Differences in responses to accounting-based and market-based benchmarks – Evidence from Nasdaq

Abstract

We study how managers of Nasdaq-listed firms respond to the threat of delisting due to quantitative listing deficiencies. We find that managers' responses vary by deficiency type, specifically, whether the deficiency is accounting-based (related to shareholders' equity) or market-based (related to market value or bid price). Firms with accounting-based deficiencies exhibit income-increasing discretionary accruals. In contrast, firms with market-based deficiencies do not. We also find that shareholders' equity-deficient firms respond with equity issuances and bid price-deficient firms initiate reverse stock splits. These findings suggest that firms trade off among methods to meet benchmarks based on costs and constraints. In additional analyses, we find some evidence that firms' delisting avoidance strategies succeed in delaying or avoiding regulatory delistings.