Abstract
This paper examines determinants of effective rates of protection (ERP) and nominal rates of protection (NRP) in Thai manufacturing. Our results indicate political bargains in Thailand are struck over ERP rather than NRP. Moreover, protection tends to be granted to industries that have a high level of industry concentration and are experiencing increased import competition. The relatively open foreign investment policy regime in Thailand means that policymakers are more responsive to requests made by foreign investors, including requests for tariff cuts. The decision to grant protection to Thai industries is justified on the basis of the ability of industries to generate employment and backward linkage to the rest of the economy.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Economic Papers: A journal of applied economics and policy
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
