Dialectic’s Role in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics x 7

Aristotle claims in the Metaphysics that in order to be resourceful in first philosophic inquiry it is useful to go through perplexity well. In this essay, the author argues that that perplexity plays a parallel role in Aristotle's account of practical, deliberative inquiry in the Nicomachean Ethics. He does so by offering an interpretation of the relation between Aristotle's account of akratic ignorance in Nicomachean Ethics 7 and his emphasis on the necessity of going through perplexity when inquiring into akrasia. Along the way, the author tries to shed some additional light on Aristotle's conception of endoxa, his account of the so-called practical syllogism, and the distinction between ethical virtue simply and "authoritative" virtue. But the intention throughout the essay is to examine the role that perplexity about the phenomena of ethical life plays in Aristotle's account of the kind of thoughtfulness required for excellence of character.

Feelings play an important role in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, but the discussion of them is scanty. A longer discussion is to be found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, but as Irwin points out, there are important differences between the context and content of the two works. I consider how far the discussion of the feelings in Aristotle’s Rhetoric can be used to elucidate the feelings mentioned in the Nicomachean Ethics. I conclude by contrasting Aristotle’s views about feelings with those of Hobbes, arguing that the clash between Aristotelian naturalism and Hobbesian voluntarism shows up even in their respective accounts of the passions.

Aristotle's categorial scheme had an unparalleled effect not only on his own philosophical system, but also on the systems of many of the greatest philosophers in the Western tradition. The set of doctrines in the Categories, known as categorialism, play, for instance, a central role in Aristotle's discussion of change in the Physics, in the science of being qua being in the Metaphysics, and in the rejection of Platonic ethics in the Nicomachean Ethics. Plainly, the enterprise of categorialism inaugurated by Aristotle runs deep in the philosophical psyche. Even so, despite its wide-reaching influence—and, indeed owing to that influence—any attempt to describe categorialism faces a significant difficulty: experts disagree on many of its most important and fundamental aspects. This article argues that Aristotle's categorial scheme, as is the case with many works in the history of philosophy, is best illuminated by opposing beams of interpretive light. It examines how Aristotle arrived at his list of categories and considers the connection between Aristotle's categories and his hylomorphism.

In this paper, I argue that purely quantitative understandings of Aristotle's concept of "the mean" (as presented in Nicomachean Ethics) are oversimplified, and I make this argument by analyzing the particular emotion of anger. Anger, I contend, helps to complicate the purely quantitative understanding of the mean, insofar as, I argue, the amount of anger experienced is not the morally salient feature in determining whether or not the anger is virtuous. Rather, anger is one example of an emotion or trait for which other, non-quantitative parameters of the mean are more salient, giving us a more nuanced understanding of what the mean is. Anger is virtuous not when it is in the right measurable degree, but rather when it is directed at the proper target. In this way, the virtue-making property of anger is distinctly qualitative. Examining anger provides insight into the concept of the mean and its role in Aristotle's ethics, and also helps to shed light on contemporary debates about political anger.

Aristotelian Necessities

versus Plato. For a long time that is the angle from which the tale has been told, in textbooks on the history of philosophy and to university students. Aristotle's philosophy, so the story goes, was au fond in opposition to Plato's. But it was not always thus.-from the Introduction In a wide-ranging book likely to cause controversy, Lloyd P. Gerson sets out the case for the of Platonism and Aristotelianism, the standard view in late antiquity. He aims to show that the twentieth-century view that Aristotle started out as a Platonist and ended up as an anti-Platonist is seriously flawed. Gerson examines the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle based on their principle of harmony. In considering ancient studies of Aristotle's Categories, Physics, De Anima, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics, the author shows how the principle of harmony allows us to understand numerous texts that otherwise appear intractable. Gerson also explains how these esoteric treatises can be seen not to conflict with the early exoteric and admittedly Platonic dialogues of Aristotle. Aristotle and Other Platonists concludes with an assessment of some of the philosophical results of acknowledging harmony.

Abstract: The standard view of the relationship between the Nicomachean Ethics , the Eudemian Ethics , and their shared “Common Books” ( AE ) holds that the NE and the AE share a more sophisticated moral psychology compared to the EE . I argue that this is backwards. The undisputed books of the NE (I–IV, VIII–X) are committed to a three-part soul, which combines theoretical and practical wisdom. The AE argues for a four-part soul, distinguishing theoretical and practical wisdom. The undisputed EE books (I–III, VII–VIII) endorse the same four-part model. This suggests two conclusions: (a) the AE and EE are harmonious, while the AE and NE conflict on point of fundamental doctrine; (b) the EE does better than the NE on the standard view’s own criteria that a model of the soul with more distinctions and parts is more sophisticated.

Ontological separation plays a key role in Aristotle’s metaphysical project: substances alone are ontologically χωριστόν. The standard view identifies Aristotelian ontological separation with ontological independence, so that ontological separation is a non-symmetric relation. I argue that there is strong textual evidence that Aristotle employs an asymmetric notion of separation in theMetaphysics—one that involves the dependence of other entities on the independent entity. I argue that this notion allows Aristotle to prevent the proliferation of substance-kinds and thus to secure the unity of his metaphysical system.

Author(s): Hutchinson, DS; Johnson, MR | Abstract: In order to reach the fullest understanding of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, we would do well not only to study the details of his argumentation but also to appreciate the various purposes that these details serve. Aristotle tries to inform his audience about his own ethical and social standpoint and how it is founded on arguments consistent with his wider philosophical commitments; but he also tries to motivate members of his audience to engage in their own philosophical inquiries, as applied not only to concrete moral and political questions but also to the most abstract and inapplicable forms of philosophy. We hope to show that the overall protreptic plan of Aristotle’s ethical writings is based on the plan he used in his published work Protrepticus (Exhortation to Philosophy), by highlighting those passages in his ethical writings that primarily offer hortatory or protreptic motivation rather than dialectical argumentation and analysis, and illustrating several ways that Aristotle’s ethical works adapt certain arguments and examples from his Protrepticus. We confine our attention in this contribution to the Nicomachean Ethics. The most explicit references to Aristotle's audience and his purpose in writing any of his ethical discourses are found in NE x. Early in the book, he writes this: “True arguments, then, seem to be the most useful, not only in the acquisition of knowledge, but in how we live. For since they are in harmony with the facts, they are believed, and for that reason they exhort (protrepontai) those who understand them to live in accordance with them” (1.1172b3-7). Toward the end of the book, however, he focuses on the qualification “those who understand them” rather more: “As things are, though they [sc. philosophical arguments] appear to have the power to influence and exhort (protrepsasthai) those young people who possess generosity of spirit, and perhaps to make susceptible to virtue character that is well bred and truly loves what is noble, they seem unable to exhort (protrepsasthai) the masses in the direction of what is noble and good” (9.1179b7-10, modified). For the majority of people, then, politics and laws are called for, not Ethics and philosophy.

This book presents an examination of Aristotle's accounts of voluntariness in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. It makes the case that these constitute a theory of moral responsibility — albeit one with important differences from modern theories. Highlights of the discussion include a reconstruction of the dialectical argument in the Eudemian Ethics II 6-9, and a demonstration that the definitions of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ in Nicomachean Ethics III 1 are the culmination of that argument. By identifying the paradigms of voluntariness and involuntariness that Aristotle begins with and the opponents (most notably Plato) he addresses, the book explains notoriously puzzling features of the Nicomachean account — such as Aristotle's requirement that involuntary agents experience pain or regret. Other familiar features of Aristotle' account are cast in a new light. That we are responsible for the characters we develop turns out not to be a necessary condition of responsible agency. That voluntary action has its ‘origin’ in the agent and that our actions are ‘up to us to do and not to do’ — often interpreted as implying a libertarian conception of agency — turn out to be perfectly compatible with causal determinism, a point the book makes by locating these locutions in the context of Aristotle's general understanding of causality. While Aristotle does not himself face or address worries that determinism is incompatible with responsibility, his causal repertoire provides the resources for a powerful response to incompatibilist arguments. On this and other fronts Aristotle's is a view to be taken seriously by theorists of moral responsibility.

Like Socrates, Thomas Smith's Aristotle practices philosophy as a way of life. The Nicomachean Ethics is Aristotle's protreptic and therapeutic introduction to this way of life. It is not a didactic treatise but a teaching that aims at the improvement of its readers' souls. It therefore begins from reputable opinions (endoxa) and employs dialectical arguments—not the best arguments simply, but the best available for improving the lives of Aristotle's audience.

This book presents an examination of Aristotle's accounts of voluntariness in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. It makes the case that these constitute a theory of moral responsibility — albeit one with important differences from modern theories. Highlights of the discussion include a reconstruction of the dialectical argument in the Eudemian Ethics II 6-9, and a demonstration that the definitions of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ in Nicomachean Ethics III 1 are the culmination of that argument. By identifying the paradigms of voluntariness and involuntariness that Aristotle begins with and the opponents (most notably Plato) he addresses, the book explains notoriously puzzling features of the Nicomachean account — such as Aristotle's requirement that involuntary agents experience pain or regret. Other familiar features of Aristotle' account are cast in a new light. That we are responsible for the characters we develop turns out not to be a necessary condition of responsible agency. That voluntary action has its ‘origin’ in the agent and that our actions are ‘up to us to do and not to do’ — often interpreted as implying a libertarian conception of agency — turn out to be perfectly compatible with causal determinism, a point the book makes by locating these locutions in the context of Aristotle's general understanding of causality. While Aristotle does not himself face or address worries that determinism is incompatible with responsibility, his causal repertoire provides the resources for a powerful response to incompatibilist arguments. On this and other fronts Aristotle's is a view to be taken seriously by theorists of moral responsibility.

We view Bayesian data analysis--the iterative process of model building, posterior inference, and model checking--as fitting well within an error-statistics or hypothetico-deductive philosophy of with posterior inference playing the role of science, model checking allowing falsification, and model building providing the potential for progress in normal science (for small changes in a model) or scientific revolutions (for larger re-evaluations). Our practical experience and corresponding philosophy differs in from usual presentations of the philosophy of statistics in two ways. First, we consider posterior probabilities to be a form of scientific measurement rather than as subjective statements of belief. Second, we perform Bayesian model checking by comparing predictions to observed data (in a generalization of classical statistical hypothesis testing), rather than by attempting to compute posterior probabilities of competing models. This chapter presents our own perspective on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics, based on our idiosyncratic readings of the philosophical literature and, more importantly, our experiences doing applied statistics in the social sciences and elsewhere. Think of this as two statistical practitioners' perspective on philosophical and foundational concerns. What we bring to the table are our substantive claims about actual social science research, and we attempt to explain those practices here. We are motivated to write this chapter out of dissatisfaction with what we perceive as the standard view of the philosophical foundations of Bayesian statistics. Here's what we take as the standard view: - Bayesian inference--inverse probability--is subjective and inductive, learning about the general from the particular. The expression p(H|y) says it all: the Bayesian learns the probability that a hypothesis H is true, given data. In the conventional view, this is completely different from classical frequentist statistics which is based on null hypothesis testing, that is, falsification. 3

Robert McKee, in his widely-esteemed screenwriting manual, Story , speaks of storytelling in general, and the screenplay in particular, as 'the creative demonstration of truth.' But what could it mean to think of the screenplay as a 'demonstration,' that is, as an argument? In this article I explore this question, taking my cue from McKee's own description of screenplay narrative as 'dramatized dialectical debate.' McKee's reference to dialectic suggests a connection to the dialectical inquiries in Aristotle's major treatises, especially the dialectical inquiry into the nature of human happiness found in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics . I argue for an analogy between this dialectical inquiry in Aristotle's ethics, and the dialectical trajectory of popular screenplays. Such an analogy helps us understand how films do work as kinds of argument, arguments that aim at the truth of what it means for human beings to achieve their good.