Dignity and Freedom in Humanism, Transhumanism and Posthumanism – Philosophical and Ethical Foundations for Legal Regulation

This paper addresses the social forces, such as cultural traditions, economic structures, and legal systems, affecting animal (human and nonhuman) rights. Also considered are the cross‐cultural degrees of societal advancement on rights, as illustrated by cultures that are stagnant on rights, progressive on rights, and regressive on rights. The definition of “advanced” versus “primitive” cultures is somewhat complicated with the argument being that technologically and materially advanced cultures can be primitive on rights issues, as found in the present‐day US. The right‐wing Bush administration, greatly aided by the “war on terrorism”, has devolved human rights by reducing civil liberties, freedom of assembly, educational opportunities, and economic equality. This repression of human rights has repercussions for environmental protection and nonhuman rights, as demonstrated herein.

Movie Minorities: Transnational Rights Advocacy and South Korean Cinema

The concept of human dignity seems to be closely connected to the idea of human rights. But whereas human rights are at least from an institutional point of view well established, the concept of human dignity is often seen as either arbitrary and superfluous or fundamen-talistic. The paper shows that human rights and human dignity had different histories for a long time but are nowadays intrinsically connected. The concept of human dignity implies a certain core of human rights and offers the chance to understand that there is not one overall view of human rights for all times and places, but that human rights discourse always has to be open to modifications according to the conditions of application. After first mentions in Cicero and Seneca, more diversified uses by Aquinas and Pico della Mirandola, the talk of human dignity finds its current meaning in Kant’s philosophy, often connected to the formula of persons as ends in themselves. This seems to be one of the systematic connections to the tradition of human rights which has its roots in the semantic shift of the word ius in 11th and 12th century from an objective order to claims of different kinds. This kind of argument is used in different contexts throughout the following centuries and transformed in 16thand 17th century into claims of citizen’s rights and human rights. Another connection between the two concepts is given by Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach which is not restricted to human reason. The criticisms against the two conceptions are also different, but connected: Human rights are accused to foster individualism and egoism against the community and declared to be an erroneous development of western culture. Human dignity is seen as an indicator of human hubris towards other creature, based on metaphysical assumptions and a part of “slave morals”, contempt by men like Nietzsche. Both criticisms seem not to be adequate. In the end, the concept of human dignity gives an instrument to defend as much as possible of human integrity in situations where human rights are violated, limited or in one or the other way under pressure.

The Limitations of Dignity: The Novel and Human Rights

Ownership is conceptualized as a human right that gives the authority to order something that is owned. As a legal state, Indonesia regulates intellectual property rights, including copyright. In this study, normative legal research is used, which is descriptive-analytical. Copyright is an exclusive right or right owned by the creator of certain information and ideas to reproduce and regulate his work. The concept of ownership in copyright gives creators economic and moral rights automatically protected by the state through copyright law. In contrast, the principle of customary law is the concept of communal ownership. Customary law is more concerned with the interests of society than individual interests. In the cosmology of Indonesian society, most do not recognize individual ownership, but the concept of ownership in the culture of society only recognizes communal property rights or shared property, so the concept of IPR is not known in the culture of Indonesian society.

The emerging field of public health ethics

The concept of ‘dignity’ at the base of Human Rights has been criticized, paradoxically, for a humiliating treatment of the ‘Other’ that disregards, for example, the embeddedness of individuals within communities. In response, I argue for considering dignity as a plural and relational concept, introducing contemporary peace and conflict research into legal philosophy. Besides the established approaches linked usually to values like ‘justice’, ‘security’ and ‘freedom’, this article addresses a ‘concordial’ perspective that needs to be recovered and put in relation to prevailing discourses on ‘dignity’. This ‘concordial’ dignity, as I show, is oriented by different guiding principles like community, non-duality, processuality, systemic embeddedness, dynamic balance, harmony and fertility. While these principles have been often connected to so-called indigenous or ‘Eastern’ philosophies, these are central (and neglected) elements also at the core of ‘Western’ philosophy. Exemplarily, I inquire a key historical source for the concept of dignity in contemporary human rights philosophy: Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio on the Dignity of Man.

This paper examines how the intercultural conception of human rights, fueled by the modes of reciprocal recognition associated with Hegel’s social philosophy, draws on traditional understandings of human dignity while avoiding the essentialism associated with those understandings. Part 1 summarizes core elements of an intercultural theory of human rights while addressing the general question of how that theory accommodates an understanding of the relationship of human dignity and human rights. Part 2 presents the intercultural approach as committed to a view of human dignity focused on the intrinsic worth of individuals, but understood, not—with Kant—as an anthropologically inherent property, but as one forged in relations of intersubjective recognition. Part 3, critically engaging arguments of C Beitz and J Habermas, claims that an intercultural approach entails a status-based conception of human dignity, one that construes the latter, not as a metaphysically conceived inherent quality, but as a function of membership in a social order supportive of both liberal right claims and a republican commitment to rights systems generally. Drawing on the work of Hegel and critically engaging the position of A Sangiovanni, Part 4 construes human dignity in terms of a doctrine of human rights expressive of a common humanity, one understood, however, not as an essential attribute of human beings, but in terms of a globally realized legal-political order whose members are dispositionally committed to the worth of all members of the human community and the value of human community itself. Critically appropriating the work of H Arendt for the intercultural theory, Part 5 considers the centrality of actual politics to a dignitarian account of human rights. Part 6 construes human dignity, again with Kant, in terms of the principle of autonomy, but one understood, not abstractly, but—engaging Pico della Mirandola—as the fallibilistically conceived process of social learning on the part the members of the human community. Part 7 considers how the intercultural view, with the idea of social practice expressive of collective human agency, accommodates a concept of human dignity understood as the “foundation”—nuanced and variegated—of human rights. Part 8 details the specific normativity of an intercultural conception, asserting that despite and even because of its attention to the empirical realities of social, historical, and political life, that conception remains committed, as with essentialist views, to context-transcending norms capable of calling into question actual practices and policies. Here, recourse is had to a concept of recognition understood both as a principle of evaluation and as a social practice encompassing the activity of individuals and groups engaged in the discourse on human rights.

Relevance of the research.The relevance of the research topic is due to the fact that in a situation of war, a person feels uncertainty and insecurity, lack of protection, violation of his rights. Important in such a situation is fruitful imagination and humanistic thinking and action, which enables a person to create and implement an image of a positive future. When we create something fruitful in the imagination, humanistically comprehend it and act, the desired becomes real, including in the implementation of human rights. Problem statement. In a modern crisis society, a number of questions are important. What is fruitful imagination? How is it related to humanistic thinking and action, in particular to the implementation and protection of human rights? Analysis of recent research and publications. The problem of imagination and its meaning is raised by M. Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. D. Bruno believes that imagination is capable of opening new worlds, D. Hume notes the importance of imagination in the process of cognition. R. Descartes claims that sensation appears first, and then imagination. I. Kant introduces the concept of productive imagination. E. Husserl points to the connection between imagination and consciousness. M. Scheler notes the role of imagination in the creation of values. Z. Freud emphasizes that imagination is a manifestation of the unconscious. J.-P. Sartre combines imagination and human freedom. Modern Ukrainian researcher G. Ilyina emphasizes that imagination is a dynamic process. Regarding human rights, the ideas of J. Locke about the naturalness and inalienability of human rights, Ch. Montesquieu, who describes such a power that protects individual human rights, are relevant. Y. Habermas notes that universal moral values are based on human rights. Ukrainian researchers V. Bachynin, K. Zhol, N. Manoilo, S. Slivka, S. Maksimov, P. Rabinovych study human rights in the context of an interdisciplinary approach. The methodology of metaanthropology of N. Khamitov allows us to understand the metamorphoses of imagination in the existential dimensions of human existence and to determine the essential features of fertile imagination, and the methodology of social metaanthropology, which is developed by the author of this article, provides an opportunity to comprehend the application of fertile imagination in the social existence of a person. Based on the methodology of metaanthropology, as well as social metaanthropology, we can connect fertile imagination with humanistic thinking and action and analyze their impact on the implementation and protection of human rights. Research task. The task of this article is to analyze the relationship between fertile imagination, humanistic thinking and action with the implementation of human rights. Main material presentation. A fertile imagination can be considered an imagination that is aimed not only at one's own pleasure, but also at the Other, serves not as a means of arbitrariness, but at strengthening freedom and love - not only one's own, but also at the Other. A fertile imagination directs a person to create a harmonious image, which subsequently turns into humanistic thinking and, through action, is realized in the provision and protection of human rights. Destructive imagination, on the contrary, is aimed at creating a negative image, which generates destructive thinking and leads to the violation not only of human rights, but also of the life of the entire society. The answer is given to the question of what is primary: fertile imagination or humanistic thinking, which directs to positive action, which means the reality of ensuring human rights. Conclusions. Effective protection of human rights is a consequence of a fertile imagination, which generates humanistic thinking, which in turn directs to positive action in the protection of human rights. Keywords: imagination, fertile imagination, human rights, humanistic thinking, humanistic action, metaanthropology, social metaanthropology, everyday human existence, human limitless being, metalimitless human existence, philosophical cinema, intelligent altruism

One of the questions that many people contemplate in their lifetime is the idea of human nature. In this essay I will seek to examine and compare the idea of human nature in the minds of Christian humanists during the Renaissance to that of late Medieval Christian mystics. The Oration on the Dignity of Man, written by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (Pico) provides an insight into the mind of a Renaissance humanist, while The Imitation of Christ, written by Thomas à Kempis illustrates the thought process that was characteristic of a late Medieval Christian mystic. Pico believed that humans are a great miracle and it is within their nature and capabilities to become something great in the world, something just below the level of God.[1] à Kempis held the belief that human nature, like the idea found in Genesis, was corrupted by the fall of man in the Garden of Eden. It can be found in his writings that he believed that human nature is something that is detrimental to the individual and should be controlled by calling on the grace of God.[2] The different points of view found in the writing of Pico and à Kempis can be traced to the sources of their inspiration. In writing The Imitation of Christ, à Kempis drew his inspiration only from the Bible. Pico, like many other Renaissance humanists, looked for truth about human nature not only in the Bible but also by studying other classical works such as the ancient Greeks and Arabs. [1] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). [2] Thomas à Kempis, The Imitation of Christ (Chicago: Moody Press, 1958).

Despite our jurisdictional carving of the Ocean, we in fact have one Ocean. An Ocean that is alive with history, authority, ancestor and kin. A living entity and being that is not only a resource, but our source of life. However, Ocean law and policy, and the science and values that inform its implementation and enforcement, are largely anthropocentric (or human-centered). This leads decision makers to view scientific metrics such as ‘Ocean health’ from a human dimension, or with humans as the primary beneficiary of a healthy Ocean. This is why I created the ‘Ocean Rights’ concept in 2017. It is a subset of the Rights of Nature movement, with over 300 initiatives, laws, policies and judicial decisions now existing in approximately 40 countries!Ocean Rights is the moral and ethical recognition of the Ocean as a living entity with inherent rights and intrinsic values, but it is much more than the recognition of rights. It is a paradigm shift in how we view, treat and use the Ocean — a transformation in the human-Ocean relationship grounded in science (western and traditional). It is a recognition that human beings and non-human beings have a right to a healthy Ocean, and that human rights and wellbeing is dependent upon a healthy Ocean. In fact, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights confirmed that the right to a healthy environment is not just a human right, but a right of Nature, including the seas.How human society relates to and values the Ocean has direct implications for conservation. For example, in the context of fishing, overarching norms such as ‘Mare Liberum’ (Freedom of the Seas) and prevalent policy tools such as Maximum Sustainable Yield, have largely imagined marine ecosystems as free for all and seek to take the most we can out of a system without preventing collapse. In fact, the best available science is only binding in 26% of countries, and what is ‘sustainable’ is often ignored for human benefit and profit.On the contrary, Ocean Rights embodies and respects the best available science and knowledge on the interconnected human-Ocean relationship as well as ecosystem linkages and system flows.For example Ocean Rights requires us to:assess the biological interactions of the different individuals, populations and communities within an ecosystem and ensure they maintain their natural balance; ensure the interests and intrinsic values of marine ecosystems and species are represented in decision making processes affecting their health; ensure a plurality of values, including intrinsic values and cultural values, are taken into account in environmental impact assessments and cost-benefit analysis; and require an ecological dimension and lens in determinations of ‘what is healthy’, ‘what is severe harm’, and ‘what is ecologically sustainable.’ The effective and full implementation of Ocean Rights involves several strategies that combine legal, policy, governance, economic, educational, scientific and community-based approaches.Instead of asking ourselves what is the science we need for the Ocean we want, how about we ask ourselves what is the science the Ocean needs?

As far as the topic of ‘necessity and human rights’ is concerned, considerations informed by necessity mainly play a role as grounds for restricting or derogating from human rights on the basis of primary norms contained in international human rights treaties, rather than on the basis of the secondary necessity norm set out in Article 25 of the ILC Articles. The arguably exhaustive treatment of necessity-informed restrictions and derogations in those treaties largely precludes invocation of the general defence of necessity under the law of State Responsibility. Indeed, the drafters have already factored in necessity when drafting human rights treaties. In so doing, they have incorporated necessity into the law itself as a justification for limitations to human rights, thereby excluding reliance on a broader concept of necessity outside this framework. Beyond the human rights treaties, for that matter, States are very hesitant to invoke necessity as an excuse, as this would amount to admitting that their conduct was in fact unlawful (although excusable). Apart from that, ‘human rights’ may possibly qualify as an ‘essential interest’ excusing non-compliance with non-human rights related international law obligations, but it can be said that the notion of jus cogens may be a more potent tonic to set aside ‘incompatible’ lesser norms of international law.

This paper tries to rethink the notion of human rights and to evaluate whether we should redefine them in light of the main challenges presented by advances in technoscience (genetic engineering, robotics, nanotechnology etc.). It claims that there are basic, intrinsic rights to personhood, which, on the one hand, allow us to justify a moral claim to a posthuman existence (should it become possible) and to attribute rights to artificial agents, while, on the other hand, granting the moral entitlement to remain human. This shows that the notion of human rights is far from becoming obsolete, as claimed by some scholars. The paper is divided into five parts. It (1) presents reasons for rethinking the notion of “a right” in order to apply it to beings other than humans (e.g., nonhuman animals, robots etc.); (2) discusses the metaethical problem concerning the meaning of “a right”; (3) presents a basic system of rights that are intrinsic to personhood and that can be attributed to different kinds of agents (human or not); (4) analyzes whether there is a right to a posthuman existence or a right to remain human; and finally, (5) presents some reasons to justify such a system of rights.

This article aims to explore potential friction points that may arise with the emergence of new natural non-human rights holders (for instance, individual animals, rivers, Pacha Mama and so on). Specifically, the article relies on the case of invasive alien species (IAS) to highlight that animal rights can collide with rights of the environment. Indeed, IAS represent a serious environmental threat and are, as such, at the centre of numerous global, regional and national regulations that favour early eradication as the best course of action. However, in a rights paradigm, this collision amounts to a conflict between the right to life of individuals from IAS and the right to integrity of the threatened ecosystems. This article addresses how such conflicts might be solved by relying on an analogy with the lawful restrictions of human rights. It highlights how, even in a rights paradigm, eradicating individuals from IAS could remain legal, albeit more strictly controlled. It also points to the inevitable questions of representation that such situations entail. As the rights of natural non-humans clash, the issue becomes, in turn, a discussion among humans. This discussion requires legal frameworks and principles to be legitimate and accountable. This article seeks to describe some of these principles by relying on an analysis of current practices in different fields. In sum, the article argues that it is not inherently problematic to solve conflicts between natural non-human rights. However, the human discussion to solve this conflict has to be based on epistemic plurality to gain in legitimacy.

May the state prohibit speech that deeply offends religious sensibilities? This issue has recently been a matter of intense controversy in both the Islamic and Western world. Much of the discussion, on both sides, has been inflammatory and deeply unhelpful, even counterproductive. This paper seeks to advance the discussion by analyzing and defending the approach suggested by international human rights law. Although international human rights law is explicitly silent on the question of speech that is intended to be or is perceived as hostile to a religion, there is a clear body of law dealing with speech that fosters racial discrimination that can be used as a model. On this basis, prohibiting speech that provokes or incites religious discrimination, religious hatred, or religious violence is clearly within the bounds of international human rights law. Prohibiting speech because that speech is offensive to adherents of a religion is not. If speech is to be free, it must be regulated only to prevent demonstrable serious harm to others that outweighs the harm to those whose speech is restricted. Crying fire in a crowded theater is a classic example. Prohibiting speech that incites religious violence clearly meets this test. The fact that some people find the speech offensive clearly does not. The human right to freedom of religion does not guarantee that others respect one’s religion. States are obliged to permit the free choice and public exercise of one’s religion and to protect that choice and exercise. States are at liberty to give support to religion, either in general or to particular religions – so long as that support does not violate the human rights of others. To prohibit some speech on the basis of the religious sensibilities of one, some, or all religions restricts a fundamental human right for a non-human rights reason of insufficient weight. آیا دولتها اجازه دارند سخنرانیهایی را که حساسیت‌های دینی را عمیقا مورد هجوم قرار می‌دهد، منع کنند؟ این مسئله اخیرا باعث اختلاف نظر شدید هم در دنیای غرب و هم دنیای اسلام شده ‌است اما بحث هر دو طرف، خشن و بی‌فایده بوده‌است. این مقاله در پی آن‌است که با تحلیل و دفاع از رویکرد نظام حقوق بشر بین‌المللی به این بحث عمق بیشتری ببخشد. اگرچه نظام حقوق بشر بین‌المللی در مورد سخنرانیهایی که هدفش حمله به دین است کاملا سکوت اختیار نموده‌، ولی در مورد سخنرانیهایی که موجب تبعیض نژادی می‌شود، آشکارا نظر خود را ابراز نموده‌است که می‌توان از آن به عنوان یک مدل استفاده کرد. بر این اساس این مدل ممانعت از سخنرانیهایی که تبعیض دینی یا دین‌ستیزی و یا خشونت علیه دین را بر می‌انگیزد به وضوح در دایره نظام حقوق بشر بین‌المللی قرار میگیرد ولی سخنرانیهایی که به پیروان یک دین اهانت می‌کند خارج از این حوزه ‌است. اگر قرار باشد که بیان، آزادی داشته باشد، نباید برای ان ضوابطی تعیین کرد مگر انکه بتوان اثبات نمود آسیب سخنرانی مورد نظر به‌دیگران، بسیار بیشتر از آسیب وارده به آنهایی است که آزادی بیان‌شان محدود شده است. یک مثال کلاسیک در این راستا سردادن فریاد آتش آتش در یک سینمای شلوغ می‌باشد. ممنوع کردن سخنرانیهایی که خشونت دینی را در پی داشته باشند، از جمله این موارد محسوب می‌شود اما این واقعیت که بعضی افراد آن سخنرانی را اهانت آمیز بدانند، از جمله موارد ممنوع کننده به حساب نمی‌آید. حق آزادی دین بدین معنا نیست که دیگران باید به دین ما احترام بگذارند. دولت‌ها موظفند تا امکان انتخاب آزاد و برگزاری علنی آیین‌های دینی را فراهم کرده از آن محافظت نمایند. البته دولت‌ها آزادند از دین چه به صورت کلی و یا از یک دین بخصوص حمایت کنند بشرطیکه این حمایت و پشتیبانی ناقض حقوق بقیه نباشد. بنابراین ممنوع‌کردن یک سخنرانی به بهانه حساسیت‌های یک یا چند دین و یا همه ادیان، در واقع محدود کردن یک حق انسانی مهم به‌خاطر یک دلیل غیرحقوق بشری کم اهمیت است. البته دولتها کاملا آزادند که انگیزه و تمایل به این‌چنین اهانت‌ها و بی احترامیها را کاهش دهند.چنین رویکردی مطمئنا یک سیاست خوب محسوب میشود. دولت ویا بعضی افراد یا گروه‌ها یقینا آزادند چنین سخنرانی‌های اهانت آمیزی را محکوم کنند، اعتراضاتی را بر ضد آن سازماندهی کنند و گوینده و یا حامیان آن سخنرانی را تحریم کنند یا حتی هرگونه اعتراض و اقدام تلافی جویانه را سازماندهی کنند بشرطیکه از بازوی قهریه دولت استفاده نکنند. اما طبق نظام حقوق بشر بین المللی دولتها حق ندارند از یک سخنرانی به خاطر آن که حساسیت‌های پیروان یک دین خاص یا کل ادیان را مورد اهانت قرار می‌دهد ممانعت بعمل آورند. این مقاله در پایان به بررسی راه‌های گفتگو بین آنهایی که رویکرد فعلی نظام حقوق بشربین المللی را قبول دارند و آنان که این رویکرد را به سبب عقاید دینی خودشان رد می‌کند، می‌پردازد.