Abstract
Given pressure to act on climate change, nations now use market-based approaches for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Cap-and-trade systems for reducing GHG are strongly debated. Policy designers must allocate emissions allowances effectively to ensure successful cap-and-trade systems; for example, some argue that the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme has underperformed due to poor allowance distribution. We apply insights from auction design theory to analyse the performance of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) emissions allowance auctions, and show how RGGI could serve as a model for a national cap-and-trade system.
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