Differential energy pricing of industrial park operator based on potential game considering public loss allocation

Abstract

With development of industrial aggregation, the industrial park energy operator (IPEO) offers energy supply services to factories with varying energy consumption requirements. Nevertheless, the unified energy pricing model is not conducive to the park operator's ability to attain a justifiable recuperation of energy supply expenses. To address these issues, a differential pricing strategy for the potential game of IPEO is proposed in this paper to achieve clean and efficient operation of industrial electric-heat energy systems (EHES). Firstly, a mechanism for allocating public losses is established in the pricing process, and the power loss of the network is precisely allocated to the user side using the complex power tracking method. Second, a potential game model for IPEO and its users is established based on the different interests of the participants. IPEO releases energy prices to users by maximizing energy sales as a profit function and considering the output of energy production facilities and purchased electricity. The user minimizes the cost of energy by considering the profit function, which takes into account the energy storage discharge and flexible load adjustment. Finally, the feasibility and validity of the proposed model are verified by comparing several cases. The simulation results show that the proposed model can fully consider the autonomy of the game participants and effectively enhance the benefits of each participant.