Des(encontros) em o “O impossível” de Maria Martins

Starting from the premise that comparison is an indispensable and basic cognitive operation, it is argued that there is no such thing as a comparative method, and that a variety of comparative approaches and research designs are available, depending on the purpose of the comparisons and more or less explicit/implicit theoretical presuppositions about the phenomena that are compared and their interrelationships. Three different attempts at discriminating between comparative approaches are presented, in order to illustrate how different comparative research designs may be understood and justified with reference to different theoretical presuppositions and purposes. The first one is associated with the so-called “societal effect”-approach developed by Marc Maurice and his colleagues in Aix-en-Provence. The second was developed by Charles Ragin, and the third by Jürgen Kocka. It is argued that two central paradoxes are running through them all: One is the propensity to compare phenomena as if they are “the same”, although we are perfectly aware that they are not. The other is the, often tacit, presupposition that the units we are comparing can be clearly separated from each other, although we know very well that in reality they cannot be clearly separated. Examples from the author’s own research are used to illustrate how these paradoxes are encountered and how one may deal with them, and some lessons are drawn about what and how one may learn from the discussion of various comparative research approaches, strategies and designs in order to deal with challenges encountered in “close up” research in studies of professions and policy-related “commissioned research”.

This is a contribution to the ongoing efforts to interpret the significant contribution to American sociology of Talcott Parsons (1902–1979). The author corrects an implication of his previous article in this journal by drawing attention to the profound impact of evolutionary cosmology upon Parsons’ theoretical presuppositions. This ensured an inner and continuing complexity in his theory of the “social system” from what we can identify as its earliest conceptual beginnings when Parsons was an under-graduate student at Amherst College.

As argumentações pautadas nos interesses e objetivos de alunos e professores durante o desenvolvimento de atividades de Modelagem Matemática foram sistematizadas em Kaiser e Sriraman (2006) por meio de perspectivas para a Modelagem Matemática na Educação Matemática. Considerando o propósito do nosso trabalho de investigar a Modelagem Matemática como prática favorável ao desenvolvimento do pensamento matemático de alunos, pautamos nossas discussões na perspectiva cognitivista para a Modelagem Matemática. Para abordar o pensamento matemático utilizamos os pressupostos teóricos de Dreyfus (2002) sobre o pensamento matemático de estudantes, e as caracterizações de Tall (2004) para diferentes "Mundos da Matemática". As análises empreendidas se realizam a partir do desenvolvimento de atividades de modelagem por estudantes de um curso de Licenciatura em Matemática e expressam reflexões e considerações sobre o pensamento matemático dos alunos e os processos cognitivos que mobilizaram e apontam indícios do trânsito dos alunos pelos Três Mundos da Matemática durante o desenvolvimento destas atividades. Os resultados obtidos a partir dessa análise indicam o potencial de atividades de Modelagem Matemática como desencadeadoras de processos de pensamento matemático caracterizados por Dreyfus (2002) e Tall (2004).

This essay focuses on the core of ethnographic research—participant observation—to argue that it is a potentially revolutionary praxis because it forces us to question our theoretical presuppositions about the world, produce knowledge that is new, was confined to the margins, or was silenced. It is argued that participant observation is not merely a method of anthropology but is a form of production of knowledge through being and action; it is praxis, the process by which theory is dialectically produced and realized in action. Four core aspects of participation observation are discussed as long duration (long-term engagement), revealing social relations of a group of people (understanding a group of people and their social processes), holism (studying all aspects of social life, marking its fundamental democracy), and the dialectical relationship between intimacy and estrangement (befriending strangers). Though the risks and limits of participant observation are outlined, as are the tensions between activism and anthropology, it is argued that engaging in participant observation is a profoundly political act, one that can enable us to challenge hegemonic conceptions of the world, challenge authority, and better act in the world.

In recent years there has been growing interest in the use of computers within qualitative geography. In this paper we review the types of software packages that have been adopted and outline some of their distinctive features. We discuss the intellectual and institutional reasons for the interest in the software and highlight the ways in which such reasons have shaped the use made of these packages. We argue that only a contextual account of how packages are adopted, adapted, and used can explain the situation in geography. Furthermore we suggest that the archaeologies underlying the packages—their theoretical presuppositions—are remarkably homogeneous and need to be clearly understood before deciding how the packages might be used. We outline how some of these presuppositions have affected the ways in which the packages have been used, and develop—from our own experiences—some points about informal networks of adoption and institutional contexts. The point of this is to suggest the minimal role played by formal software guides and manuals in choosing whether and how to use a package. The paper outlines the current ‘state of play’ and raises issues of future use to be addressed in a second paper on this theme. Our intention is neither to sell a particular package, nor to say “to do X, use package Y”, because such recommendations are often misleading. Rather, our aim is to provoke discussion about the use of software packages in qualitative geography.

Carl Schmitt’s conceptual history of war is routinely invoked to comprehend the contemporary mutations in the concept and practice of war. This literature has passively relied on Schmitt’s interpretation of the nomos of the Ius Publicum Europaeum, which traced the transition from early modern ‘non-discriminatory war’ to the US–American promotion of discriminatory warfare as a new category in liberal international law . This chapter provides a critical reconstruction of Schmitt’s antiliberal narrative of war and argues that his polemical mode of concept formation led to a defective and, ultimately, ideological counterhistory of absolutist warfare, designed to denigrate liberalism’s wars as total while remaining silent on Nazi Germany’s de facto total wars. The historical critique is supplemented by an interrogation of his theoretical presuppositions: decisionism, the concept of the political, and concrete order thinking. It shows that Schmitt’s history of warfare is not only empirically defective but also theoretically unsecured by a succession of arbitrarily deployed and hyperabstract theoretical registers. At the center of Schmitt’s work yawns a huge lacuna: the absence of social relations as a category of analysis.

Before embarking on an analysis of the data, it is well to review a number of theoretical issues which arise consistently in studies of economy and population. Theoretical presuppositions will be discussed and tested empirically wherever possible. Fortunately, the work of economic historians since Colin Clark and Simon Kuznets has resulted in considerable breakthroughs, including recent efforts to harmonize national accounting systems, particularly in less developed countries.

Neste trabalho, tomamos como pressupostos teóricos a noção-conceito de formação discursiva, conforme proposta por Michel Pêcheux (1997) e com base no artigo Palavra de amor, de Eni Orlandi (1990) para analisarmos, sob o ponto de vista da Análise de Discurso de linha francesa, fragmentos de canções em língua inglesa e em língua portuguesa. A análise das canções nos permitiu perceber as formações discursivas do amor enquanto dor ou sofrimento e do amor enquanto saudade como constitutivas dos textos, reveladas por regularidades enunciativas em funcionamento através de elementos linguísticos e características dos textos. Na impossibilidade de tratarmos aqui de todos os aspectos investigados sobre o discurso de amor, reiteramos a certeza de que a noção-conceito de formação discursiva, como teorizada por Pêcheux (1997) ainda se faz bastante produtiva. Igualmente, reafirmamos a produtividade do artigo de Orlandi (1990), apesar de seus quase trinta anos de produção de sentidos.

This article highlights methodological and theoretical presuppositions that have contributed to scholarly neglect and rejection of exploration chronicles such as Fray Marcos de Niza's account of his journey to Cibola in 1539. Marcos's relación and similar texts often have been ignored or rejected because of presuppositions about the “accuracy” of modern anthropological, as opposed to historical, texts and unwitting acceptance of the “civilization‐savagery” myth, which continues to govern interpretations of European and Indian relations. Discourse analysis of Marcos's relación reveals numerous observations on native life that shed light on the archeological record and the fate of the Hohokam and Trincheras cultures of the Greater Southwest.

This paper grapples with the issue of naked statistical evidence in general and the reference class problem (RCP) in particular. By analysing the reasoning patterns underlying the RCP, I will show, first, that the RCP rests on theoretical presuppositions which we are by no means willing to accept. Such a presupposition is the wholesale approach in decision-making. Secondly, I will show that the very effort to increase the level of precision to a maximum so that a reference class contains a single member only is theoretically inconsistent insofar, as it deprives reference classes of their general (and thus scientific) character. Thereupon, I will argue, thirdly, that the decision to enact a specific evidence rule is a political one and reflects deep moral and jurisprudential values, not scientific propositions. Such a value is personal autonomy, which I go on to illuminate briefly. Whether the trier of fact will treat cases in a wholesale approach or not depends on constitutional arrangements and legal values putting emphasis on the individual and the latter’s dignity.

This study addresses the question of whether or not active learning can be taught online. There are many definitions of learning: It is the process and the sum total of acquiring knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, beliefs, and emotions. There is, however, a nuanced definition of active online learning, defined as methods by which learners actively participate in the learning process (e.g., online discussion groups, problem-solving, experimentation, and the like). Theoretical presuppositions such as informal learning, contiguity, reinforcement, repetition, social-cultural principles and andragogy not only guide the assumption that active learning can take place online but also reinforce that active learning may lead to the creation of new knowledge and the skills needed by learners in this current century. This research reveals that technology, used effectively, enhances active learning benefitting the instructor as well as the learner.

The evidence is overwhelming in favor of the public choice explanation of the pandemic decision-making while simultaneously refuting all the public-interest claims thereof. The theoretical presuppositions upon which public choice theory relies are more robust than the ones of public-interest explanation, and this is vindicated once again when the two theories are applied to the Covid-19 pandemic.KeywordsPublic choice theoryTheoretical underpinningsUtility maximization

O estudo do “ciúme”, paixão que se manifesta no conto “Sarapalha”, de João Guimarães Rosa, é objeto de análise deste trabalho. Os pressupostos teóricos são os da semiótica francesa. Objetiva-se descrever a dimensão sintática do ciúme, que revela a intensidade do sofrimento dos sujeitos afetados pela paixão – Primo Ribeiro e Primo Argemiro – em relação à perda do objeto-sujeito amado, Prima Luíza, para um rival comum. Busca-se descrever também o esquema passional canônico do ciúme na cena enunciativa, que capta o momento da revelação de Argemiro a Ribeiro a respeito do amor platônico que nutrira por Luíza. Ribeiro, ciumento caracterizado pelo apego exclusivo, assume o papel do observador avaliador social e não perdoa Argemiro, apesar de o papel de rival, que ele atribui ao primo, ser uma construção de seu imaginário.
 
 Palavras chave: Paixão. Ciúme. Esquema passional canônico.

Neste trabalho realizou-se uma leitura da obra poética de Pablo Neruda, conforme os pressupostos teóricos de Freud e Lacan. A preocupação inicial foi a de elaborar um esquema teórico que fornecesse subsídios ao estudo. Num segundo momento foi realizada uma leitura das principais obras que marcam os três períodos literários de Pablo Neruda, tentando-se interpretar psicanaliticamente a rede simbólica encontrada nessas obras. Com base nas análises realizadas, pôde-se observar que a poesia de Pablo Neruda parece possuir um papel de figura objetal, possibilitando ao autor religar-se às suas figuras parentais, nas quais projeta os seus desejos e frustrações.

I respond to H. M. Collins's claim (1985, 1990, 1993) that experimental inquiry cannot be objective because the only criterium experimentalists have for determining whether a technique is “working” is the production of “correct” (i.e., the expected) data. Collins claims that the “experimenters' regress,” the name he gives to this data-technique circle, cannot be broken using the resources of experiment alone. I argue that the data-technique circle, can be broken even though any interpretation of the raw data produced by techniques is theory-dependent. However, it is possible to break this circle by eliminating dependence on even those theoretical presuppositions that are shared by an entire scientific community through the use of multiple independently theory-dependent techniques to produce robust bodies of data. Moreover, I argue, that it is the production of robust bodies of data that convinces experimentalists of the objectivity of their data interpretations.