Abstract
This paper examines how voluntary financial disclosures made with earnings announcements affect analysts' processing of these announcements and the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. We find that analysts base their forecasts more on private information (and less on common information) after earnings announcements that include a balance sheet disclosure or segment reporting information. We also find that there is a greater improvement in the accuracy of the mean forecast after earnings announcements that include the voluntary disclosure of a balance sheet or segment reporting information.
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