Dilemmas of Agrarian reform in the Soviet Union

Abstract

AGRICULTURAL POLICY is not solely a matter of economics or production. At its core agricultural policy is made up of 'those decisions by governments which alter the prices farmers confront in the markets which determine their income'.1 In order to understand the politics of agricultural policy one must explain the patterns of intervention engaged in by governments. These patterns of intervention reflect leadership values vis-a-vis the peasantry, elite considerations of political stability, and the ability to build bases of support for a set of given policies. These factors in turn affect the regime's social policies in the countryside. Although social policy is multifaceted, for the purposes of this article we are interested in those policies which specifically impinge upon peasant incomes. The purposes of this article are twofold. On the one hand we are interested in explaining the patterns of state intervention in the USSR which have affected food prices and peasant incomes. A general consensus has emerged among Soviet policy makers and agricultural experts that past social rural policies were detrimental to the long-term ability of the agricultural sector to meet rising expectations. Gorbachev and others have displayed an awareness of the social and political ramifications of these frustrated expectations and have attempted to change policy in a way that would address shortcomings. However, in large part these reform efforts have not been successful. Thus, the second task of this article is to examine the reasons why agricultural reform has proceeded so slowly and unevenly in the Soviet Union.2 Towards this end we analyse the political dilemmas faced by Gorbachev in his attempt to reform the agrarian sector. I argue that one major shortcoming in Gorbachev's reform design is that, as presently configured, no one really wants it. That is, a critical deficiency of agricultural reform is the lack of political and social bases of support for the elements contained in the reform package. If we are to understand Gorbachev's political dilemmas in agrarian reform, we must see that, while Soviet rural policy promoted political stability for many years, in the long run it actually engendered political instability as Soviet society was modernised, bringing with it increased consumer expectations. The postStalin amelioration of the regime's 'urban bias' improved the well-being of rural dwellers and for a time led to increased agricultural production, but during that time the urban population was changing rapidly in size, education and sophistication.3 As the expectations of urban dwellers changed they wanted better quality and selection of food, as found in Western stores, but these expectations were