriate for data-poor and uncertain situations common in ethics.

Founders of a forensic examination science positioned theirforensic expert work not otherwise than research activity which is primarily directed at the development and accumulation of scientific knowledge and theirfurther introduction in the application of law. The paper considers a number of factors which influence upon formation of the personality of the modern forensic expert. Also it presents the characteristic and defines the features of separate components of this process, from which the scientific and ethical ones are considered. The scientific component is presented by interaction of a science and practice which gives to the gathered knowledge with the possibility of their realization in the practical activities of the forensic expert, forms his professional thinking. Development of the scientific thinking of the forensic expert is one of the most importantfactors of his becoming whereas formation of the creative person cannot occur without maximum use of informative activity. In formation of the professional forensic expert the important place occupies reception ofnew knowledge by scientific cognition which overruns the limits of the existing system of knowledge, and the use of new rules. It’s expediently to refer the profession of the expert by modern criteria of evaluation to a top of professional skill, which can only be reached by means of full self-development and maximal self-realization of the personality. The ethical component forms an ethical culture and arranges the basе points of the behavior ofa professionalforensic expert. Correct perception of the ethics principles helps the expert in resolving difficult situations and allows to effectively carry out an expert activity. In its turn the observance of ethical standards in the course of a forensic expert activity is not only the guarantee of a reliable result and a positive microclimate in the collective, but and a precautionary measure concerning expert errors.

What I want to do is to examine some views about Nibbana (Nirvana), the Way to it and Buddhist ethics, which are new, imaginative and erroneous. They are set out in a paper' by David Bastow. He suggests an interpretation of the Way and the Goal in Early Buddhism such that: i. The Goal and the Way are not conceptually distinct. We know this because: (a) 'Everything said about this goal of Arahatship, with the exception of a very few pictorial similes, is by reference to the progressive achievements of the Way.' And (b) The alternative, which is unsatisfactory, is that the relation between the Way and the Goal is 'causal and therefore contingent'. (c) The Way, from the first stage of moral restraint up to the final liberation of Nibbana, is a pattern of progressive stages, each char acterised by self-restraint leading to a freedom. 2. But 'freedom', introduced hopefully as a unifying concept for the stages of the Way, is vague, so it is necessary to give it 'descriptive stiffening'. There are three possibilities: freedom from immorality, from craving (but both are rejected), or from illusion and all that is impermanent. Even the last possibility is rejected, however, since it does not cohere with the con cepts of freedom as found in the early stages of the Way. 3. The Way is morally justified, not in terms of the Goal, but because the later stages are a logical and natural development and culmination of the principles implicit in the early part, where they are normally accepted wNithout difficulty. Since we are not told what is meant by 'Early Buddhism', it is not clear what is to count as scriptural evidence for or against the above thesis, but I shall, like him, limit myself chiefly to the Pali Canon, though there will be references to the commentaries. Let us start with i. My main point here is that the Goal and the Way are distinct. There is some difficulty in saying 'conceptually distinct', because the Goal itself cannot be conceptualised. It is atakkavacara,2 'not in the realm of logical thought'. And we read3 'There is no measuring of man won to the goal, whereby they'd say His measure's so: that's not for him; when all conditions are removed, all ways of telling are removed'. But even

The Buddhist ethical concept of kuśala (C. shan 善), which is usually rendered as “wholesome” or “skillful,” has drawn significant scholarly attention. Although scholars have not reached a consensus on how to approach Buddhist ethical systems, it seems to be commonly acknowledged that the wholesome dharmas in early Buddhism are divided into two types: the wholesome dharmas on the mundane level and the wholesome dharmas on the supramundane level. According to the typical account of Buddhist soteriology, a practitioner should cultivate these two types of wholesome dharmas in order to reach the final goal of nirvāṇa. However, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, in which the division between the mundane and the supramundane sphere was ultimately denied, the distinction between the wholesome dharmas on the mundane and supramundane levels was often seen as being problematic. As a result, a philosophical problem arose concerning how to explain the doctrinal contrast between the ultimate universality and the concrete particularities. In ancient East Asia this problem emerged centering on the two conflicting notions of the Buddha-nature (Skt. buddha-dhātu, alt. tathāgatagarbha, C. foxing 佛性), the universal spiritual capability innate in all sentient beings, and the icchantikas (C. yichanti 一闡提), “incorrigibles,” those who are devoid of the capability (or, the wholesome dharmas) to attain Buddhahood. This article discusses the philosophical conundrum entailed from doctrinal incompatibility between the universal capability to become a Buddha and the beings who lack the wholesome dharmas by examining the Silla scholar monk Wŏnhyo’s 元曉 (617–686) understanding of the four antinomies (Skt. catuṣkoṭi, C. siju 四句) on the Buddha-nature of the Nirvāṇa Sutra.

Classical presentations of the Buddhist path prescribe the cultivation of various good qualities that are necessary for spiritual progress, from mindfulness (sati) and loving-kindness (metta) to faith (saddhā) and wisdom (paññā). Examining the way in which such qualities are described and classified in early Buddhism—with special reference to their treatment in the Visuddhimagga (Path of Purification) by the fifth-century Buddhist thinker Buddhaghosa—the present article employs a comparative method in order to identify the Buddhist catalog of virtues. The first part sketches the characteristics of virtue as analyzed by neo-Aristotelian theories. Relying on these accounts, the second part considers three lists from early Buddhism as possible catalogs of virtue: (1) the components of ethical conduct (sīla), (2) the 37 factors that contribute to awakening (bodhipakkhiyā dhammā), and (3) the wholesome (kusala) or beautiful (sobhana) mental factors (cetasika). I then raise the question of why the Buddhist tradition developed several classifications of virtue, whereas the Western tradition of virtue ethics used a single category. Appealing to the connection between the virtues and living well (eudaimonia) in the eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics, I propose that one of the reasons why Buddhism developed multiple lists of virtues is its pluralistic acceptance of different modalities of living well and associated practices, in MacIntyre’s sense of the term. These modalities and practices are not equal, but are ordered hierarchically. Accordingly, I conclude that Buddhist ethics ought to be seen as a pluralist-gradualist system rather than a universalist theory.

Inasmuch as the Buddhist ideal is human perfection, ethics are a particularly important area. Ethics (śīla) is one of the three trainings (with insight and meditation) that lead to enlightenment. Ethics can be approached in several ways: many of the following works are “normative,” seeking to establish which ethical principles are foundational and what conclusions one might draw from that concerning specific ethical problems (see Foundations, Early Buddhism, Madhyamaka, East Asian Traditions, and Tibetan Traditions). Some are “meta-ethical,” reflecting on the overall nature of Buddhist ethics or the meaning of moral terms (see Nature of Buddhist Ethics). Some are examples of “applied ethics,” focusing on specific rules (see Early Buddhism and Vinaya). Some are “descriptive,” telling us how people actually behave (see especially East Asian Traditions and Tibetan Traditions and the works under Perspectives on Contemporary Issues). Finally, some are “comparative,” reflecting on what Western psychology or cognitive science can tell us about Buddhist moral judgments (see Phenomenology of Buddhist Moral Judgments and Buddhist Ethics and Cognitive Sciences).

Surprising parallels can be found between the philosophical psychologies of William James, Bertrand Russell and Early Buddhist thought. James, a philosopher and psychologist who was influential in the early twentieth century, puts forth a view of selfhood that resembles the Buddhist doctrine of no-self (anattā). I suggest that James holds a reductionist view of the self that is very similar to the Early Buddhist conception of selfhood. The idea of relinquishing the notion of selfhood is then discussed in relation to philosophy of religion as well as ethics. I show how a no-self perspective, whether that of James or that of Buddhists, tends to support a form of impartial consequentialism in ethics. In fact, the endorsement of impartial consequentialism is evident in James’s own discussions of moral philosophy. Parallels can also be drawn with some of James’s ideas in The Varieties of Religious Experience, where various Asian notions of self-transcendence are treated sympathetically. The chapter ends with a consideration of various points of contact between James, Russell, and Buddhism. Russell, a friend and interlocutor of James, was impressed by aspects of Buddhism from an early age, and I discuss and examine the parallels between his early ideas and those of Buddhist philosophy. James’s exposure to Buddhist ideas may likewise have played an important role in his development. Though Russell and James did not agree on much else, they were both drawn to one or another version of the no-self claim and also both drawn to consequentialism. In the history of twentieth-century metaphysics and ethics – and especially the areas where they overlap – we thus find a hitherto unexplored triangular relationship between these two major figures of Western philosophy and a system of Buddhist ideas that was just beginning to make an impact in their milieu.

In recent decades, Buddhist scholars have begun serious exploration into the theoretical dimensions of Buddhist ethics. However, due to the diversity of moral proclamations found in traditional texts and commentaries, it has been difficult to formulate a widely acceptable theory of Buddhist ethics. Working with the textual analyses of the Buddhist Pāli Canon and recent scholars of Buddhism, I present arguments for viewing early Buddhist ethics as broadly Kantian (deontological) in nature. The methodology follows that of previous authors in Buddhist ethics and in Comparative Religious Ethics with a focus on philosophical ethics and historical and textual studies. In constructing a framework of Buddhist ethics, this work draws from the ancient sources, primarily the Buddhist Pāli Canon, as well as the philological and historical work of previous Buddhist commentators and scholars. A similar construction of the ethics of Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) is based primarily on the recent writings on both the philosophy and life of Kant, and for source material critical English editions of Kant's primary works. The uniqueness of this work is found in the discussion of Buddhist ethics in the context of its theories of human nature and cosmology and secondarily in its revaluation of Kantian thought as a legitimate interlocutor for scholars of Buddhist ethics. This Kantian perspective, when combined with the insights gained from virtue ethics and consequentialist perspectives, provides a fuller understanding of Buddhist ethics. The findings suggest that Buddhist ethics may claim not only many of the same strengths, but also suffer the same weaknesses, as Kantian deontological moral theory.

The aim of the article is to define the tendencies of elaboration of ethical problems in early medieval exegetical texts - treatises of post-canonical Abhidharma. Ethics as a specific philosophical discipline concerning morals was not specifically developed because of cosmological character of Buddhist philosophy. Explication of the ethical discourse presented in treatises of eminent early medieval Indian Buddhist exegetics Vasubandhu (4-5 cc.), Asaṅga (4 c.) and Yaśomitra (8 c.) showed that specific for ethics questions on the highest good, sense of human life, the nature and sources of morals, freedom of will etc. were solved in post-canonical period. According to the religious doctrine they interpreted the highest good as the benefit of liberation ( mokṣabhāgīya ) from the fetches of suffering. The Buddha’s moral instructions known as prātimokṣa is aimed at the attainment of the highest good. Therefore the essence of morality has nothing to do with saṃsāra, and human society forming and perishing in cosmic cycles cannot be the source of moral norms. According to historiosophical myth, human beings get the first instructions on righteous behavior in deep antiquity from charismatic Universal ruler ( cakravartin ) coming to the world as the forerunner of the Buddha. He explains ontological contrariness of the good and the evil but is not the Teacher of the truth. Freedom of will cannot manifest itself spontaneously in a human being attached affectively to saṃsāra. Such an individual falsely takes his ignorant self-will for the freedom of will. Hearing the sermons of salvific teaching is the condition for the rising of free will impulse.

In the last two decades, a comparative trend has developed within the discipline of Buddhist ethics in which scholars argue which of the major Western normative ethical theories is closest to early Buddhism: virtue ethics, consequentialism, or deontology. This article is devoted to the view of Buddhist ethics as a variant of virtue ethics. The article begins with a statement of the basic provisions of Buddhist ethics on which researchers rely when constructing the theory of Buddhist ethics. The purpose of this article is to show why the comparison of Buddhist ethics with the virtue ethics of Aristotle seems to be a successful and productive variant of the conceptualising Buddhist ethics, able to compete with the equally popular consequentialist approach. The work is mainly based on the consideration of the argumentation proposed by Damien Keown, a researcher who was the first to thoroughly approach the study of Buddhist ethics from a comparativist point of view, opening a wide field for discussion. Keown defends the view of Buddhist ethics as a variant of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and offers a critique of the consequentialist interpretation of the ethics of Buddhism. In conclusion, I propose the following solution to the comparative question: from my point of view, Theravada ethics is closest to virtue ethics in its basic positions. However, in Mahayana ethics, the features of consequentialism are more pronounced. Although comparative thinking is certainly interesting and productive, in the end I agree with the position that Buddhist ethics does not fit completely into any of the Western normative theories, but is an independent phenomenon.

In this chapter, Sevilla examines where the idea of “emptiness” in Watsuji Tetsuro’s ethics comes from, by first returning to Watsuji’s early works on Buddhist ethics, where he began using this term alongside his discussions of “no-self” and “dependent arising.” Sevilla then examines the continuity and discontinuity of this earlier Buddhist ethics with Watsuji’s later interpersonal/hermeneutic ethics. Finally, Sevilla develops his own creative interpretation of Watsuji, which focuses on the overlaps of these two projects, in what is called an “Interpersonal Buddhist Ethics.” Using this model, Sevilla confronts the following dilemma: Do we approach ethics from transcendent ideals or from that which is immanent in everyday life? By addressing this question, Watsuji’s ethics can be situated alongside and contributing to other “selfless” approaches to ethics, such as those found in Engaged Buddhism (Thich Nhat Hanh, etc.) and its predecessors.

Although canonical Buddhist philosophy does not offer systematic, meta-ethical argumentation in a manner that might be familiar to readers of Western ethical theories, Buddhism has long been deeply concerned with ethical questions, offering detailed articulations of human flourishing, elaborate moral psychologies, taxonomies of virtues, rules for moral conduct, and instructions on spiritual technologies for ethical self-cultivation. The ethical underpinnings of the Buddhist project manifest differently across Buddhist traditions, although teachings such as the Buddha’s diagnosis of the suffering endemic to the human condition and the way to resolve it in the four noble truths, the workings of karma (literally “action” in Sanskrit) and its effects in shaping the world that a being experiences, and the moral-psychological structure of experience together provide a shared set of foundational principles. How these foundational principles are enacted within the ethical teachings and contemplative practices of different Buddhist traditions varies. Among the early Buddhist schools that emerged in the first few centuries after the lifetime of the Buddha, a distinctive ethical focus is its elaboration of the moral psychology of monitoring and purifying unwholesome qualities of feeling and thinking as an essential task on the path of liberation. With the emergence of Mahāyāna (Sanskrit: “Great Vehicle”) Buddhism around the 1st century bce, the ethical lodestone shifts to the cultivation of bodhicitta (Sanskrit: “awakening mind”)—the radically altruistic intention to achieve enlightenment in order to benefit sentient beings—as well as advancing the figure of the bodhisattva (Sanskrit: “awakening being”) as moral exemplar. Vajrayāna (Sanskrit: “Indestructible Vehicle”) Buddhism upholds the basic ethical view of the Mahāyāna while activating them within a contemplative scheme characterized by elaborate tantric rituals, which are said to conduce to a more expeditious realization and are supported by additional sets of ethical commitments. In addition to exegeses of these traditional Buddhist ethical commitments and the practices that support them, much of the scholarship on Buddhist ethics in the 21st century is concerned with constructing systematic interpretations of traditional Buddhist ethics, applying traditional Buddhist ethics to contemporary moral problems, expanding the scope of Buddhist ethical reflection to articulate activist stances on social justice issues, and interpreting the recent secularization of Buddhist practice in evidence-based contemplative science protocols.

Journal of Chinese PhilosophyVolume 37, Issue 2 p. 248-260 A BUDDHIST-CONFUCIAN CONTROVERSY ON FILIAL PIETY GUANG XING, Corresponding Author GUANG XING THE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONGHong Kong, ChinaGUANG XING, Assistant Professor, Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong. Specialties: Early Buddhism, Chinese Buddhist Ethics. E-mail: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author GUANG XING, Corresponding Author GUANG XING THE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONGHong Kong, ChinaGUANG XING, Assistant Professor, Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong. Specialties: Early Buddhism, Chinese Buddhist Ethics. E-mail: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 03 May 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2010.01582.xCitations: 2Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume37, Issue2June 2010Pages 248-260 RelatedInformation

Purpose: The aim of the article is to present the principles of Buddhist ethical educa-tion in the context of their usefulness for the study of ethics in accounting in Poland. Methodology/approach: a critical and comparative literature analysis was used. Findings: Buddhist ethics offers a significant development of Mele’s model, which is largely based on Catholic ethics and has great potential for application in the Polish cultural circle. The model expanded in this way illustrates the impact and importance of developing the right view on developing practical knowledge and virtues, meditating practice on cultivating the right view, and the conditioning between effective (right) meditation and the ability to concentrate properly. Finally, this model emphasizes the continuity and repetition of the processes leading to “moral behavior”. Research limitations/implications: The model presented in the article can be used to develop new educational techniques in teaching accounting ethics. Originality/value: The article fills the cognitive gap regarding the Buddhist model of teaching the ethics of accounting, which is a potential supplement to educational theo-ries and techniques in this field, and indicates the directions of research that may con-firm the possible usefulness of its application in combination with Mele’s model.

Contributors. Acknowledgments. Introduction G.R. Dudley-Grant, C.P. Bankart, K.H. Dockett. Part I: Foundations. 1. On the Path of the Buddha: A Psychologists' Guide to the History of Buddhism C.P. Bankart, K.H. Dockett, G.R. Dudley-Grant. 2. Five Manifestations of the Buddha in the West: A Brief History C.P. Bankart. 3. Value and Meaning in Gestalt Psychology and Mahayana Buddhism E.S. Ragsdale. Part II: Healing and Psychotherapy: Alternatives in Psychotherapy. 4. Buddhism, Psychology, and Addiction Theory In Psychotherapy G.R. Dudley-Grant. 5. Suffering from Biobabble: Searching for a Science of Subjectivity P. Young-Eisendrath. 6. Role of Responsibility in Daseinanalysis and Buddhism B. Siew Luan Khong. 7. Classical Buddhist Model of a Healthy Mind R.P. Hayes. Part III: Empowerment, Responsibility and the Challenges of Change. 8. Buddhist Empowerment: Individual, Organizational, and Societal Transformation K.H. Dockett. 9. The Role of Religion and Spirituality in Community Building L.A. Jason, J. Moritsugu. 10. Transcending Self and Other: Mahayana Principles of Integration K.H. Dockett, D. North-Schulte. 11. Environmental Problems and Buddhist Ethics: From the Perspective of the Consciousness-Only Doctrine S. Yamamoto. 12. Buddhist Social Principles D.W. Chappell. Part IV: Future Directions: Global Impact. 13. On the Path to Peace and Wholeness: Conclusion to Psychology and Bubbhism G.R. Dudley-Grant, C.P. Bankart, K.H. Dockett. Author Index. Subject Index. About theEditors.