Abstract
Foreign and national militaries around the world have been increasingly involved in post-conflict reconstruction and development practices. In post 9/11, the trend of militarization of aid has been observed in many conflict-ridden countries but it is perhaps most visible in Afghanistan. Several studies highlighted the various reasons for the intangible achievements between 2001 and 2021 in Afghanistan; however, literature covering the anomalies of the security-development nexus remains scarce. The main aim of the paper is to critically analyse the security-development nexus by answering the questions: Why did development aid couldn’t achieve positive results in Afghanistan? Whose security and interests were served with the development aid programs? The security-development nexus poses a confounding paradox: which one should come first? Over six months (November 2021–April 2022), 26 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key respondents using purposive and snowball sampling. The paper argues that development under the US military authority brought military and civilian actors under one umbrella yet the existing cooperative framework was heavily influenced, in design and operation, by military actors.
Published Version
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