Diplomatic Crises between Türkiye and Israel and The Attitude of Global Actors After The Palestine-Israel Crisis

This article will examine the driving dynamics behind the increasing relations between Turkey and Somalia. Turkey has been an important actor on the African politics since the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002. For instance, while Turkey only had 12 embassies across the continent until 2005, it currently has 35. Turkey is today among the countries in the world having one of the most diplomatic missions on the African continent. Turkey’s economic relations with the continent have also changed significantly. Whereas Turkey’s total trade with Africa was 2 billion dollars in 2005, it is presently about 22 billion dollars. Importantly, Turkey is aiming to increase her total trade with Africa up to 50 billion dollars until 2020. Furthermore, Turkish NGOs are actively involved in many humanitarian projects in the different African countries. Turkey has particularly paid a great deal of attention to increasing political, economic and social relations with Somalia during the AK Party government. This article argues that the AK Party has been establishing a new foreign policy identity and transforming the parameters of the traditional Turkish foreign policy through the social interactions with Somalia.

Turkey has been among one of the most active players in African politics over the last decade. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) governments have changed the traditional foreign policy approach towards Africa. Turkey has sought to develop its strategic relations with non-Western regional and sub-regional organisations during the AK Party governments. In this regard, Turkish Embassy in Addis Ababa was accredited to the African Union (AU) and other sub-regional African organisations since 2005. In this research, the main question is ‘why has Turkey deepened and widened its strategic relations with African regional and sub-regional organizations?’ This research will scrutinise Turkey’s engagement with the African organisations by employing a theoretical approach and a holistic approach. According to the findings of this research, Turkey has changed its traditional approach towards African politics and played a dynamic role in establishing a new global order despite persistent challenges in the world.

Turkey has been actively engaged in African politics since the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government announced the year 2005 as the Year of Africa. The strategic importance of Africa for Turkey has significantly increased during the AK Party governments. The number of Turkey–Africa studies done both in Turkey and in the West has increased since 2010, but most of these studies dealt with Turkish foreign policy toward Africa from a narrow perspective. This study highlights that there are complicated, hidden, and interrelated factors and dynamics driving Turkey–Africa relations. In particular, the systematic factors are the most overlooked dynamics in the studies carried out. This study endeavors to explore these complicated dynamics in a systematic and holistic approach by using the three levels of analysis. The main research question in the study is, “What are the individual, state, and systemic factors shaping Turkish foreign policy toward Africa?” In this research, primary and secondary sources and the “process-tracing research method” were used.

In this article, we discuss the new cultural policy of the present AK Party government towards the State Theatre in Turkey. AK Party government has made clear its intention to terminate the status of state performing arts institutions as state-funded operations. We show that the new policy involves a re-thinking of the role of the state in cultural provision, and, furthermore, a re-thinking in the light of AK Party’s conservative political principles. In looking at the example of theatre, we are concerned with the actual complexity of what the AK Party means and does with respect to this policy commitment which, in practice, does certainly not end to the state’s direct involvement in culture. By closing the State Theatre and State Opera and Ballet directorates, the government intends to demobilize, or de-centre, the westernizing and secular cultural orientation that has characterized Turkey’s official cultural identity until now.

ABSTRACTThis article aims to demonstrate the importance of the relationship between the Naqshbandi Ismailağa community and the AK Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, “Justice and Development Party”) government. As one of the most widespread Sufi brotherhoods in the world, the strength of the Naqshbandiyya lies in its characteristic combination of strict adherence to religious law and active involvement in social and political affairs. The İsmailağa community, one of five main Naqshbandi communities in Turkey, is highly conservative and traditional, historically dominated by elders who have remained aloof from any power struggles within the Turkish government. While the AK Party has developed ties with religious orders in recent years, including the Ismailağa, some voices within the Ismailağa community have become critical of this relationship, leading to a rift within the community. In addition, since 2013, and especially after the attempted coup of July 2016, the AK Party has lost the support of its old ally, the Fethullah Gülen movement. This article examines the relationship between the AK Party and religious movements in Turkey as reflected via its relationship with Ismailağa, and assesses whether the Fethullah Gülen movement can be replaced as a party ally by the Ismailağa community.

1 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXXVI, No.4, Summer 2013 Turkey’s Changing Stance and Paradoxes over the Libyan and Syrian Crises Muhsin Baran* Introduction The current uprising in the Middle East, the Arab Spring, has been sui generis with respect to the exclusive support from the masses and large protests against the regimes in the related countries. The primary reason for such spectacular public backing lies in the demands for change by the peoples of the region. Since these demands were closely related with democracy, the western world, particularly the United States, was expected to devote close attention to this issue and contribute to toppling these regimes. The support from the western world was well below these expectations as the United States and its allies only launched a military intervention in Libya. Other states, namely Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt and Syria, were assisted in different forms rather than direct military intervention. Turkey’s attitudes towards a foreign intervention were a bit blurred in the beginning. No sooner was a military operation launched by the western world on Libya, than Turkey insistently stressed the danger of third parties’ military interventions in the region and urged that, first and foremost, the internal dynamics should be backed rather than going ahead with a direct military intervention. However, it was not long before when Turkey shifted from its past opposition to a military intervention in Libya and backed the operation indirectly. This new stance was based on the grounds of the rising number of casualties. Turkey’s stance during the Syrian crisis was similar to that of Libya. As the civil war became more brutal and the death toll seemed likely to reach *Muhsin Baran is a PhD candidate at Uludağ University, Department of International Relations. His research interests are the Middle East, Kurdish issue, discourse analysis and Critical Security theories. He has been writing his dissertation on relations between Turkey and Kurdistan Regional Government. 2 an alarming level, Turkey called for a military intervention led by international organizations to stop the bloodshed. The reluctance of the western world due to the Islamist factions in the Syrian opposition and the vetoes of Russia and China in the United Nations Security Council blocked a military intervention in this country. Turkey’s new stance started to be severely criticized by both the secular main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP) as this new policy was different from traditional Turkish foreign policy. The zero problems with neighbor’s policy developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, was criticized and recast sarcastically by the Turkish opposition as the zero neighbors policy. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) was blamed for turning once friendly regional states into new foes and deviating from traditional Turkish foreign policy. Apart from the internal opposition, there were serious criticism from regional states such as Iran, Iraq and Russia, for they held Turkey partly responsible for the instability and civil war in Syria. Turkey’s new stance demanding a foreign intervention in Syria was paradoxical with respect to the Islamist identity of the ruling AK Party and Turkey’s treatment of Kurdish opposition in Syria. Calling for non-Islamic third party interventions in a Muslim state contradicted the Islamic approach, which has always urged the unity of the Muslim world. The exclusion of the Kurdish opposition whilst patronizing and arming all other factions including those believed to have connections with al-Qaida was another paradox. This study provides an analytical discussion on Turkey’s paradoxes over the Libyan and particularly Syrian crises. It starts with a brief description of Turkey’s traditional foreign policy during the Cold War era. Then the new policy shaped by Davutoğlu, a renowned professor of International Relations, is explained. Following this, Turkey’s new stance and the paradoxes affiliated with this shift during the Libyan and Syrian crises is discussed in the context of the Arab Spring. The study ends with a conclusion that the foreign policy of a state, as in the case of Turkey, is primarily dependent on national interests. (I) A New Paradigm in Turkish Foreign Policy...

This paper aims to perform a comparative analysis of Turkey and Indonesia's foreign policy on Palestine Issue. It applies neoclassical realism as one of foreign policy theory. It discusses changing dynamics and influential factors shaping Turkey and Indonesia’s Palestine policies at the unit and systemic level of analysis. It summarises that the factors of leaders' perceptions upon international systemic changing trends and pressures, state power have become influential factors. During AK Party's eras in Turkey, its domestic politics has undergone domestic transformations namely public opinion and civil society's roles that influence to the foreign policy, the emergence of civilian leader as a new actor of foreign policy, leader factors, an increase of Islamist factor, the Israel-Palestine conflict perceived as the heart of regional instability resulted in Proactive Foreign policy including in the settlement of Palestine issue. Meanwhile, after reform eras in Indonesia, anti-colonialism spirit of 1945 Constitution has been continued as the historical background of Indonesia's engagement. Besides, an increase of Islamist factor in domestic politics namely Islamist-oriented aspirations in domestic public opinion, muslim groups as a moral force, an increasingly role of Islamist parties, and new Indonesia's international orientation and identity at SBY's tenure have affected a continuity of non-recognition policy towards Israel and supporting Palestine in accordance with two-state solution. As well as Indonesia's democratised foreign policy has been conducted through various diplomatic efforts.

This study examined the relationship between the Turkish Islamic movements and the present government of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AK Party). Since the AK Party came to power in 2002 it implemented unparalleled political reforms and pursued to improve Turkey’s relations with the EU. Opponents argued that because of the dominance of the secular military in Turkish politics, the AK Party is forced to secretly advance its Islamic agenda using the language and symbolism of democracy and human rights. This study argued that the ideas of the AK Party show similarities with the “Ottomanist” thought of the late Ottoman era. With special reference to the preservation of the Ottoman State, Ottomanism in an eclectic way was able to incorporate Islamic principles like freedom, justice and consultation into the political arena which was increasingly dominated by the secular European concepts. Literature on Islam and politics in Turkey, however, disregards the Ottoman roots of freedom and pluralism and tends to reduce the relationship between religion and state into exclusively confrontational struggles. This conceptualization of the political process relies on particular non-Turkish Muslim experiences which do not necessarily represent Islam’s venture in Turkey. Contrary to the prevailing scholarship, Islamic movements in Turkey, namely, Naqshbandi, National View and Nur, which are discussed in detail in this study, are not monolithic. They all uphold the same creedal tenets of Islam but they have sharp differences in terms of how they conceptualize the role of religious agency in politics. I argue that this diversity is a result of three distinct methodologies of Islamic religious life which are the Tariqah (Tarikat), Shariah (Şeriat), and Haqiqah (Hakikat). The differences between these three approaches represent a typological hierarchy in the formation of the Muslim/believer as an agent of Islamic identity. Through these different if not conflicting modes, the AK Party reconnected itself with Turkey’s Ottoman heritage in a post-Ottoman, secular setting and was able to develop an eclectic political identity of Neo-Ottomanism that is evident in the flexibility if not inconsistency of its domestic and foreign policy preferences.

This article discusses the emergence of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; the AK Party) as a center-right political movement with Islamic and national roots. It examines the AK Party’s political ideology of “conservative democracy” within the context of the new dynamics of twenty-first-century Turkish politics. It evaluates the AK Party’s performance in government since taking office in 2002. Finally, the AK Party’s foreign policy and its struggle to overcome oppositional identities are considered.

Since 2003, following the election of the Justice and Development Party (JDP), Turkish Foreign Policy placed a clear emphasis on the Middle East, establishing and improving relations with the region. This, by some, was interpreted as a major shift away from the traditional Western oriented stance, while others argued that this was just an effort to develop a multi-dimensional foreign policy. The paper argues that the rising interest in the Middle East is not something we observe for the first time. There are two factors that determine Turkey’s interest in the region: government’s ideological position and the international context. Due to the developments in these two areas Turkey experienced periods of rising interest before. This being said, there are certain characteristics that distinguished JDP policies from previous experiences like an effort to act independently and a special emphasis on the Palestinian issue. The paper also argues that despite what we have been observing so far, Turkish foreign policy will continue to act alongside of the West in the region.

Authoritarian leaders try to create an environment conducive to the maintenance of their own ontological security. In this study, we advance a theory of tripartite securitization marked by critical junctures that shed light on how authoritarian actors establish a sense of security for themselves when they govern. Using elite interviews with actors from Turkey’s different political parties, we argue that the three major steps towards authoritarianism in Turkey involved restructuring core institutions and ‘cleansing’ them of the perceived hostile elements; doubling down on securitising existing internal and external ‘enemy’ identities; and securitising rivals that cannot be co-opted in the political process. This tripartite securitization starts with what we call ‘desecuritisation of the self’ in cases where the party in power itself was once the target of securitising acts. We trace how tripartite securitisation has unfolded in Turkey under the AK Party government, and we identify three critical junctures associated with this securitisation process: The Ergenekon and Balyoz Trials, the KCK Trials and the 2016 Failed Coup Attempt.

The study aimed at identifying the determinants, premises and the milestones of the Turkish Foreign Policy under the rule of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) toward the Palestinian issue. The study sought to unveil the basics and foundations of this new Turkish foreign policy, which the AKP depends on. The researcher investigated historically the Turkish foreign policy toward the Palestinian issue in the last era. It has established a kind of relative compatibility with the neighborhood and the world on many foreign policy issues, which all are characteristics that granted Turkey the possibility of establishing and implementing active and influential policies.The Palestinian issue with all its intricate and barbed nature is the best entrance of AKP Turkey to take a regional and international place. The Palestinian issue is considered the entrance of AKP Turkey to the “Islamic World.” At the end of the study, the researcher recommended that the Palestinian politicians benefit from the Turkish foreign policy under the rule of the AKP. It is through this policy that Turkey occupies a distinctive regional role through mediating between the disputing parties and exploits this role and its acceptance by the international community in supporting the Palestinian issue.

Iran has been a home for prominent civilizations since early ages thanks to its geographical position, at the intersection point of Europe and Asia. Iran also is a very important market for Turkey. Its population is growing adn several ethnical groups takes place in the country. Its economy is growing despite pressure from international society; these restrictions are lifted in the near future. Relations between Iran and Turkey are important for Middle East politics; Ankara and Tehran's lack of cooperation before the issues in the Middle East led the region to further tribulations, resulted in a decrease in their activities not only in the Middle East but also on a global scale. The relations became closer during AK Party governments in Turkey.

When Do Religious Parties Moderate?Religious Party Moderation in Indonesia, Turkey, and India Allison Berland (bio) The previous articles examined cases of the rise, decline, and absence of religious parties across the globe. A critical question about the future of religious parties is the following: under what conditions do these parties become more moderate? Studies of the evolution of Christian Democratic Parties in Europe have argued that the inclusion of religious parties into democratic electoral politics creates the conditions (i.e. institutional constraints) that foster moderation.1 Samuel Huntington captured a version of this idea with the term "democratic bargain," implying a trade-off between democratic participation and political moderation.2 Subsequent research—particularly with respect to the Islamic Parties in the Middle East—has tested whether the inclusion of religious parties into democratic electoral politics, often referred to as the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, is sufficient to achieve moderation. In addition, other factors, such as a religious party's internal dynamics, play an important role in moderation.3 More recently, this line of research has examined the role of religious party moderation in an Asian context, such as India and Indonesia.4 This article compares the trajectory of religious party moderation for three parties: the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, or PKS) in Indonesia, the Justice and Development Party (AK Parti or AKP) in Turkey, and the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) in India. In exploring different patterns of religious party moderation, this study finds that inclusion in democratic electoral politics is not necessarily sufficient to create the conditions for persistent moderation, corroborating studies indicating that other factors play a critical role in moderation. These cases also suggest that the moderation of religious parties is both non-linear and a highly context specific process. The article is organized into three sections: The first section defines key terms used in this study and introduces readers to the literature on religious [End Page S-131] party moderation. The second section examines the trajectory of three religious parties, presenting different patterns of party moderation. First, the PKS in Indonesia illustrates a case of a religious party that demonstrated an increasing level of moderation over time. The second case, the AKP in Turkey, offers an example of a religious party that initially came to power espousing a moderate platform, but subsequently shown a decreasing level of moderation. The BJP in India presents a third pattern of moderation, which demonstrates oscillating degrees of moderation over time. The final section presents a discussion of the findings. For this study, I use the term religious party to refer to parties that use, or have used, religious symbols, rituals, or appeals to mobilize electoral support.5 The two Islamic parties studied here, the PKS and AKP, fall into this category. The BJP has at times been identified as an ethnic party, and other times as a religious party.6 Since the BJP has used religious-cultural appeals to mobilize electoral support in the past (e.g., a mobilization campaign to build a Hindu temple), the BJP for this study is considered as a religious party. Second, I used the term moderation to refer to the willingness of a religious party to (1) accept the competitive institutional framework of democratic electoral politics, (2) decrease the political salience of a party's religious goals, and (3) embrace democratic norms and values, such as tolerance of other perspectives, freedom of expression, and the protection of human rights.7 The following analysis of religious party moderation will explore these dimensions of moderation. Erik Jones' article discusses the recent decline in electoral support of Christian Democratic parties after a long period of hegemonic influence in three European countries. Long before their recent decline in electoral popularity, Christian Democratic parties was moderate in all aspects of the term described above: they operate within the competitive institutional framework of democratic electoral politics, reduced the political emphasis of religious goals, and embraced democratic norms and values. Yet, the moderate behavior of Christian Democratic Parties has not always been the case. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Catholic movements at the time opposed liberal democracy. For example, the Belgian Catholic movement of the 1870s...

Reviewed by: Turkey’s State Crisis: Institutions, Reform, and Conflict by Bülent Aras Michael B. Bishku Turkey’s State Crisis: Institutions, Reform, and Conflict. By Bülent Aras. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2022. ISBN: 9780815637349. 146. In the United States, many people are tired of the polarization and divisiveness in politics that has become the norm in recent years. Yet, despite four years’ experience (2017–2021) with a president possessing autocratic tendencies, and continued partisanship in Congress, even over supposedly non-partisan issues, the strength of American institutions has generally prevented the worst results, even though there is still need for reform as is the case with every country in the world. Turkey, as Bülent Aras expounds upon, is in dire need of political reform as its institutions are ill-suited to efficiently handle the country’s pressing problems, while facilitating the increasingly autocratic behavior of its president (and former prime minister) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He is the leader of the Islamist Justice and Development (AK) Party, which, in the last few years, has been in an electoral alliance with the Nationalist Action Party, and has had dissension by leading figures within its ranks leading to defections. At the same time, the opposition has been divided. Many who have vigorously opposed Erdoğan’s policies or have written unfavorable reports about the activities of his administration, especially since the failed coup of July 2016, have been labeled unpatriotic at best and a threat to the security of the state at worst, facing loss of jobs and/or prison, or having to seek exile. That is to say that the state has employed either co-optation or coercion, rather than accommodation in the domestic arena, while foreign policy has become a battleground for domestic schisms and an area where there is a lack of long-term planning, leading to inconsistent short-term fixes or blunders. After identifying the problems with the state and institutions, including in internal conflict resolution and in addressing foreign policy and security issues, Aras offers recommendations for reform. He begins the initial chapter by stating that “Turkey has faced recurrent political crises since early Turkish modernization,” (p. 6) which one assumes means since the reign of Ottoman Sultan Selim III, but then proceeds to almost focus on [End Page 97] the rule of Erdoğan exclusively and the AK Party, especially during the last decade. These crises have involved the “conflict between the center and periphery,” manifesting itself as a “never-ending power game between the military-judiciary bureaucracy and the political elite.” (p. 8) As for the time period since the Second World War, Aras asserts that the “quality of Turkish democracy has been dubious at best.” (pp. 6–7) The AK Party promised further democracy and liberalization, but especially since the adoption of the presidential system following the failed coup of 2016, instead has brought “authoritarianism, centralization of state power, and the rebuke of no majoritarian interests.” (p. 7) According to Aras, the new system minimizes “checks and balances” as the office of the president has “overwhelming control over” the three branches of government and turned parliament into a “virtual nonplayer.” Aras contrasts this time with the AK Party’s early years in power when Turkey began membership talks with the European Union, giving the National Security Council (MGK), which had been dominated by the military, more influence from civilians, and allowing for more open debate on the Kurdish, Cypriot, and Armenian issues. Thus, the AK Party, in Aras’ words, “seemed to have normalized the perennial question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy.” (p. 9) While this was certainly true among segments of Turkish society and the impression of Western leaders, at least in public, there were secularists and nationalists who were still quite distrustful of the AK Party’s intentions, but this political opposition was fragmented. Meanwhile, the AK Party was assisted by the Gülen movement as both feared the power of the military and judiciary, the former of which they proceeded to weaken through trials and the latter through a referendum. This alliance began breaking down first with differences over the Mavi Marmara incident in May...