‘Difficult but possible’: an exploratory approach to the regulation of cyber weapons using lessons learned from chemical weapons arms control

Developments in science and technology improve health and wellbeing of humankind, for example with better methods to detect and treat diseases. However, some advances have led to the development of weapons of mass destruction: chemical and biological weapons. Although banned by international treaties, chemical weapons have been used in recent years in assassinations and the Syrian civil war. Additionally, biological weapons became the subject of recent suspicions and allegations. While not limited to these fields, the so-called dual-use potential—the possibility to apply aspects both with benevolent or malevolent intentions—is especially pronounced in the life sciences. Here, we showcase some areas explored at the conference series Spiez CONVERGENCE that facilitates an exchange between science, arms control and international security. Together, these communities discuss the potential impact of life scientific advances on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Enabled by digital technologies, DNA sequencing and synthesis provide the toolbox to (re)construct viruses and cells, which demonstrated invaluable during the COVID-19 pandemic but bear the misuse risk to allow intentionally triggering an outbreak. Open databases and algorithms could be used to generate new chemical weapons. We argue that preventing unintended consequences of life science research while promoting its benefits with responsible science, requires awareness and reflection about unexpected risks of everyone involved in the research process. The strength of the ban of chemical and biological weapons also depends on scientists interacting with policy makers in evaluating risks and implementing measures to reduce them.

Those who really deserve praise are the people who, while human enough to enjoy power, nonetheless pay more attention to justice than they are compelled to do by the situation. Thucydides, Speech of the Athenians [1] have the power, the capability, sitting in my home with my computer and my modem--if I only understood how to do it--to wage war. That is a very different environment than anything that we have experienced in the past. James Adams [2] Today we are on the verge of technological advances that will redefine how we wage war and, in many cases, blur the current line between economic competition and warfare. The technology which holds the most promise, as well as the most unknown danger, is the world of computer networks--cyberspace. With the proliferation of computers and ever-increasing computing power available to nearly every private citizen in developed countries, microprocessors have changed the lives of countless millions of people. The ubiquity of computing within business, finance, educational, and military institutions has raised concerns about the security of the data and tools upon which we have become increasingly dependent. [3] Many authors have expressed increasing concerns with our computer security. Some have speculated that an against the United States could disrupt electricity supplies and telephone service, interfere with air traffic control, cause leaks or explosions at chemical plants or refineries, and cause economic damage ranging into billions of dollars. [4] Likewise, other nations and transnational groups may have similar vulnerabilities the United States could exploit. Therefore, some people reason the United States should develop its own capabilities in the realm of computer network attack. In many articles and books, authors highlight the supposed elegance of bringing an enemy to his knees without firing a shot, instead rendering him defenseless and harmless by defeating his information infrastructure via surgical attacks. [5] The weapons of computer network include chipping [6] (inserting malevolent code into hardware during manufacturing), programming back doors to allow external control of a computer, and disseminating computer viruses. On the surface, these weapons appear to be nonlethal in nature, but they may have disruptive or deadly higher-order effects. Technologically capable nations are, perhaps by necessity, contemplating the addition of computer to their arsenals. During the Kosovo intervention, the United States attempted limited electronic attacks on Serbian computers containing banking records of Serbian leaders. [7] The United States is not alone, however. In 1995, the National Security Agency and Department of Energy estimated that more than 120 nations already had some sort of computer capability. [8] The People's Republic of China reportedly is studying numerous types of dirty war--asymmetric attack in today's military parlance --which include using computer viruses to pitch China's technologically advanced enemies into political and economic crisis. [9] The potential for such a crisis makes the application of computer network a very different sort of combat power than the kinetic weapons it may someday supplement or replace. Like kinetic weapons, a computer network can destroy both military and civilian targets. Unlike kinetic weapons, however, a computer network can reach across the world at the speed of light, invisibly transiting many international borders en route to its target. Like chemical and biological weapons, cyber weapons can target large masses of people in both military and civilian communities. Unlike biological and chemical weapons, however, they affect humans indirectly rather than directly. Cyber weapons thus share some similarities with weapons of yesterday, yet they occupy a completely new niche by their nature. …

There have been immense developments over the two decades since chemical weapons were first used in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Today we live in a very different world. The Cold War has come to an end and there is now much cooperation across Europe and Russia. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 raised the world's awareness of the real dangers posed by the possible use of chemical and biological weapons by Iraq against the coalition forces. Following the war, UNSCOM despite the intransigence of Iraq successfully demonstrated the magnitude of the Iraqi offensive chemical and biological weapons programmes and oversaw the destruction of such stockpiles and capabilities and the introduction of ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq. There were high hopes in the early 1990s for a new world order of peace and stability. This was underlined through the Security Council meeting for the first time at Heads of State and Heads of Government level in January 1992 to consider 'The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security' which agreed1 that: The members of the Council underline the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament; to prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction; … They emphasize the importance of the early ratification and implementation by the States concerned of all international and regional arms control agreements, … The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end. … In conclusion, the members of the Security Council affirm their determination to build on the initiative of their meeting in order to secure positive advances in promoting international peace and security. … The members of the Council agree that the world now has the best chance of achieving international peace and security since the foundation of the United Nations.

The elimination of stockpiled weaponry constitutes a key step in arms control and disarmament processes, lending permanence and irreversibility to arms reductions. Yet it has proven challenging in practice. The destruction of advanced weapon components, like lethal chemical agents and the fissile materials from which nuclear weapons are constructed, is often technically complex and costly. To elucidate the dynamics of this back-end of arms control and disarmament processes, this article compares two representative cases involving analogous challenges but divergent outcomes: the nearly complete elimination of the US chemical weapon stockpile and stalled efforts to shrink the US weapons plutonium stockpile. Drawing from both engineering and organisation theory, technical and social distinctions between these efforts are assessed to identify key factors governing their outcomes. This analysis shows that the technical bases for stockpile reductions were broadly analogous between the two cases, and thus fail to explain their divergence. Rather, differing organisational characteristics among the responsible institutions proved decisive. These fostered either adaptive (in the chemical weapon case) or path-dependent (in the weapons plutonium case) organisational planning, influencing the ability of the responsible entities to pivot from stockpile maintenance to an unfamiliar reductions mission.

Two of the most pressing questions concerning international peace and security today are how to avoid an escalation of conflicts in cyberspace and how to ensure responsible behavior and accountability of states in their use of information and communication technologies. With more than thirty states now possessing offensive cyber capabilities and cybersecurity incidents such as Stuxnet, WannaCry, and NotPetya causing significant physical effects or financial damage, there is a clear need to find a better way to manage security risks connected with the use of increasingly sophisticated cyber means by states. At present, this issue is on the agenda of two United Nations groups and is mainly addressed through a “framework for responsible behavior of states” consisting of international law, voluntary and non-binding norms, and confidence-building measures for states’ use of information and communication technologies. What the current discussions do not address, however, is whether the security risks could also be regulated through an arms control and inspection regime for cyber weapons. While such a regime has been proposed by scholars, states remain skeptical or even actively opposed to efforts to impose traditional arms control measures on offensive cyber capabilities. This essay examines why a cyber weapons inspection regime is so difficult to devise. It argues that due to their nature and mode of functioning, cyber weapons significantly differ from traditional nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, such that mechanisms established by traditional arms control treaties either will not work or will not be agreed to by states. Instead, new regulatory approaches are necessary.

248 SAISREVIEW Chemical Warfare, Chemical Disarmament. By Valerie Adams. Bloomington , Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990. 276 pp. $29.95/cloth. Reviewed by Ricky Aberle, M.A. Candidate, SAIS. The Soviet Union and the United States are dramatically revising their military postures in Europe and around the world in a climate of reduced threat. It was within this climate that the treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces was negotiated, with its sweeping elimination of an entire category of weapons and its highly intrusive verification regime. Hopefully, this climate will breathe new life into negotiations on chemical weapons, which in the past have been frustrated by verification concerns. For those studying chemical weapons, Chemical Warfare, Chemical Disarmament is an excellent text. Valerie Adams has produced one of the most comprehensive books available on the subject. The extensive up-to-date bibliography provides a useful reference guide for further research. Adams begins by defining chemical warfare and clearly explaining the functions and classifications ofvarious chemical agents. Her conversational style allows her to flesh out drier topics while holding the reader's interest. The approach is casual and informative, and provides data in an organized, comprehensible fashion. Adams divides her book into consumable sections covering the history of chemical weapon use from Ypres to Iraq, superpower perspectives, and a chronology of arms control negotiations. On controversial issues such as Agent Orange and yellow rain, Adams delivers the facts, allegations and statements from all parties involved and lets the reader decide. Her personal accounts help liven the narrative. She presents the long history ofchemical arms negotiations chronologically, highlighting the salient issues and decisions. This approach gives readers a basic grasp ofthe negotiations process without engulfing them in a quagmire of detail. Adams avoids moral issues till the end of the work, where she addresses whether chemical weapons should be banned, the political implications of weapons production, and the threat of chemical proliferation. The balanced, factual treatment gives the work its unbiased quality, and readers arrive at this final chapter well-versed enough in the history and effects of chemical weapons to judge these issues for themselves. The Great Universal Embrace: Arms Control Summitry—A Skeptic's Account. By Kenneth L. Adelman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. 366 pp. $19.95/cloth. Reviewed by Bill Mikhail, Center for Strategic and International Studies. U.S.-Soviet summits, says Kenneth Adelman, lead to better relations "in sentimental ways, by warming the atmosphere." In The Great Universal BOOK REVIEWS 249 Embrace, the former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reimposes his position as a leading summit skeptic. Adelman provides strong opinions on many important issues which affect superpower relations and the dynamics of arms control. The book includes discussion of the U.S.-U.S.S.R summits at Geneva, Reykjavik, and Washington, as well as debates over SDI, the INF treaty, and SALT II. Adelman is critical of the fact that arms control has become the focal point of Soviet-American summits. The ideal agenda for the two superpowers' relations, according to Adelman, must also encompass regional issues, bilateral relations, and human rights. He argues that summits do not deter Soviet aggression; rather, the Soviets become even more aggressive after these summits. The Kennedy -Khrushchev summit did not stop the Soviets from deploying their missiles in Cuba in the Fall of 1962, nor did the Johnson-Kosygin summit prevent the Soviets from invading Czechoslovakia in 1968. Adelman writes of the Reagan-Schultz syndrome in negotiations with the Soviets during the summits and the Foreign Ministers' talks, charging that "[w]hile the President prided himself on his abilities as a negotiator, the Secretary prided himself on his prowess as an arbitrator." According to Adelman, "traditional arms control has reached a dead end." Reduction in only first-strike nuclear weapons is difficult to achieve, and fifty percent cut in strategic arms will only eliminate older weapons while leaving the new ones. To Adelman, arms control neglects strategic crisis management. Fewer nuclear weapons, the goal of the START negotiations, may even heighten the prospects of a nuclear exchange. Fewer numbers can make nuclear weapons more usable in a "use 'em or lose them situation." Moreover, any strategic accord will...

Environmental democracy is the political basis of the sustainable development of the environment. From the perspective of political science, the public needs to be involved both in the process of the making of environmental policies and in avoiding government failures in environmental protection. From the perspective of economics, sustainable development of the environment requires a democratic production mode and in avoiding “the tragedy of public land” the public needs to be involved. From the legal perspective, solving environmental hazard incidents involves environmental hazard litigation. From the perspective of the international political science, in order to build a society in which the individual rights of us and our responsibilities to the neighborhood, the community and the earth are deemed to be intrinsically connected, we need to democratize the decision-making process of the social policies.

The revelation of Stuxnet in 2010 as the world’s first cyber weapon of its own kind that attacked Iranian enrichment facility has led to an extensive debate on the issue of cyber security. In every cyber attack, the attacker may risk of handing over the ammunition to the enemy as a blueprint for the latter to develop a cyber weapon of its own. In cyber warfare, there is possibility that victims of cyber attack develop their own cyber weapon resulting into proliferation of cyber weapons, which is going to be awfully perilous for the security of international system given the complex interconnectivity of computer networks and internet across the world. Since, until now the cyber weapons are used in an offensive mode; therefore, the probability of more states developing offensive cyber weapons is increasing. The chapter argues that the offensive nature of cyber weapons without having an adequate defensive character is destabilizing for the international security system. In this regard, this chapter examines the offense-defense balance in the cyber warfare, and how does offense has the advantage in the cyber warfare that can destabilize the security.

The confrontation in Syria during 2013 is an ongoing cause for concern regarding the potential use of chemical and biological weapons. There have been reports of the use of chemical weapons including Sarin (BBC, 2013a) which UN chemical weapons inspectors are investigating (BBC, 2013b). If chemical weapons have been used by either side, then the potential use of biological weapons cannot be disregarded. In addition to stockpiles of chemical weapon (BBC 2013c), Syria is thought to have stockpiles of a number of biological agents including anthrax, plague, tularaemia, botulinium, smallpox and cholera (Gordon, 2007). Some groups sympathetic to Al Qaeda might also have access to some of these through their terrorist networks. Because these weapons can have a substantial impact beyond the immediate conflict zone, there are serious questions about how best to respond efficiently to their use and manage their impacts. One such concern is whether the response to an attack involving a single agent would be the same as when more than one agent is used. There are indications that infectious diseases which promote cytokine response can have a protecting effect on infection with a second disease (Graham et al., 2007, Barton et al, 2007). Plague affects the innate immune system by suppressing cytokine responses (Li et al., 2008) while smallpox activates the cytokine response (Fenner et al, 1988). Such an interaction is therefore possible with smallpox and plague in people who are infected with both diseases. While there are a number of papers on the management of both smallpox and plague (Halloran, (2002), Rani et al, (2004)), there are few, if any, which discuss infection by both agents simultaneously or the likely confounding factors that will affect outcomes in their infection control after the attack. In this paper we explore the application of microsimulation modelling of a simultaneous attack on a civilian population using plague and smallpox as an example of a simultaneous coinfection through its effect on the spread of disease and number of deaths As a basis for analysis, we have developed simulations involving a population of 1250 people based on NSW statistics for households and work. The structure of a community model of social mixing is briefly discussed, over which a multi-infection model is imposed that accounts for varying infectivity in different stages of each disease as well as confinement to home as each disease progresses. A number of simulations were run assuming 10% immunity to both diseases, to establish a baseline for each disease in the community. Further simulations were used to model the delay of the introduction of plague compared to smallpox between 0 and 35 days respectively. The strength of the immunological interaction by smallpox on plague deaths was also investigated. Each scenario was repeated 10 times to assess the variability. Our model showed the outcome is complex as the number of deaths is dependent on the delay in the release of plague and varies according to the number of people progressing through the active release locations that can infect them. Additionally confinement to their household during the later stages of both diseases reduces the number of susceptible people in the general community although it still allows for spread to other household members. It was found that the number of confections was about 10% of the total number infected and that the reduction in deaths from plague where the two infections were present also depended on how many smallpox cases were at the correct stage of development compared to the plague infection. We believe that the use of microsimulation has a benefit in that many of the human factors that affect delay in control and hence the size of any epidemic can be easily incorporated into the simulation without affecting the other components of the simulation. For example, vaccine and drug supply can be added as additional peeps that move to hospitals or doctors’ surgeries and then interact with the human population through creation of additional states based on these locations. Further work is planned to assess the impact of these human factors on preventing epidemic spread as well as assessing current WHO guidelines for each disease. The intention is to develop protocols for application both within and outside of conflict areas. Progress on this will be reported at the conference.

Technological and scientific progress, especially the rapid development in information technology (IT), plays a crucial role regarding questions of peace and security. This textbook addresses the significance, potentials and challenges of IT for peace and security. For this purpose, the book offers an introduction to peace, conflict, and security research, thereby focusing on natural science, technical and computer science perspectives. In the following, it sheds light on fundamentals (e.g. IT in peace, conflict and security, naturalscience/ technical peace research), cyber conflicts and war (e.g. information warfare, cyber espionage, cyber defence, Darknet), cyber peace (e.g. dual-use, technology assessment, confidence and security building measures), cyber arms control (e.g. arms control in the cyberspace, unmanned systems, verification), cyber attribution and infrastructures (e.g. attribution of cyber attacks, resilient infrastructures, secure critical information infrastructures), culture and interaction (e.g. safety and security, cultural violence, social media), before an outlook is given. This chapter provides an overview of all chapters in this book.

Part 1 Introduction to the problem section: weapons technology and regional stability, W. Seth Carus arms trade and the proliferation of new military technologies, Yuri Pinchukov the strategic implications of chemical weapons proliferation, Brad Roberts mayhem or deterrence? regional and global security from non-proliferation to post-proliferation, Christopher Carle. Part 2 Arab-Israel: quality vs quantity - the Arab perspective of the arms race in the Middle East, Abdel Monem Said Aly security and arms control in the Middle East - an Israeli perspective, Shai Feldman. Part 3 Gulf: Iran and the lessons of the war with Iraq: implications for future defense policies, Shahram Chubin arms control and the proliferation of high technology weapons in the Near East and South Asia - an Iraqi view, Nazim T.Mushtak. Part 4 India-Pakistan: arms control and the proliferation of high technology weapons in South Asia and near East - a view from India, Jasjit Singh arms control and the proliferation of high technology weapons in South Asia and near East - a view from Pakistan, Ross Masood Hussain. Part 5 Arms control section: untangling the priorities - weapons, vehicles and the objectives of arms control, Ian Smart arms control goals in the Middle East and South Asia, goals, methods, and limitations, Geoffrey Kep and Shelly A.Stahl stemming the proliferation of ballistic missiles - an assessment of arms control options, Janne E.Nolan chemical and biological weapons and regional arms control, Brad Roberts controlling weapons of mass destruction in South Asia - an American perspective, Stephen P.Cohen Soviet policy toward arms transfers to the Middle East, Andrei Shoumikhin conclusion, Geoffrey Kempt and Shelley A.Stahl.

In the computer science field coordinated vulnerability disclosure is a well-known practice for finding flaws in IT-systems and patching them. In this practice, a white-hat hacker who finds a vulnerability in an IT-system reports that vulnerability to the system’s owner. The owner will then resolve the problem, after which the vulnerability will be disclosed publicly. This practice generally does not focus on potential offenders or black-hat hackers who would likely exploit the vulnerability instead of reporting it. In this paper, we take an interdisciplinary approach and review the current coordinated vulnerability disclosure practice from both a computer science and criminological perspective. We discuss current issues in this practice that could influence the decision to use coordinated vulnerability disclosure versus exploiting a vulnerability. Based on different motives, a rational choice or cost–benefit analyses of the possible reactions after finding a vulnerability will be discussed. Subsequently, implications for practice and future research suggestions are included.

Armed forces of many countries are preparing cyber warfare. Without limitations there is an arms race with a strong danger of escalation. As with other destabilizing weapon systems, arms control is advisable, but this meets difficulties. Cyber weapons are not as tangible and countable as tanks or combat aircraft. As long as cyber arms control is not in place, confidence (and security) building measures (C(S)BMs) can act as first steps in reducing threat perceptions and damping escalation. States have started considering CBMs, e.g., in the UN. The strongest measures are recommended in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). These voluntary measures do not mention cyber forces explicitly, but they are included. The OSCE has a wealth of experience with CSBMs in the traditional military domains. Several of these measures could be transferred to the cyber realm, e.g., exchanges about the force structure and about policy and doctrines, contacts and visits, prior notification of exercises, inspections, and evaluation visits. With or without formal CSBMs, an international monitoring system for cyberspace would be useful. It would provide threat detection and attack early warning, support in emergencies, and reporting of vulnerabilities. Such an infrastructure would foster information sharing and collaboration toward acceptable norms for state behavior in the cyber sphere.

Javed Ali is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Special Projects Division of Research Planning, Incorporated (RPI) in Falls Church, Virginia, where he currently provides counterterrorism analytical, training and exercise support for a range of U.S. government agencies. He is a recognized authority on chemical and biological weapons issues, arms control, terrorism, and regional security dynamics, and is a frequent contributor to Jane’s Defence publications.

We recently called for a new for making sense of the relationship between visibility and invisibility of human bodies in the twenty-first century (Casper and Moore 2009). Drawing on six diverse but interrelated case studies ranging from infant mortality to HIV/ AIDS in Africa to Lance Armstrong s testicular cancer, in Missing Bodies we ethnographically mapped the processes by which we see or do not see certain bodies and what this witnessing has to do with power and the politics of gender, race, class, sexuality, citizenship, age, and geography. We have begun to employ our t/methodological project to investigate new sites where (in)visibility matters. Committed to feminist and sociological methods, our critical attention to visibility and the ocular ethic is based on empirical research and is deeply attentive to social structures. We focus our analytical lens here on connections between national security, arms control, and the shifting gender politics of laboring bodies. We are specifically interested in how an international treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), reflects a strategic rationality aimed at eliminating deadly weapons but uses the abstract language of states with very little textual reference to human bodies (see also Dawes 1999). And yet implementation of the CWC, as we show, relies on, among other things, the invisible work of men at hazardous disposal sites. What does it mean, we ask, when ideals of global and are achieved by risking some bodies for the sake of others? Who can be (made) safe in a world with chemical weapons, even as these noxious munitions are being slowly eradicated? Will obliteration of chemical weapons make everybody safe and secure, as the treaty's architects seem to imply? And how do global treaties and the domestic practices they instigate both reveal and extend structural inequalities? We show that and risk operate in juxtaposition, such that concepts as broad and vague as homeland security may mean for some but only at the expense of others. Inspired by Foucault (1979/2010) and contemporary scholars of biosecurity and human (e.g., Collier, Lakoff, and Rabinow 2004; Berman 2007), we interrogate the (dis)embodied qualities of the CWC. We reveal it principally, and perhaps unsurprisingly, as an instrument of governmentality in the service of global arms control. That is, through the CWC policy makers seek to produce secure - but not inevitably safe - global subjects who will adhere to and ostensibly benefit from some version of peace; of course, this works only if certain people are subjected to bodily risks in the name of security. Ideals of security, then, do not necessarily translate into for all human beings. Indeed, by bringing workers into our analytical frame, by making them visible, we illustrate how embodied labor facilitates success of the CWC and its policy goals. In short, the collision of disembodied rationality with lived experiences represents a hierarchy of abstract goals over situated practices. The lofty ideals and rhetoric of trump the practical realities of community relations; basic human in the workplace; and the needs and rights of citizens to live in clean, safe environments. In what follows, we investigate and interpret the ways in which human bodies are simultaneously erased in bureaucratic governmental treaties and used in the nitty-gritty of executing the treaty's provisions. After providing a historical overview of chemical weapons in the United States, we describe our fieldwork and data-gathering strategies. Moving through our analysis of the consequences of creating a treaty without specific consideration of and engagement with human bodies, we then examine our ethnographic data to interpret how men actually work in chemical weapons disposal and what this means in terms of masculinity and practices. We conclude with observations about the broader implications of safety as both ideology and practice and how this relates to governmentality and arms control, rhetorics of national/global security, and the dangerous work of human bodies. …