Digital Conglomerates and EU Merger Control - Analysis of the Leverage Theory of Harm

Abstract

The central theme of this thesis is the treatment of conglomerate mergers under EU merger control, with particular reference to conglomerates in the digital markets. In particular, this thesis analyses the effects of leverage theory of harm in the traditional and the digital markets. Given that background, the author discusses whether the positive prior treatment afforded to conglomerate mergers in traditional markets should also be extended to digital conglomerates. Additionally, it evaluates whether the current EU merger control framework is equipped to examine the effects of conglomerate mergers in digital markets. For that purpose, the provisions under non-horizontal merger guidelines and Commission’s jurisprudence to establish the conditions necessary for prohibiting conglomerate mergers on grounds of foreclosure through leverage of market power are examined. Thereafter, such conditions are applied in the context of digital markets to determine the sufficiency of the current legal framework. In doing so, this thesis focuses on certain characteristics of digital markets such as presence of economies of scope and network effects to show that the competitive effects of leveraging strategy are amplified in such markets. In conclusion, it has to be claimed that certain changes are required to the methodologies and framework under EU merger control to appropriately deal with the amplified effects of conglomerates mergers and with dynamic challenges posed by innovation in the digital markets.