Deterrence as a Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

Abstract

Although a long practiced strategy, deterrence, as is commonly understood today, was theorised during the cold war. The cold war is now a distant memory, as is the occurrence or threat of war among the major powers in the world. This situation will naturally give rise to the question of whether deterrence as a defence strategy holds any utility in today’s world. As Gray points out, deterrence survived the cold war as a credible theory because it passed what he calls ‘the Brodie standard’; it was ‘good enough’. It was effective in what it was employed for. This essay will show that although it is still an effective strategy in the twenty-first century, and is hence not defunct, the theories supporting deterrence requires much revision to bring them into line with deterrence as practiced in the twenty-first century. Accordingly this essay will first explore the notion of deterrence and look at where it’s perceived weaknesses lie. An answer to the critics of deterrence will be provided with theoretical and practical supporting evidence. This will be followed by an argument for why deterrence is fit for service in the twenty-first century. After a brief look at key points to be considered when thinking of employing deterrence, a concluding statement will bring together all the evidence which shows the continuing utility of deterrence as a strategy in the twenty-first century.