Digital Verification Techniques in the Nuclear Safeguards System: Status and Perspectives

Abstract

For more than 25 years the nuclear safeguards system had been based on states’ declarations and International Atomic Energy Agencies (IAEA) verification. The world community, in response to the violation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), strengthened the safeguards system, i.e., NPT compliance verification system, by establishing the Additional Protocol (AP). Under the AP, the IAEA’s mission is to detect undeclared nuclear facilities, materials and activities, and to verify the correctness and completeness of states’ declarations. While continuing to use material accountancy to detect diversion of nuclear material, the IAEA, henceforth, has to execute extended access rights within the nuclear facilities as well as on the states’ territories. Furthermore, the IAEA has to handle more comprehensive information to be provided by the states as well as information acquired by the IAEA from open sources about states’ nuclear activities. To this end, the IAEA has acquired new competence in satellite imagery analysis and open source information analysis and is re-engineering its safeguards information system. In Eastern Europe and Asia new states have come under safeguards, and nuclear programmes in Asia and elsewhere are being expanded. Finally, in the course of nuclear disarmament in nuclear weapons states the IAEA will have to safeguard excess fissile materials transferred from former military use. In order to cope with these challenges, the IAEA, in cooperation with member states, develops approaches to increase its efficiency and effectiveness in using its resources. The IAEA will focus more on qualitative safeguards