Dignity in Death: A Comparative Account of the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands

Counterterrorism, Dignity, and the Rule of Law

The legal homosexual has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past three decades, culminating in United States v. Windsor, which struck down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). In 1986, the homosexual was a sexual outlaw beyond the protection of the Constitution. By 2013, the homosexual had become part of a married couple that is “deemed by the State worthy of dignity.” This Article tells the story of this metamorphosis in four phases. In the first, the “Homosexual Sodomite Phase,” the United States Supreme Court famously declared in Bowers v. Hardwick that there was no right to engage in homosexual sodomy. In the second, the “Equal Homosexual Class Phase,” the Court in Romer v. Evans cast the legal homosexual as a member of a “class of citizens” whose exclusion from anti-discrimination protections the Constitution could not tolerate. In the third, the “Free Intimate Bond Phase,” the Court shifted its focus in Lawrence v. Texas to an enduring intimate bond involving private sexual acts protected from government intrusion. In the fourth and current phase, the “Dignified Married Couple Phase,” the Court in United States v. Windsor validated the decision of several states to “confer” upon homosexuals “a dignity and status of immense import.” The heart of the Article is an analysis of this final phase. Although Windsor is an important civil rights victory, the Court’s opinion ushers in important consequences for the legal homosexual. In the process of dignifying the same-sex couple, the Court erased the terms “homosexual” and “lesbian,” cast marriage as an elevated moral state, and, most importantly, promoted a concept that the Article calls a “weak dignity.” Windsor’s dignity is weak in three ways. First, human dignity was not understood by the Court as inherent in all humans. The Court instead assumed that the State confers dignity upon individuals. Second, Windsor’s concept of dignity is much narrower than theories promoted by contemporary moral and legal philosophers. Third, Windsor adopted a rhetoric of injury and pity that presents all those in same-sex relationships and their children as the wounded and humiliated victims of DOMA. The Article concludes with suggestions on how advocates and courts applying Windsor can employ the concept of equal dignity while moving beyond Windsor’s weaknesses.

Obergefell v. Hodges stands as one of the most significant cases decided by the Supreme Court in recent years. In a broader compass, it is one among a small number of cases rightly seen as landmark decisions. The Court’s holding in Obergefell, declaring a constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment for same-sex couples to marry, vindicated the petitioners’ claim for “equal dignity in the eyes of the law.” Though it lacks an explicit textual basis in the Constitution, the jurisprudence of equal dignity was anything but new. Indeed, its roots stretch back through the Court’s modern due process and equal protection decisions, and it is most explicitly elaborated in the gay rights trio of Lawrence v. Texas, United States v. Windsor, and Obergefell v. Hodges. While the embrace of a jurisprudence of equal dignity is a great transformation in American constitutional law, its emergence was neither straightforward nor uncomplicated. Each of these cases presented a different conception of human dignity and its place in American law. Moreover, these articulations were decisively shaped by the structure of the American constitutional order. This essay has two principal objectives. The first is to sketch what I call the “structural articulation” of equal dignity, that is, how the substance of dignitary jurisprudence was fundamentally influenced by the political and institutional context in which it developed. Specifically, I argue that political and legal action channeled through the federal system forced the Court in Windsor to turn away from the conception of dignity-as-autonomy expressed in Lawrence and instead embrace an understanding of dignity that can be extended and enhanced by government action. I term this second conception “variable dignity.” While this was a radical development, evocative of positive rights jurisprudence more common abroad, it was nonetheless short-lived. In Obergefell the Court rejected this understanding in favor of a partial return to inherence, offering yet another conception of dignity, which I refer to as “democratic dignity.” The second objective is to delineate the significance of these developments. Of particular concern here are the consequences of the specific way in which the jurisprudence of equal dignity has developed. Even as Obergefell’s recognition of democratic dignity further established dignity as a salient constitutional value, its turn away from variable dignity risks limiting the future possibilities of political and legal action directed towards vesting such interests in either defined social groups or specific types of behavior. I thus argue that the development of the jurisprudence of equal dignity presents two discrete kinds of revolution, a revolution of change (brought about by Windsor) and a revolution of return (wrought by Obergefell). The broader context of this essay, as it is for the jurisprudence of equal dignity, is the robust body of constitutional law outside of the United States in which dignity figures prominently. As such, reference is made throughout to related constitutional jurisprudence, with the intention of providing some comparative context for the jurisprudence of equal dignity.

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.在當代的醫療實踐中，各種新的醫療技術在臨終階段的應用引發了關於如何維護死亡的尊嚴的激烈爭論。爭論的焦點集中在對什麼是人的尊嚴和什麼是死亡的尊嚴的概念的不同理解上。人的尊嚴概念在當代西方的倫理學中尚沒有得到清晰的闡釋，死亡的尊嚴概念更是存在混亂。儒家倫理學則可以在這種討論中為問題的解決提供新的思路。本文試圖重建儒家的人的尊嚴和死亡的尊嚴的基本含義，並對死亡的尊嚴與人的生物學生命的關係，死亡的尊嚴與人的痛苦的關係，死亡的尊嚴同人的自主性的關係，以及死亡的尊嚴同社會公平正義之間的關係做出分析說明。儒家關於人的尊嚴的觀點有助於化解西方死亡倫理研究中出現的概念混亂和理論矛盾。What does a death have dignity? In modern healthcare, the wide use of new technology has generated confusion around how to define and protect human dignity, especially in the case of death and dying. Those who advocate the legalization of assisted suicide often appeal to the right to “die with dignity” and the right to individual autonomy. The problem is that it is very difficult to justify one particular understanding of human dignity in the contemporary pluralistic world through a rational formulation without defining dignity.In this paper, the authors attempt to respond to the current debate on euthanasia and assisted suicide from a Confucian perspective. The paper first defines the Confucian concept of human dignity and shows how the concept could be used in the case of dignity in death and dying. The authors argue that in Confucianism, there are two kinds of dignity: One is intrinsic dignity, which is endowed by Heaven on everyone, and the other is extrinsic dignity, which arises from the cultivation of virtues. This extrinsic dignity is also called “personal dignity.” Unlike the individual-oriented human dignity model, Confucian ethics argue for a family-oriented model of human dignity. That is to say, the Confucian ideal of human dignity is not satisfied by a concept of human dignity that is centered on individual rights and freedom of choice; instead, it focuses on relations in a concrete community in which a person’s human dignity is actualized through morals and virtues. In the case of euthanasia and assisted suicide, therefore, the decision should not be solely based on freedom of choice, but on what kinds of values and obligations the person has. In addition, the paper shows that the Confucian view of human dignity does not support the idea of prolonging life through technological means without restraints.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 1292 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Philosophy publications and in particular healthcare philosophy papers which include the term dignity as a major discussion point are numerous. Indeed, dignity has become something of an evergreen topic, seemingly a perpetual theme in writings on human rights and health care, offering an opportunity for philosophers and others to exercise ingenuity. Yet, it is not unreasonable to ask whether any of these texts significantly advances our understanding of the concept of human dignity itself or crucially, influences its practical application. In the United States, the President’s Council on Bioethics, an eminent body of 17 experts in the field deliberated on dignity over many years, spurred on by rapid developments in the fields of genetics, bioethics and medical innovation. The associated publication Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics (2008), some 550 pages long and containing 20 essays written by members of the commission and by others, provides a comprehensive summary of many key aspects though it is clear that there is not an overwhelming consensus regarding the concept itself or indeed its relevance. It seems that if complete agreement or at least substantial accord is what is required, then the search may prove rather futile. At the same time, the irony is that many if not most members of the general public possess an immediate and clear intuitive understanding of what they perceive to be flagrant infringements of respect for human dignity in health care. Similarly, press reports on aspects of manipulation of fundamental human genetic material, for instance those questioning the use of stem cells or whether ‘‘three-parent IVF’’ should be permitted, tend to stimulate real public concern on either religious grounds or for not being natural. Whilst the term dignity itself might not always feature, it appears at least implicitly to be the nature of the unease. Such concerns as there are indicate that a respect for human dignity is acquired by most of us, like many other fundamental moral attitudes, as part of the process of growing up and living in a cultural community in which certain standards of behaviour are apparent and imbued. Hence, although there may not be significant public awareness of the theoretical concept of dignity nor relevant underlying principles this might not be a serious problem if intuition is all that is required or could be expected. And indeed educating the public could prove to be both difficult and unnecessary other than clearly setting out relevant factual details. So, against this background, just who needs a theoretical concept of human dignity and why? It would seem that the importance of maintaining and enhancing academic scholarship in this field is most applicable in assisting healthcare professionals and administrators to fully appreciate the nature and relevance of human dignity in their practice and in particular to identify contexts where failure D. Badcott (&) Centre for Applied Ethics, Cardiff University, Humanities Building, Colum Drive, Cardiff CF10 3EU, UK e-mail: badcottd@cf.ac.uk

Достоинство стихотворца: формирование статуса автора во второй половине XVIII века

Dignity After Death and Protecting the Sanctity of Human Remains

Appeals to dignity are a staple of political and legal discourse in the United States, as they are in other countries. Dignity is invoked frequently in judicial decisions in the United States, including in numerous opinions of the United States Supreme Court. References to dignity by Justices of the Supreme Court are both interesting and, for some, puzzling, because there is no mention of dignity in the Federal Constitution at all. In modern times perhaps no Justice has invoked dignity more frequently and more substantively than Justice Anthony Kennedy. Kennedy is said to have “penciled in” dignity as a constitutional value. This article will assert and defend the thesis that what Kennedy “penciled in” is a constitutional norm of dignity as integrity. In Kennedy’s constitutional jurisprudence, the concept of dignity is enlisted to defend and affirm the integrity of a person, from the most basic (physical integrity) to the most reflective (social integrity) aspects of personhood. Kennedy views humiliation as the extension of cruelty from the physical to the psychological realm of suffering. Dignity is meant to guard against cruelty in all of its dimensions. Viewed this way, dignity is an existential value, invoked to defend the threshold conditions (privileges and immunities) that are necessary for a person to exist as an integral whole. The article develops and defends its thesis through a systematic and detailed examination of all of Justice Kennedy’s opinions which invoke dignity, both on the Supreme Court and on the Ninth Circuit where he served before his elevation to the Supreme Court. The article will also examine his speeches and testimonies to the extent that they shed light on his understanding of what dignity entails. The article shall occasionally refer to opinions of other Justices of the Supreme Court, such as Justice Brennan, and those of constitutional courts of other countries, such as the German Constitutional Court, for purposes of clarifying Justice Kennedy’s view of dignity and the norm of dignity as integrity.

This article explores how the concepts of dignity and conviviality impact the social justice work of young-adult Muslims in the United States. Here, conviviality demands confronting and coping with historical discrimination, exploitation, and abuse (Gilroy 2004) and is examined in relation to the ideology of the Muslim ummah, a united, global community of all Muslims. However, the Muslims this article focuses on see a tension between the ideology of the ummah and the practice, which results in inequity and a lack of dignity experienced by some Muslims. The author argues that attempts at building convivial relationships inadvertently lead Muslims to feel distance and isolation from Muslim spaces and community. Their social justice work provides them with the ability to look beyond the Muslim ummah and see dignity in a shared humanity. Combined with their intellectual and academic study of social justice, these Muslims are developing their own ethical frameworks grounded in Islam. Though challenging to enact, by continually confronting their privileges, biases, and blind spots, these Muslims are striving to live, behave, and build relationships that prioritize the dignity of all people, inside the Muslim community and beyond.

Models of constitutionalism In order to assess the role played by the concept of human dignity in European and US constitutionalism, it is expedient to briefly recall the two phases that western constitutionalism went through during the last two centuries. In the nineteenth century, the state model prevailing on both sides of the Atlantic was the classical liberal model . The legal system was composed of relatively few stable norms, some of which were modified from time to time by special legislation. The special norms were meant to be interpreted narrowly. The system would define and protect the autonomy of the individual in all areas of social life, in particular the economy, culture and politics. Where formal, written constitutions existed, they usually contained solemn guarantees for individual autonomy, the fundamental institutes of which were already defined and protected by sub-constitutional, ordinary law. In addition, these constitutions usually proclaimed a general principle of formal equality of all citizens before the law. The constitutional guarantees were judicially enforceable against executive state action. In the United States they were, in principle, also enforceable against unconstitutional legislation. The twentieth century witnessed the advent and the expansion of the model of the interventionist state . The progress of the new model was primarily connected with the industrialisation of society. Industrialisation carried with it: a weakening of autonomy rights in the area of economic relationships in order to protect important interests which were not sufficiently provided for by the mechanisms of the free market; a reinforcement of civil rights and freedoms in the areas of culture, politics and the strictly personal life of the individual, perhaps as a sort of compensation for the diminished force of economic freedoms; […]

The concept of dignity is recognised as a fundamental right in many countries. It is embedded into law, human rights legislation and is often visible in organisations' philosophy of care, particularly in aged care. Yet, many authors describe difficulties in defining dignity and how it can be preserved for people living in long term care. In this article, Nordenfelt's 'four notions of dignity' are considered, drawing on research literature addressing the different perspectives of those who receive, observe or deliver care in the context of the long-term care environment. A review of the literature was undertaken using the terms 'nursing homes', 'residential care' or 'long-term care'. The terms were combined and the term 'human dignity' was added. A total of 29 articles met the inclusion criteria from the United Kingdom (14), United States (2), Australia (1), Sweden (3), Hong Kong (2), Norway (3), Nordic (1), Taiwan (1), Netherlands (1). Ethical Considerations: Every effort has been made to ensure an unbiased search of the literature with the intention of an accurate interpretation of findings. The four notions of dignity outlined by Nordenfelt provide a comprehensive description of the concept of dignity which can be linked to the experiences of people living in long-term care today and provide a useful means of contextualising the experiences of older people, their families and significant others and also of staff in long-term care facilities. Of particular interest are the similarities of perspectives of dignity between these groups. The preservation of dignity implies that dignity is a quality inherent in us all. This links directly to the exploration and conclusions drawn from the literature review. Conversely, promoting dignity implies that dignity is something that can be influenced by others and external factors. Hence, there are a number of implications for practice. We suggest that two of Nordenfelt's notions, 'dignity of identity' and 'dignity of Menschenwüde', are a common thread for residents, family members and staff when conceptualising dignity within long-term care environments.

For any way of thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced that appeals to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and our desires, as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit. If successful, this conceptual apparatus becomes so embedded in common sense as to be taken for granted and not open to question. The founding figures of neoliberal thought took political ideals of human dignity and individual freedom as fundamental, as ‘the central values of civilization’. In so doing they chose wisely, for these are indeed compelling and seductive ideals. These values, they held, were threatened not only by fascism, dictatorships, and communism, but by all forms of state intervention that substituted collective judgements for those of individuals free to choose. Concepts of dignity and individual freedom are powerful and appealing in their own right. Such ideals empowered the dissident movements in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union before the end of the Cold War as well as the students in Tiananmen Square. The student movements that swept the world in 1968––from Paris and Chicago to Bangkok and Mexico City––were in part animated by the quest for greater freedoms of speech and of personal choice. More generally, these ideals appeal to anyone who values the ability to make decisions for themselves. The idea of freedom, long embedded in the US tradition, has played a conspicuous role in the US in recent years. ‘9/11’ was immediately interpreted by many as an attack on it. ‘A peaceful world of growing freedom’, wrote President Bush on the first anniversary of that awful day, ‘serves American long-term interests, reflects enduring American ideals and unites America’s allies.’ ‘Humanity’, he concluded, ‘holds in its hands the opportunity to offer freedom’s triumph over all its age-old foes’, and ‘the United States welcomes its responsibilities to lead in this great mission’. This language was incorporated into the US National Defense Strategy document issued shortly thereafter.

Lights, Camera, Execution!: Cinematic Portrayals of Capital Punishment fills a prominent void in the existing film studies and death penalty literature. Each chapter focuses on a particular cinematic portrayal of the death penalty in the United States. Some of the analyzed films are well-known Hollywood blockbusters, such as Dead Man Walking (1995); others are more obscure, such as the made-for-television movie Murder in Coweta County (1983). By contrasting different portrayals where appropriate and identifying themes common to many of the studied films – such as the concept of dignity and the role of race (and racial discrimination) – the volume strengthens the reader’s ability to engage in comparative analysis of topics, stories, and cinematic techniques.Written by three professors with extensive experience teaching, and writing about the death penalty, film studies, and criminal justice, Lights, Camera, Execution! is deliberately designed for both classroom use and general readership.

In studies of the Australian press, a wide range of American influences—on news genres, on notions of newsworthiness and presentation, and on the language in which stories are written—has been larg...

Objective: Legislation is an effective strategy for reducing road-related fatalities and injuries. Public opinion can be an impetus for passing new laws and can affect the success of their implementation, but little is known about the current state of public opinion toward existing and proposed road-related policies in the United States. This review describes the scope and results of research on public support for state- and local-level evidence-based motor vehicle– and bicycle-related policies. We identify gaps in our understanding of public support for these policies. Methods: Published U.S. literature and all reports from the NHTSA from the past decade (2003–2012) were searched for data on opinions about existing or proposed policies related to motor vehicle or bicycle injury prevention. Twenty-six studies fulfilled the inclusion criteria. In all, studies reported public opinion about 7 injury prevention topic areas: all-terrain vehicles (n = 1), automated enforcement with red light and speed cameras (n = 5), distracted driving (n = 4), drinking and driving (n = 5), graduated driver licensing (n = 7), helmets (n = 7), and seat belts (n = 4). Twenty-three studies focused only on one topic, and 3 sought public opinion about multiple topic areas. Results: The studies revealed generally high levels of support for injury prevention policies in all topic areas. Fifteen studies collected information from national samples, and only 7 studies reported data from the state (n = 5) or local (n = 2) level. Conclusions: There is a relatively small evidence base on public opinion related to motor vehicle– and bicycle-related evidence-based policies; even less is less known for state- or county-specific policies. The findings of this review suggest that the public's opinion toward injury prevention legislation is generally favorable. This information can be used to communicate with the media and policy makers to reinforce the need for effective policy solutions to continuing motor vehicle injury problems. More research is needed to understand the perspectives of those who do not hold favorable opinions, to understand opinions toward local or state-level policies, and to monitor trends in public opinion over time. Supplemental materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Traffic Injury Prevention to view the supplemental file.