Dependence by design: decisive control in Royal Navy missions under US retrenchment

This article examines the Royal Navy (rn) in the aftermath of the Falklands War of 1982, focussing on the long-standing disparity between commitments and resources in UK defence planning. Two central arguments are developed. First, it is argued that the 1981 defence review failed to address the disparity between UK commitments with resources. Second, despite victory in the Falklands War, the UK naval lobby failed to reverse the long-term decline in the size of the rn although, in the long-term, the 1982 war reinforced the case for enhancing rn maritime aviation capabilities. This article presents a case of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the rn seeking, and failing, to resolve an insoluble problem. This analysis of UK naval policy demonstrates that British defence planning remains torn between a maritime strategy and a continental commitment to the present day.

While it is often assumed that counseling interventions can be helpful in resolving relationship difficulties, there is limited research which provides evidence of this being the case in respect of military families, who are facing additional, unique stressors due to the military lifestyle, which can significantly strain couple relationships and family functioning. This study presents the first empirical evaluation of relationship counseling within the context of UK Naval families, addressing a significant gap in the literature on military family dynamics and wellbeing. Employing a pre‐test/post‐test mixed methods design, the research draws on data from 187 Royal Navy and Royal Marines personnel and their families who accessed counseling delivered by a civilian provider through a programme funded by a leading UK naval charity. Quantitative findings, derived from validated individual and family outcome measures, indicate statistically significant improvements in mental well‐being, resilient coping, family functioning, and couple communication. Qualitative data further illuminate the complex relationship challenges faced by military families, underscoring the nuanced role of counseling as a supportive intervention. The study highlights the need for targeted mental health support and effective triage systems when military families seek help for relationship difficulties. It also identifies the potential of counseling as a preventative measure to mitigate the relational strain of military life, with implications for family stability and military personnel retention. This research makes an original contribution to understanding the role of counseling interventions in enhancing the wellbeing of military families and informs future policy and practice in community support services for military‐connected families.

Hernias are a relatively common occurrence in the armed forces community and may affect an individual's fitness for duty and impact on operational capability, particularly in specialist occupations. Their early identification and management will allow appropriate treatment and minimise any impact on operational capability. This article aims to summarise the assessment and management of simple hernias and considers occupational considerations in their management for personnel serving in the Royal Navy and Royal Marines.

1. Abstract The selection of materials suitable for use in submarines is complex. There is a need to achieve technical suitability to maximise operational capability. There is also the necessity to comply with through-life requirements including health and safety, occupational, and environmental legislation. In selecting materials the risk to crew and the vessel must be reduced to as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP). Submarine crews are enclosed for continuous periods each possibly lasting up to 90 days. For this patrol cycle the Royal Navy (RN) has to comply with UK legislation and additional requirements to adjust for the unusual working and living patterns that are encountered in an isolated environment. When selecting materials different types of hazards have to be considered: inherent, particulate, and fire toxicity hazards, the latter resulting from early onset of fire conditions (e.g. off-gassing because of overheating) through to complete combustion. The passive control process utilised by the RN aims to avoid or limit the use of toxic materials within the confines of the submarine to achieve the following aims: (1) Acute and chronic health risks to crew will be minimised ALARP; (2) Mental and physical crew performance must be unimpaired; (3) Submarine installed equipment must not be degraded to an unacceptable level; (4) Other risks must not be aggravated by the introduction of new contaminants in the submarines atmosphere. In this paper, the authors describe in detail the different types of hazards to be mitigated and the difficulties involved in trying to provide suitable hazard identification to the key stakeholders: builders, maintainers and operators. The information collated by the toxicologist enables key stakeholders to minimise risk to ALARP during normal use, and also considers potential hazards that might be generated when a product suffers damage. The purpose is to give confidence that hazard and risk information relating to the most technically suitable materials is assessed correctly and that materials selected conform to UK, European, and RN policy even when procured from countries external to Europe. It is important to ensure that any toxic substances introduced into the enclosed atmosphere comply with relevant exposure standards. There can be many different nations involved in the supply chain each controlled by various national and international governing bodies defining their own acceptable safety criteria. Consequently, the relevant safety criteria need to be evaluated in context of the RN’s requirement for a sealed environment, and assessment must be made as to whether the hazards and risks determined for the enclosed environment are manageable during routine operation and emergency conditions, especially if a compromise in material selection was inevitable due to maintaining operational capability. The requirement for material selection is not exclusive to the enclosed breathable atmosphere of submarines but all sealed atmospheres isolated against harsh environments.

In this chapter discusses the maritime military strategies of the U.K. reflecting on how the development of the Royal Navy from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century was synchronized with the trade revolution and how its role has diminished in power since the heydays of Colonialism. Even after two world wars, British maritime military strategy remained unchanged in principle and prioritized sea control and power projection. The Royal Navy has not changed its basic force structure until very recently and has maintained a limited nuclear capability and a level of sea control that supplements the superiority of the United States in the oceans, and a limited power projection to respond to low-intensity conflicts or peacetime disaster relief. The limitations of their operational capability are discussed in detail with reference to the Falklands war. Such limitations are reflected in the inadequacy of assets such as aircraft carriers, assault landing ships and attack submarines, which are necessary not only for sea control but also for area denial.

As with the general population, headaches are commonly suffered by members of the United Kingdom Armed Forces. These are often managed by patients with over-the-counter medication without the involvement of healthcare professionals. Patients may present to medical teams when deployed because of limited access to over-the-counter medication or because of concerns about the cause of the headache. This article will examine the differential diagnosis and management of headaches in primary care as well as considering the occupational and operational aspects related to the Royal Navy (RN). The aim is to equip General Practitioners (GPs) and General Duties Medical Officers (GDMOs) with the clinical knowledge to diagnose various common forms of headaches and to detect the red flag symptoms that warrant further investigation. This article will also make specific reference to the service person and the impact of headaches on occupational functioning and operational capability.

After the Cold War, several cooperative ventures involving continental EU member states have produced joint or similar submarines, amphibious vessels, destroyers and frigates. Although the Royal Navy has been Europe’s preeminent naval power throughout most of its existence, UK’s participation has been cautious. This is contrasted by the European exposure of Britain’s naval industry. Rolls Royce and BAE Systems have major continental manufacturing stakes and most UK naval sensor production is carried out by pan-European defence firms. Utilising scholarly insights and a mapping of competing national preferences on EU’s grand strategy, this chapter explores how these contradicting tendencies may impact post-Brexit European naval programmes and industry structure in the event of either a Brexit deal in the defence and security domain or absence thereof.

Discussion about military modernisation and revolution and total warfare in the period 1775–1815 focuses on land conflict in Europe, and generally ignores or underrates the importance of naval deve...

Royal Navy cuts—former minister comments

<i>Cold War Command: The Dramatic Story of a Nuclear Submariner</i>

The WR-21 gas turbine engine will be employed by the Royal Navy and potentially by the United States and French Navies in their future Integrated Full Electric Powered Surface Combatants. The Intercooled Recuperated (ICR) advanced cycle means that in a Warship power system a single WR-21 engine sits on the throne of the realm that traditionally would have been occupied by two gas turbine engines, one for ‘cruise’ and one for ‘boost’; not forgetting that it is also doing the job of at least two diesel generators in our traditional example. This performance will provide Warship operators with an unprecedented opportunity to configure the Warship propulsion plant to return exceptional Platform Life Cycle Cost reductions in peacetime while retaining warfighting operational capability in time of conflict. The Royal Navy is the first user of the WR-21 ICR gas turbine engine in its Type 45 Air Defense destroyer, an artists impression of which is shown in Figure 1. The vessel is a 7500 tonne monohull, fitted with an integrated electric propulsion plant comprising two WR-21 Gas Turbine Alternators (GTAs), the prime mover side of which is capable of delivering 25 MW (ISO) and the Alternator side of which is rated at 21.6 MWe (0.9 pf lagging), 4.16KV. These GTAs in combination with a pair of diesel generators rated at around 2 MWe (0.9 pf lagging) will provide electrical power to two 20 MWe (0.9 pf lagging) 4.16 KV electric propulsion motors and to the ship’s non propulsion consumer electrical distribution system. Any combination of generator set can provide any consumer with electrical power. In their crudest form any generator set that forms part of the Type 45 power system may be simply regarded as Mega Watts towards the installed power total. The division of priority and delivery of power to meet the Command’s requirements will require skilful and subtle engineering of the control systems that will be used to operate the power system and precise definition of the operating philosophy and principles for the platform. In a Warship that has only four sources of electrical power the principles of survivability and prime mover independence are fundamental. The limitations of operating electrical generation machinery are established. This paper examines how the WR-21 will be capable of providing power to the Command of the Type 45 as an integral part of the Warship power system in all states of operational readiness for war.

The WR-21 gas turbine engine will be employed by the Royal Navy and potentially by the United States and French Navies in their future Integrated Full Electric Powered Surface Combatants. The WR-21 is an advanced cycle gas turbine that will not only meet the high power generator prime mover requirements of these ships but also offer an efficient cruise generator engine in one power dense package. The engine gives ship designers the freedom to procure, install and maintain one engine to power the vessel over its entire operating profile in place of the traditional two engine ‘cruise’ and ‘boost’ fit. Warship operators will also have a new freedom to configure the warship propulsion plant to return unprecedented Platform Life Cycle Cost reductions in peacetime while retaining operational capability in time of conflict. The Royal Navy is the first user of the WR-21 Intercooled and Recuperated (ICR) gas turbine engine in its Type 45 Area Defense destroyer. The vessel is a 6000 tonne monohull, fitted with an integrated electric propulsion plant comprising two WR-21 Gas Turbine Alternators (GTAs), the prime mover side of which are capable of delivering 25 MW (ISO) and the Alternator side of which is rated at 21.6 MWe (0.9 pf lagging), 4.16KVA. These GTAs in combination with a pair of diesel generators rated at around 2 MWe (0.9 pf lagging) will provide electrical power to two 20 MWe (0.9 pf lagging) 4.16 KVA electric propulsion motors and to the ship’s non propulsion consumer electrical distribution system. Any combination of generator set can provide any consumer with electrical power. This flexibility of propulsion plant configuration will demand a step change in operating culture if its ultimate benefits are to be truly harnessed. Every part of warship propulsion and gas turbine engine operating philosophy must be examined to check its relevance in the modern machinery outfit. The engines themselves must be scrutinized to ensure that they can fulfill the requirements of true ship generation machinery and are not regarded as ‘propulsion generators’. In a Warship that has only four sources of electrical power the principles of survivability and prime mover independence are fundamental.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The most comprehensive and perhaps impartial account of these incursions was made in 1987 by Milton Leitenberg and published as Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters. 2. Keith Speed was Navy Minister in Margaret Thatcher's first government from 1979 to 1981 when he resigned in protest at proposed cuts to the Royal Navy surface fleet. He remained absent from active politics thereafter. 3. As originally published, the work was entitled Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. For inexplicable reasons the current publishers have dropped the preposition, though the work has always been colloquially referred to as Some Principles. 4. Mahan's work is cited twice in Corbett's work: The War of 1812 and Lessons of the War with Spain. Corbett refers to him only as a ‘weighty critical authority’. 5. In its most simplistic form, ‘risk theory’ postulated that if the German High Seas Fleet could threaten sufficient loss to the Royal Navy that it would be unable to confront other rivals, then it would avoid risking the assertion of its command of the seas, and be obliged to concede to Germany a great freedom of action (Keegan 1988: 101). In fact the theory was inextricably bound to calculations of the state of international relations, and Britain's capacity to preclude Germany from gaining a secure alliance with a maritime power. Its natural counterpart was, therefore the Royal Navy's own Two Power Standard. 6. This critical difference is responsible for Percival's decision to expend more resources in Malaya defending the operational capability of the naval base, than he could afford to lose if he had to defend the Island. Hence his decision to commit forces to a prolonged defensive battle down the length of the Malay peninsular. He was conforming to the military maxim of maintaining focus on the prime objective.

From the perspective of twenty-first-century America, it seems natural to assume that no other nation has ever been able seriously to threaten the continental states with its navy or military. The assumption that US geography has always deterred such pressure, however, ignores the early Victorian era. In the 1830s and 1840s, one nation could and did pose a credible threat to the United States: Great Britain. As the world's supreme naval and financial power, Britain had the means to protect and advance its interests in the face of American belligerence. Ultimately, Britain's strength deterred the United States from turning the tensions of 1838-46 into war. True, by this time Britain could never invade and reconquer its former American colonies. But it was never in its interest to go to war with the US. Anglo-American commercial relations were quite profitable, and peace kept them so. Furthermore, the British preferred a divided America, fighting over slavery and states' rights, to one united against an external enemy. Britain's goal was peace, but the methods it used to avoid war with the US in this period did not look particularly peaceful. Especially under Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston, preserving the peace did not equate with yielding in diplomatic battles. Rather, a `strong stance' warned the US away from confrontations of a more lethal kind. Interestingly, the prospect of a British invasion through Canada played only a relatively small part in this deterrence. More important was the ability of the Royal Navy, with new gunnery and steam vessels, to strike at the populous and prosperous cities of the eastern and southern coasts of the US. Britain knew the possibilities for mayhem, as did the US government and some, at least, of the American public. Besides Britain's technical advantages, its funding and political support for the navy were second to none. While the US struggled in vain to finance new ships and fortifications, the British cabinet could rest assured that if the Royal Navy required more funding, it would get it. The British government counted on the navy's strength to intimidate the Americans in controversies over the Caroline and McLeod affairs, the Maine boundary and the Oregon territory. Palmerston's personal style of `gunboat diplomacy' may have encouraged this course, but he and his colleagues did worry that the political system of the United States might lead it to start a war neither side really wanted: the fevered American press and people might push the government to some act the British could not tolerate. Britain used the Royal Navy to signal the dire consequences of such an act and forced the American government to resist popular pressure. Geography in these cases was not enough to shield the US; Britain's strong stance preserved its existing interests and maintained peace.

The victory secured over the Central Powers and especially Germany during the First World War owed much to Britain’s maritime dominance if little to the fruits of fleet action. If the result was as expected by the British public and Royal Navy both, then its means of delivery certainly was not and the failure to secure a decisive victory against the High Seas Fleet rankled commoner and commander alike. Why the pre-war expectation of naval combat proved so divergent from the reality of wartime can be attributed to several factors. Still, that evolving technical considerations rendered nugatory the mythology of explanation surrounding Britain’s past naval success was certainly a vital one. Contemporaneously, the Royal Navy’s understanding of how naval power was fostered and exercised underwent a deep and profound shift as it became more ‘scientific’. Not scientific in the sense that its tenets could be verifiably proven or worked out with mathematical precision, but rather it now became anchored in the analysis of previous experience tied to its survey through surviving documentary evidence. Closely associated with this, future naval encounters could be approximated in war gaming based on reasonable conclusions of ship and weapon performance. All this came to fruition in the decade before the war and the disparate strands influencing the future style of naval warfare came together not so much as the clear image of a photograph but more the blurs of an emerging image, slowly crystallising.