Direct democracy and political extremism

Theoretical debates about direct and representative democracy tend to be based on unrealistic assumptions about how direct democracy – and sometimes how representative democracy – works. This article explores the interaction between direct and representative democracy in Switzerland, where direct democracy is an essential part of everyday politics. We show that the key actors of the representative system – governments, parliaments and parties – play a central role in the direct democratic process too. Political actors adapt to the direct democratic challenge and manage to control the direct democratic process to a great extent. Looking at the possible effects of direct democracy on the representative system, we show that direct democracy does not necessarily weaken parties; direct democracy in combination with the relative strength of the different parties is responsible for the oversized coalition government that exists in Switzerland since 1959 and that policy‐making becomes less predictable for the political elites. However there are arguments that single policies tend to be more in favour of the median voter than in a pure representative system.

Implementing direct democracy via representation

Education and Support for Representative, Direct and Stealth Democracy

The paper attempts to reflect on some aspects of the interplay between direct democracy, representative democracy and minority rights. It particularly focuses on direct democracy in different sub-national legal and political frameworks. It applies a comparative approach in assessing direct-democratic instruments as a mechanism for institutional change and as a governance tool for participatory political decision-making. This given the fact that both direct and representative democracy are constituent parts of the democratic principle. The relationship between direct democracy and representative democracy is thus to be considered as complementary. After a brief theoretical note, the paper introduces the case study of South Tyrol. Against the background of the failed referenda in South Tyrol in 2009, the paper analyses some precedents of differing natures, all of which present some hints that help to highlight the delicate relationship between direct democracy, representative democracy and minority rights, ranging from considerations on multinational federations (Switzerland and Belgium) to general considerations on the nature of direct democracy in classical federations (Austria, Germany). The paper does not intend to favor or disfavor direct democracy, but wants to raise some questions. The paper overall argues that direct democracy and the protection of minority groups are not a priori incompatible, provided that politics is conducive to its use and that certain technical precautions (e.g. legal guarantees) are put into place.

In representative democracy, participation by the people is realized through the election of representatives. Therefore, representative democracy is truly democratic if the elected actually represent the public interest. However, electoral campaigns, especially under audience democracy, manipulate public opinion, resulting in a low representativeness of the government elected. To improve the situation, an alternative election procedure is imagined, which redirects attention from candidates as personalities to their abilities as representatives. Electoral ballots are proposed to include questions about the voter’s position on key issues in candidate manifestos (Introduce nationwide minimum wage? Yes/No; Relax protection against employee dismissals? Yes/No, etc.). The procedure envisages evaluating the candidates by the degree to which their profiles match with that of the electorate as a single body, implementing the idea of public determination. In contrast to voting based on individual choices, the candidates receive no votes. The embedded referendum on a sample of issues serves as a direct democracy (statistical) test of the candidates, thereby introducing to election random ‘democratic’ elements. Our proposal attempts to bridge direct and representative democracies, overcome the oligarchical nature of election, and make election meet democratic objectives better. For illustration, the method is used to redistribute seats in the German Bundestag with a considerable gain in its representativeness.

Education and support for representative, direct and stealth democracy

<p>This thesis is a comparative constitutional study of the origin and role of direct democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand. It reveals that the direct democracy systems in these jurisdictions came into being as a consequence of sustained periods of economic turmoil which coincided with widespread disillusionment with the performance of elected representatives. Constitutional reformers in these jurisdictions embraced direct democracy as a means of improving, not displacing, representative democracy. Their aim was to restore the legitimacy of their constitutional systems. The study also demonstrates that the majoritarian potential of the direct democracy devices in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand is limited. It is limited to the extent that is consistent with the constitutional principles underlying representative democracy in these jurisdictions, particularly those designed to protect minority rights. This reconciles the competing philosophical traditions on which most of the arguments for and against direct democracy are based. Provided minority rights are protected sufficiently, Jeffersonian-inspired advocates of direct democracy should not offend adherents of representative democracy, whether Burkeian or Madisonian in its conception. This thesis concludes that the direct democracy systems in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand are not the same, nor could be, given the unique forces that contributed to the formation and practice of constitutional law in these jurisdictions. They are different primarily because direct and representative democracy coalesced differently in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand due to variations in the constitutional principles underlying representative democracy in these jurisdictions. These principles vary because constitutional law in each jurisdiction is a unique and intricate confluence of law, politics, history, economics, and cultural expectations. This study also fills a void in the literature on direct democracy, primarily by documenting the origin of New Zealand's direct democracy system, analysing its possible role, and comparing it to the origin and role of the systems in Switzerland and California. In doing so, it provides a detailed examination of the origin and role of direct democracy in Switzerland and California, topics that have previously escaped comprehensive treatment.</p>

<p>This thesis is a comparative constitutional study of the origin and role of direct democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand. It reveals that the direct democracy systems in these jurisdictions came into being as a consequence of sustained periods of economic turmoil which coincided with widespread disillusionment with the performance of elected representatives. Constitutional reformers in these jurisdictions embraced direct democracy as a means of improving, not displacing, representative democracy. Their aim was to restore the legitimacy of their constitutional systems. The study also demonstrates that the majoritarian potential of the direct democracy devices in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand is limited. It is limited to the extent that is consistent with the constitutional principles underlying representative democracy in these jurisdictions, particularly those designed to protect minority rights. This reconciles the competing philosophical traditions on which most of the arguments for and against direct democracy are based. Provided minority rights are protected sufficiently, Jeffersonian-inspired advocates of direct democracy should not offend adherents of representative democracy, whether Burkeian or Madisonian in its conception. This thesis concludes that the direct democracy systems in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand are not the same, nor could be, given the unique forces that contributed to the formation and practice of constitutional law in these jurisdictions. They are different primarily because direct and representative democracy coalesced differently in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand due to variations in the constitutional principles underlying representative democracy in these jurisdictions. These principles vary because constitutional law in each jurisdiction is a unique and intricate confluence of law, politics, history, economics, and cultural expectations. This study also fills a void in the literature on direct democracy, primarily by documenting the origin of New Zealand's direct democracy system, analysing its possible role, and comparing it to the origin and role of the systems in Switzerland and California. In doing so, it provides a detailed examination of the origin and role of direct democracy in Switzerland and California, topics that have previously escaped comprehensive treatment.</p>

In this paper, we contrast direct and representative democracy. In a direct democracy, individuals have the opportunity to vote over the alternatives in every choice problem the population faces. In a representative democracy, the population commits to a candidate ex ante who will then make choices on its behalf. While direct democracy is normatively appealing, representative democracy is the far more common institution because of its practical advantages. The key question, then, is whether representative democracy succeeds in implementing the choices that the group would make under direct democracy. We find that, in general, it does not. We model a population as a distribution of voters with strict preferences over a finite set of alternatives and a candidate as a strict ordering of those alternatives that serves as a binding, contingent plan of action. We focus on the case where the direct democracy choices of the population are consistent with a strict ordering of the alternatives. We show that even in this case, where the normative recommendation of direct democracy is clearest, representative democracy may not elect the candidate with this ordering.

Race-based districting: does it help or hinder legislative representation?

A growing literature has revealed a notable electoral advantage for congressional and gubernatorial candidates with deep local roots in their home districts or states. However, there is a dearth of research on the presence and impact of local roots in state legislative races. In this paper, we close that gap by demonstrating the consistent and significant electoral impacts that state legislators’ local roots have on their reelection efforts. We use data capturing a representative cross-section of state legislative incumbents (N = ~5,000) and calculate a novel index measuring the depth of their local roots modeled after Hunt’s (2022, Home Field Advantage: Roots, Reelection, and Representation in the Modern Congress) measure for the US House. We present evidence that state legislators with deep local roots in the districts they represent run unopposed in their general elections nearly twice as often as incumbents with no such roots. Of those who do attract challengers in their reelection efforts, deeply rooted incumbents enjoy an average of three extra percentage points of vote share. Our results have important implications for candidate emergence in state legislative elections during a time when so many are uncontested. They also demonstrate the limits of electoral nationalization for understanding state politics.

Up until very recent times in Western political philosophy, theory, science, and discourse, the words predominantly used to describe the democratic pole of Aristotle’s political continuum were direct democracy, indirect democracy, social democracy, and, in Aristotelian terms, republic or representative democracy. The latter half of the 20th century, however, saw dramatic changes in democracy around the world in its spread, variation in form, and in the use of the word. In fact, there have been a number of books in recent years that have discussed a wide array of models or degrees of democracy (Held, 1996; Sartori, 1987). Phrases such as participatory democracy, managed democracy, strong democracy (Barber, 1984), and semidirect democracy (Toffler & Toffler, 1994) are just some of the clusters of terms now used to define particular kinds of democracy that exist or are theorized to be better forms of it. Also, as the 20th century drew toward a close, there was a virtual consensus among Western political scientists that a potentially dangerous schism has grown between the citizens of both representative and social democracies and their governing elites. Indicators of such are public-opinion polls that manifest an increasing discontent with the political class and politicians (usually termed alienation) and a general decline in voter turnout (albeit with occasional upticks). Most of this dissatisfaction with, or alienation from, various forms of representative democracy is considered to be due to the growth of the influence of those who lavish large sums of money on the public’s representatives in these political systems. Another widely perceived cause of this gap between the people and their governments is the inertia of bloated, entrenched bureaucracies and their failure to acknowledge the wishes of the general public in policy implementation. Both of these phenomena seem to be present in all modern, industrialized, representative democracies, and they even seem to become manifest in the youngest, least industrialized countries as well. For example, in the fall of 2004, Cerkez-Robinson (2004) reported that the turnout in the Bosnian national election had fallen precipitously because most Bosnians are tired of repeated fruitless elections. As this complex problem in modern representative democracies seems to have become systemic, a potential technological solution has also come upon the scene. This involves the previously unimaginable proliferation of information and communications technologies of the late 20th century and early 21st century. This new and rich mixture of rapid, electronic, interactive communications has been seen by many political thinkers and actors as an excellent medium by which to close the gap between the people of representative democracies and their elected and administrative officials. This has led to a plethora of new adjectives and letters to prefix the word democracy, each referring to some theoretical or experimentally tested improvement in the present and future forms and practices of both direct and/or indirect democracy using ICTs. Thus, in the past decade or so of reinventing government (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), we have come to learn of such new ideas and ideals of democracy as electronic democracy (or e-democracy), digital democracy, cyberdemocracy, e-government, and teledemocracy (Becker, 1981; this listing is far from exhaustive.) Taken together, they demonstrate that the future of democracy around the world is in flux, that there is a broadly perceived need by those in and outside government for some changes that will ultimately benefit the general public in various aspects of governance, and that these new technologies are seen by many as part of the solution. As alluded to above, there are numerous experiments and projects along these lines that have been completed, many are in progress, and there are multitudes to come that probably will be a part of any such transformation in the future of democracy on this planet.

Up until very recent times in Western political philosophy, theory, science, and discourse, the words predominantly used to describe the democratic pole of Aristotle’s political continuum were direct democracy, indirect democracy, social democracy, and, in Aristotelian terms, republic or representative democracy. The latter half of the 20th century, however, saw dramatic changes in democracy around the world in its spread, variation in form, and in the use of the word. In fact, there have been a number of books in recent years that have discussed a wide array of models or degrees of democracy (Held, 1996; Sartori, 1987). Phrases such as participatory democracy, managed democracy, strong democracy (Barber, 1984), and semidirect democracy (Toffler & Toffler, 1994) are just some of the clusters of terms now used to define particular kinds of democracy that exist or are theorized to be better forms of it. Also, as the 20th century drew toward a close, there was a virtual consensus among Western political scientists that a potentially dangerous schism has grown between the citizens of both representative and social democracies and their governing elites. Indicators of such are public-opinion polls that manifest an increasing discontent with the political class and politicians (usually termed alienation) and a general decline in voter turnout (albeit with occasional upticks). Most of this dissatisfaction with, or alienation from, various forms of representative democracy is considered to be due to the growth of the influence of those who lavish large sums of money on the public’s representatives in these political systems. Another widely perceived cause of this gap between the people and their governments is the inertia of bloated, entrenched bureaucracies and their failure to acknowledge the wishes of the general public in policy implementation. Both of these phenomena seem to be present in all modern, industrialized, representative democracies, and they even seem to become manifest in the youngest, least industrialized countries as well. For example, in the fall of 2004, Cerkez-Robinson (2004) reported that the turnout in the Bosnian national election had fallen precipitously because most Bosnians are tired of repeated fruitless elections. As this complex problem in modern representative democracies seems to have become systemic, a potential technological solution has also come upon the scene. This involves the previously unimaginable proliferation of information and communications technologies of the late 20th century and early 21st century. This new and rich mixture of rapid, electronic, interactive communications has been seen by many political thinkers and actors as an excellent medium by which to close the gap between the people of representative democracies and their elected and administrative officials. This has led to a plethora of new adjectives and letters to prefix the word democracy, each referring to some theoretical or experimentally tested improvement in the present and future forms and practices of both direct and/or indirect democracy using ICTs. Thus, in the past decade or so of reinventing government (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), we have come to learn of such new ideas and ideals of democracy as electronic democracy (or e-democracy), digital democracy, cyberdemocracy, e-government, and teledemocracy (Becker, 1981; this listing is far from exhaustive.) Taken together, they demonstrate that the future of democracy around the world is in flux, that there is a broadly perceived need by those in and outside government for some changes that will ultimately benefit the general public in various aspects of governance, and that these new technologies are seen by many as part of the solution. As alluded to above, there are numerous experiments and projects along these lines that have been completed, many are in progress, and there are multitudes to come that probably will be a part of any such transformation in the future of democracy on this planet.

Citizen initiatives and referendums play an important role in modern democracies, from treaty ratifications in the European Union to gay marriage in California, to the control of foreign workers in Switzerland. Departing from the classic opposition between direct and representative democracy, we study the equilibrium effects of direct democracy institutions on the incentives and selection of elected officials. We find that facilitating direct democracy induces a negative spiral on politicians’ role and contribution to society, which may dominate any direct benefit. The theory offers predictions on reelection probabilities and politicians’ performance consistent with recent evidence from the US states.

In Direct Democracy or Representative Government? John Haskell develops a devastating critique of direct democracy by exposing the central flaw in populist thinking. Contrary to the beliefs of populist advocates of direct democracy, the popular will cannot be interpreted from the results of the plebiscite. John Haskell presents a defense of representative institutions that brings to bear, in an understandable way, the findings of public choice scholars. Haskell covers the clash of ideas between populists and constitutionalists throughout American history. He follows the development of direct democracy during the twentieth century, especially the dramatically increased use of initiatives and referenda in the last decade. As Americans become increasingly frustrated with the workings of the institutions of government at the state and national levels, and as populist ideas gain greater currency, new forms of direct and participatory democracy making use of the latest computer technology appeal to more people. Haskell speculates as to the likely future direction of direct democracy in the U.S. He describes in clear language the fundamental problem with the premise of populist thinking and explains why direct democracy presents a threat to minority rights and only promises irresponsible and unaccountable governance.