Abstract
AbstractThis paper deals with a case study that provides unique and original insight into social media credibility attacks against the Saudi journalist and activist, Jamal Khashoggi. To get the data, I searched all the state-run tweets sent by Arab trolls (78,274,588 in total), and I used Cedar, Canada’s supercomputer, to extract all the videos and images associated with references to Khashoggi. In addition, I searched Twitter’s full data archive to cross-examine some of the hashtag campaigns that were launched the day Khashoggi disappeared and afterwards. Finally, I used CrowdTangle to understand whether some of these hashtags were also used on Facebook and Instagram. I present here evidence that just a few hours after Khashoggi’s disappearance in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Saudi trolls started a coordinated disinformation campaign against him to frame him as a terrorist, foreign agent for Qatar and Turkey, liar.... etc. The trolls also emphasized that the whole story of his disappearance and killing is a fabrication or a staged play orchestrated by Turkey and Qatar. The campaign also targeted his fiancée, Hatice Cengiz, alleging she was a spy, while later they cast doubt about her claims. Some of these campaigns were launched a few months after Khashoggi’s death. Theoretically, I argue that state-run disinformation campaigns need to incorporate the dimension of intended effect. In this case study, the goal is to tarnish the reputation and credibility of Khashoggi, even after he died, in an attempt to discredit his claims and political cause, influence different audiences especially the Saudi public, and potentially reduce sympathy towards him.
Highlights
After he entered the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul at 1:14pm local time on October 2nd, 2018, Jamal Khashoggi disappeared
Under the auspice of “cyber-defense”, the ruling AK party has “built a team of ‘white hat’ hackers” whose purpose is to “contribute to the increasing efforts of the security agencies to hack dissident users” (Topak, 2019). This demonstrates a clear form of networked authoritarianism because, at the production level, the state is involved in practices of censorship and prosecution of social media users
This study attempts to answer the following research questions: RQ1: What are the strategies followed by a networked authoritarian state like Saudi Arabia in targeting its oppositional human rights activists and journalists? RQ2: What are the major themes used by this networked authoritarian state in targeting Jamal Khashoggi?
Summary
After he entered the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul at 1:14pm local time on October 2nd, 2018, Jamal Khashoggi disappeared. Under the auspice of “cyber-defense”, the ruling AK party has “built a team of ‘white hat’ hackers” whose purpose is to “contribute to the increasing efforts of the security agencies to hack dissident users” (Topak, 2019) This demonstrates a clear form of networked authoritarianism because, at the production level, the state is involved in practices of censorship and prosecution of social media users. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) in the 2016 U.S presidential election is perhaps the clearest indication of the Russian state’s international networked authoritarianism In this case, IRA employees were paid to produce Facebook posts with the intent of creating political polarization and spreading fake news (Al-Rawi & Rahman, 2020; Woolley and Guilbeault, 2017). Networked authoritarianism, by virtue of new technology such as bots and trolls, can occur internationally, with foreign interference in political elections becoming a subject of increasing urgency, demanding global attention
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
