Distinct indiscernibles and the bundle theory

Abstract

A : Like Locke, you think an object must be something more than its properties. So you posit a mysterious “substratum”, an unreachable “kernel” that bears properties but is not itself a property. This is metaphysics at its most gratuitous and pernicious. All we observe or detect are the properties of things, and a particular substance is nothing more than a bundle of properties. B : So you say. But remember Max Black’s description of a world containing nothing but two intrinsically indiscernible spheres, at some distance from one another (Black, 1952)? You have yet to satisfy me that your bundle theory of substance is compatible with the possibility of such a world. A : I must admit, Black’s world had me worried for a time. But it now seems clear to me that the possibility he describes poses no real threat to the bundle theory. B : How so? The spheres have to be bundles of the very same universals; and they can’t be distinguished by their relations to one another, either. Throwing in relations to different places won’t help, since the places in question are indiscernible, too. If you posit distinct but indiscernible places, doesn’t this amount to the recognition of things that are something more than mere bundles of universals? The only way out is to deny that Black’s world is really possible. But I know you too well to think that you’ll take that route; you’re not one of these “modally-challenged” philosophers, unable to recognize a possibility when they see one. A : Ah, but there is another way out. 1 In order to see it, you must first recall that the universals I’m bundling into substances are not, of course, Platonic entities existing outside of space and time somewhere. They’re “immanent universals”, located right where and when their instances are. B : Oh, you’re bundling tropes , particular instances of universals, which can differ solo numero . That will solve the problem—but it’s cheating, from the point of view of the traditional bundle theory. You’ve