Dilithium/2 = Lithium? Post-quantum signatures for undergraduate classes

Quantum Computing (QC) is hailed as the future of computers. After Google’s claim of achieving Quantum Supremacy in 2019, several groups challenged the claim. Some QC experts attribute catastrophic risks that unrestrained QC may cause in the future by collapsing the current cryptographic cybersecurity infrastructure. These predictions are relevant only if QC becomes commercially viable and sustainable in the future. No technology can be a one-way ticket to catastrophe, and neither can the definition of superiority of that technology be. If there are catastrophic risks, large-scale QC can never enter the public domain as a minimum viable product (MVP) unless there are safeguards in place. Those safeguards should obviously become an integral part of the definition of its superiority over the legacy systems. NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology) is pursuing the standardization of Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) as that safeguard. However, with all the 82 candidate PQCs failing and companies already offering QC as a service, there’s an urgent need for an alternate strategy to mitigate the impending Q-Day threat and render QC sustainable. Our research proposes a novel encryption-agnostic cybersecurity approach to safeguard QC. It articulates a comprehensive definition of an MVP that can potentially set a sustainable gold standard for defining commercially viable quantum advantage over classical computing.

Roadmap of post-quantum cryptography standardization: Side-channel attacks and countermeasures

In recent years, public-key cryptography and digital signature have become fundamental components of digital infrastructures. Such a scenario has to face a new and increasing threat, represented by quantum computers. It is well known that quantum computers in the next years will be able to run algorithms capable of breaking the security of currently widespread cryptographic schemes used for public-key encryption and digital signatures. Post-quantum cryptography aims to defining and executing algorithms on classical computer architectures, capable to withstand attacks from quantum computers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology is currently running a selection process to define one or more quantum-resistant public-key algorithms and lattice-based cryptographic constructions are considered one of the leading candidates. However, such algorithms require non-negligible computational resources to be executed. One viable solution is to accelerate them totally or partially in hardware, to alleviate the workload of the main processing unit. In this paper, we investigate a solution trading-off performances and complexity to execute the lattice-based algorithms CRYSTALS-Kyber and -Dilithium: we introduce a dedicated Post- Quantum Arithmetic Logic Unit, embedded directly in the pipeline of a RISC-V processor. This results in an almost negligible area overhead with a large impact on the algorithm speed-up and a consistent reduction in the energy required per single operation.

Large quantum computers have the potential to break many cryptographic systems, e.g., Rivest–Shamir–Adleman, Diffie–Hellman key exchange, and the elliptical curve cryptosystem. The Department of Defense (DoD) is aware of this threat, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology is preparing a set of approved encryption and signature schemes that are not susceptible to these attacks by quantum computers, the so-called Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The task of substituting older encryption and signature schemes raises a number of questions, to which there are not yet clear answers. In this research, we investigate the transition to PQC on existing networks, explain the approved PQC schemes, describe the likely path to an adaptation of PQC, and offer forward guidance on challenges and threats that may be encountered in the process of transition to PQC. This paper discusses the impacts of the new PQC schemes on network performance and speculates on possible side-channel attacks on the new encryption scheme. This paper offers hardware/software solutions based on the Split-protocol.

The rapid progress in quantum computing has initiated a new round of cryptographic innovation, that is, developing postquantum cryptography (PQC) to resist attacks from well-established quantum computers. In this brief, we propose a novel compact and optimized polynomial multiplier accelerator (COPMA) for high-performance implementation of learning-with-rounding (LWR)-based PQC. As not many LWR-based PQC schemes are available in the literature, we have just used Saber, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) third-round PQC standardization finalist, as a typical case study example. First of all, we have formulated the polynomial multiplication, the major component of Saber, into a novel “subpolynomial”-based processing format for compact computation (yet has the potential for fast operation). Then, we have designed the proposed algorithm into an area-efficient polynomial multiplication hardware accelerator with high-frequency operational capability. Finally, we have verified the efficiency of the developed COPMA and have deployed it to build a cryptoprocessor. The implementation and analysis demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed COPMA. The proposed strategy is highly efficient and can be extended to build other PQC hardware accelerators.

In recent years, there has been steady progress in the creation of quantum computers. If large-scale quantum computers are implemented, they will threaten the security of many widely used public-key cryptosystems. Key-establishment schemes and digital signatures based on factorization, discrete logarithms, and elliptic curve cryptography will be most affected. Symmetric cryptographic primitives such as block ciphers and hash functions will be broken only slightly. As a result, there has been an intensification of research on finding public-key cryptosystems that would be secure against cryptanalysts with both quantum and classical computers. This area is often called post-quantum cryptography (PQC), or sometimes quantum-resistant cryptography. The goal is to design schemes that can be deployed in existing communication networks and protocols without significant changes. The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of selecting one or more public-key cryptographic algorithms through an open competition. New public-key cryptography standards will define one or more additional digital signatures, public-key encryption, and key-establishment algorithms. It is assumed that these algorithms will be able to protect confidential information well in the near future, including after the advent of quantum computers. After three rounds of evaluation and analysis, NIST has selected the first algorithms that will be standardized as a result of the PQC standardization process. The purpose of this article is to review and analyze the state of NIST's post-quantum cryptography standardization evaluation and selection process. The article summarizes each of the 15 candidate algorithms from the third round and identifies the algorithms selected for standardization, as well as those that will continue to be evaluated in the fourth round of analysis. Although the third round is coming to an end and NIST will begin developing the first PQC standards, standardization efforts in this area will continue for some time. This should not be interpreted as meaning that users should wait to adopt post-quantum algorithms. NIST looks forward to the rapid implementation of these first standardized algorithms and will issue future guidance on the transition. The transition will undoubtedly have many complexities, and there will be challenges for some use cases such as IoT devices or certificate transparency.

Journal of Polymer Science Part B: Polymer PhysicsVolume 41, Issue 14 p. 1697-1700 Letter Suppression of phase-separation pattern formation in blend films with block copolymer compatibilizer L. Sung, L. Sung Building Materials, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Search for more papers by this authorJ. F. Douglas, Corresponding Author J. F. Douglas Jack.Douglas@nist.gov Polymers Divisions, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Building Materials, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Search for more papers by this authorC. C. Han, C. C. Han Polymers Divisions, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Search for more papers by this authorA. Karim, Corresponding Author A. Karim alamgir.karim@nist.gov Building Materials, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Building Materials, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Search for more papers by this author L. Sung, L. Sung Building Materials, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Search for more papers by this authorJ. F. Douglas, Corresponding Author J. F. Douglas Jack.Douglas@nist.gov Polymers Divisions, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Building Materials, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Search for more papers by this authorC. C. Han, C. C. Han Polymers Divisions, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Search for more papers by this authorA. Karim, Corresponding Author A. Karim alamgir.karim@nist.gov Building Materials, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Building Materials, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899Search for more papers by this author First published: 11 June 2003 https://doi.org/10.1002/polb.10519Citations: 6Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume41, Issue1415 July 2003Pages 1697-1700 RelatedInformation

This research aims to establish a secure system for key exchange by using post-quantum cryptography (PQC) schemes in the classic channel of quantum key distribution (QKD). Modern cryptography faces significant threats from quantum computers, which can solve classical problems rapidly. PQC schemes address critical security challenges in QKD, particularly in authentication and encryption, to ensure the reliable communication across quantum and classical channels. The other objective of this study is to balance security and communication speed among various PQC algorithms in different security levels, specifically CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and Falcon, which are finalists in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization project. The quantum channel of QKD is simulated with Qiskit, which is a comprehensive and well-supported tool in the field of quantum computing. By providing a detailed analysis of the performance of these three algorithms with Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA), the results will guide companies and organizations in selecting an optimal combination for their QKD systems to achieve a reliable balance between efficiency and security. Our findings demonstrate that the implemented PQC schemes effectively address security challenges posed by quantum computers, while keeping the the performance similar to RSA.

Public-key cryptography is indispensable in maintaining the security and integrity of digital data. The most widely used current public-key cryptography is based on the integer factorization problem and the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem, which are vulnerable against an adversary with large-scale quantum computers. Fortunately, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) can provide security against both classical and quantum adversaries. Due to rapid advancement in quantum computer development, the transition from classical public-key cryptography to PQC has become imperative. A watershed moment in this transition is the recent publication of a set of PQC schemes by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Although it is a significant step, the research and development in PQC is quite immature compared to several decades-old classical public-key cryptographic schemes. Therefore, several open problems, such as physical attack analysis and their countermeasures, application-specific modifications, lightweight implementations for resource-constrained devices, integration into different secure protocols, etc., need to be addressed before the widespread deployment of PQC in real-world applications. This dissertation aims to address some of these problems in order to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of PQC.

Post-quantum Cryptography (PQC) is an umbrella term for cryptographic schemes based on hard mathematical problems which are resistant to attacks by quantum computers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated a PQC standardisation process in 2017, with a total of 4 algorithms selected for standardisation after round 3 and 4 undertaken for further analysis in Round 4 in 2022. PQC schemes on hardware devices, such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA), show the potential of higher throughput performance, for comparable security, at the cost of high area and power consumption. The major aim of this thesis is to help facilitate the global transition to a post quantum secure set of security protocols. This thesis will focus on the optimisation of the the hardware architectures to improve the computational speed and reduce the area overhead. The side channel analysis vulnerabilities and their countermeasures will also be studied.

2030 is projected as the year for the launch of the 6G (sixth generation) telecommunication technology. It is also the year predicted to introduce quantum computers powerful enough to break current cryptography algorithms. Cryptography remains the mainstay of securing the Internet and the 6G networks. Post quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms are currently under development and standardization by the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) and other regulatory agencies. PQC deployment will make the 6G goals of very low latency and low cost almost unachievable, as most PQC algorithms rely on keys much larger than those in classical RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) algorithms. The large PQC keys consume more storage space and processing power, increasing the latency and costs of their implementation. Thus, PQC deployment may compromise the latency and pricing goals of 6G networks. Moreover, all the PQC candidates under NIST evaluation have so far failed, seriously jeopardizing their standardization and placing the security of 6G against the Q-Day threat in a catch-22 situation. This report formulates a research question and builds and supports a research hypothesis to explore an alternate absolute zero trust (AZT) security strategy for securing 6G networks. AZT is autonomous, fast, and low-cost.

Structure and thermodynamics of antigen recognition by antibodies.

In 1994, P. Shor discovered quantum algorithms that can break both the RSA cryptosystem and the ElGamal cryptosystem. In 2007, a Canadian company D-Wave demonstrated the first quantum computer. These events and quick further developments have brought a crisis to secret communication. In 2022, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced 4 candidates—CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon, and Sphincs+—for post-quantum cryptography standards. The first 3 are based on lattice theory and the last on Hash functions. In 2024, NIST announced 3 standards: FIPS 203 based on CRYSTALS-Kyber, FIPS 204 based on CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and FIPS 205 based on Sphincs+. The fourth standard based on Falcon is on the way. It is well known that the security of the lattice-based cryptosystems relies on the hardness of the shortest vector problem (SVP), the closest vector problem (CVP), and their generalizations. In fact, the SVP is a ball packing problem and the CVP is a ball covering problem. Furthermore, both SVP and CVP are equivalent to arithmetic problems for positive definite quadratic forms. There are several books and survey papers dealing with the computational complexity of the lattice-based cryptography for classical computers. However, there is no review article to demonstrate the mathematical foundation of the complexity theory. This paper will briefly introduce post-quantum cryptography and demonstrate its mathematical roots in ball packing, ball covering, and positive definite quadratic forms.

The field of post-quantum cryptography has seen significant global progress, with a notable contribution from the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process managed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States. At the same time, the advancement in programmable quantum computers has exceeded earlier predictions. Consequently, numerous nations, including the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Türkiye, China, and (South) Korea, have made significant strides, particularly within the last decade, towards preparing for the quantum computing era. This article seeks to present an overview of relevant institutions and their corresponding endeavors within Türkiye. Specifically, we provide a concise summary of public announcements, NATO events, conferences, and projects primarily from the past five years. The intention is to offer a succinct and enlightening reference for relevant individuals and institutions.

The paper proposes strategic steps that organizations can take to future-proof their security architecture against quantum threats for the security of data integrity and confidentiality in the post-quantum era. it is a very threat that quantum computing is advancing too fast, and the classical cryptographic systems will be in danger. Therefore, we need to modify the methods of cryptography in Quantum-Safe Cryptography. In this paper, we focus on exposing the vulnerabilities of existing public-key cryptosystems faced with quantum attacks and the direction of the post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithm in securing the underlain infrastructure. The paper discusses ongoing efforts to standardize cryptosystems led by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). It overviews several quantum-resistant cryptographic techniques: lattice-based, hash-based, and code-based examples. Moreover, the paper also outlines difficulties in implementing quantum-safe cryptography solutions into currently in-place cybersecurity frameworks, especially in the finance, healthcare, and critical infrastructure industries.