Abstract

The plague of repression that swept through Latin America in the 1960s and the 1970s left virtually no political system untouched. Even countries such as Chile and Uruguay that had a history of democratic regimes succumbed to military dictatorship. In the two volumes reviewed here, Silvia Dutrénit Bielous, an Uruguayan historian working in Mexico, offers two very different approaches to examine the relationship between the military and political parties under the military regimes in three countries of the Southern cone, as well as the role of those political parties during the subsequent transition to democracy. The volume entitled Diversidad partidaria y dictaduras offers in-depth analyses of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan cases. The second volume with the cryptic title El maremoto militar y el archipiélago partidario focuses exclusively on Uruguay and includes the author’s interviews with various Uruguayan political leaders about the dictatorship from 1973 to 1984.Interviews with politicians are always tricky, but the author tries to keep the self- serving statements of career politicians under control by asking some timely questions. In addition, her choice of political leaders is balanced and includes most of the key players in the transition process. There are no new revelations; however, several of the interviews give us insight into the character and personalities of Uruguayan politicians, such as Senator Jorge Batlle, Hugo Corres, Luis Lacalle, and Julio María Sanguinetti. Batlle, who could be Uruguay’s next President, displays an encyclopedic grasp of the individuals and motives of the people who were involved in the political process during Uruguay’s long nightmare; Hugo Cores continues to believe in his passionate and well-constructed leftist interpretation of events; Luis Lacalle, former President, displays his conservative roots; and Julio María Sanguinetti, shows the grasp of language that has twice made him Uruguay’s President.All those interviewed continue to insist that in the protracted discussions of the Club Naval that ultimately led to the military’s exit, the issue of human rights violations was never placed on the table. In addition, they confirm that triumvirates were formed by the leaders of Uruguay’s main political parties—Blancos, Colorados and the leftist coalition Frente Amplio—to make decisions and attempt to guide party policy during an exceptionally difficult period. In sum, this volume would only be of interest to those who study Uruguayan history and politics and, even then, only marginally.The first volume, on the other hand, with its thoughtful analysis of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan cases is worthy of any scholar’s attention. The restoration of democracy in these three countries has heightened our interest in political parties for two reasons: first, to understand their role during the transition from an authoritarian regime until the consolidation of democracy; second, to recognize the importance of political parties as institutions because even the military tried to either destroy or restructure them. The military’s desperate search for legitimacy—an effort that failed miserably in Argentina and Uruguay, but achieved moderate success in Brazil— prompted the dictatorships to think about, legislate, and ultimately recognize the role of political parties in their respective polities.Cesar Tcach handles the Argentine case in his chapter “Partidos políticos y dictadura militar en Argentina (1976–1983).” For this reader it was the weakest of the three contributions, offering little insight; although the chapter is thorough in its use of the newspapers of the period and provides a useful analysis of the power struggle within the radical party as the military collapsed, the author fails to make full use of the available literature on this topic.Silvia Dutrénit’s chapter on Uruguay, “Del margen al centro del sistema político: Los partidos uruguayos durante la dictadura,” is a solid account of the period of military rule in Uruguay from 1973 until 1984. This reviewer agrees with the author’s main thesis that Uruguayan political culture helped prevent the military from establishing legitimacy. However, while she also concedes that there are some scholars who argue that the transition in Uruguay was controlled by the military in terms of timing and outcome, she seems to ignore a third hypothesis. While the activities of the political parties, especially with regard to the 1980 plebiscite rejecting the military’s constitution, internal party elections of 1982, and the mass demonstration in late 1983 cannot be overlooked, the military’s failure to establish legitimacy stems as much from the failure of the dictatorship’s economic program as it does from Uruguay’s political culture.The sad reality is that civil society in Uruguay was atomized by the military that handed over a country in 1984–85 that was a shell of its former self. The political and social resurgence that ensued is a testament to the historic role of political parties, the democratic political culture, and the quality of political leadership, but it was a restoration that took place after the exhaustion of the military’s project.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.