Abstract
ABSTRACT Bagnoli and Watts (2013) show that a firm will always disclose its private information when this information solely affects its rival's product market decisions. This result is robust to different competitive scenarios (Cournot or Bertrand competition), features (product heterogeneity or private information quantity), and levels of commitment (ex ante or ex post). I highlight how this result fits in the accounting disclosure literature, describe the intuition behind the theory, and discuss its implications for future work.
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