Democratic Reflexes (in the EU, Spain and Türkiye): How Defensive and Militant Logics Shape Anti-Disinformation Policies

Kenya’s defence policy is an integral part of the country’s foreign policy since it gained its independence. Kenya’s foreign policy has become more assertive due to globalization, which has significantly impacted the country’s defense policy. Globalization processes have produced new transnational non-state security threats. Hence the defense policy has become more forceful to accommodate these new security threats thereby producing new defense and foreign policy actors that significandy influence foreign policy behavior. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first examines the theoretical relationship between foreign policy analysis, globalization, and the new security dilemma so as to provide a framework that helps describe, analyze, and explain defense and foreign policy behavior in Kenya. The second provides a general account of the country’s foreign policy from 1963 to 2013 and indicates the way in which foreign policy has been realigned and how existing and new foreign policy actors have emerged. The third section looks at the relationship between globalization, constitutionalism, and the country’s defense policy with the aim of demonstrating how this relationship has produced new defense policy actors. The fourth section examines Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia as a radical outcome of the decision-making processes of the country’s realigned defense and foreign policies, while the fifth looks at this military intervention and its implications for security within the context of the new security dilemma and subsequently defense and foreign policies.

In 1960, Morris Janowitz argued publication of Samuel Huntington's landmark study, The Soldier and State, represented the first time since Alexis de Tocqueville American military institutions were being analyzed as an aspect of American political process (1960; 5). A decade later, Robert Miewald criticized scholars in public administration their neglect of military. It is now obvious, he wrote, that few students of public administration have been moved to heed periodic cries military organization be considered an integral part of their field of study. Despite importance of military today, more scholarly care seems to have been lavished on mosquito abatement districts (1970; 129). A more recent assessment argued there were not adequate successors to 1960s classics in defense scholarship, nor was there an authoritative scholarly analysis of U.S. defense buildup in 1980s (Walt, 1991; 227). A recent review of Allison's innovative treatment of Cuban Missile Crisis noted for courses dealing with bureaucracy and foreign policy there are few alternatives to Essence of Decision (Bendor and Hammond, 1992; 301), first parts of which were published a quarter-century ago. We find these observations to be indicative of a long-standing neglect - by both political scientists and defense analysts - of connection between military and study of American political institutions. Although intellectual landscape is not as barren as these critics charge,(1) theoretical and practical literatures on public administration and American institutions typically avoid study of defense policy and military organizations. Few political scientists trained in either American institutions or policy studies focus on defense as their substantive area, leaving field to those trained in defense policy and international relations, who in turn have neglected domestic political aspects of security policy (Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988; Welch, 1992) despite recognition of domestic-international linkages in other policy areas (Davis, 1993; Chubb, 1983, 1989). Scholars have noted existence of this gap, but our goal in this article is to explain why gap exists and illustrate how it might be bridged. In our view, lack of engagement stems from two assumptions about military policy which discourage scholars from looking at how politics - which we take to mean competition between actors and institutions over control of policy and goals, rather than pork barrel, bureaucratic, or electoral politics - affects defense issues. First, most studies of American politics assume defense and civilian policies are so different they belong in separate fields. Second, most defense analysts adopt normative assumption defense policy making should be above politics. As a result, scholars in both fields avoid thinking about connections between political structures, political relationships, and defense policy outputs. We address these issues and then show effort to depoliticize defense policy is actually part of a broader debate in public administration and public policy studies: striking proper balance between expertise (which is politically neutral) and accountability to elected officials. In virtually every domestic policy arena, as in study of defense policy, analysts bemoan intervention of politics in definition, administration, and evaluation of public policy. Our effort to find some common ground between defense policy and study of institutions led us to recent developments in what is commonly referred to as new economics of organization. Its framework of principals, agents, and transaction costs associated with bringing about compliance has been applied to a number of domestic policy areas (Moe, 1984, 1989; McCubbins, 1985; Weingast, 1984; Wood and Waterman, 1991; Woolley, 1993) but has not yet been used to investigate questions about defense policy. …

This study sought to investigate the implications of East-West Great Power Competition on Kenya’s defense and security policy between 2003 and 2022. The first section introduces the nature of East-West strategic competition and the second section analyses the implications of East-West strategic competition on Kenya defense and security policies. Four key areas of Kenya’s Defense Policies are analyzed. These are: firstly, policies on military assistance to Kenya, secondly, Kenya’s peace support operation policies, thirdly, Kenya’s policies on military and security allies and fourthly, Kenya’s counter-terrorism policies. The study is anchored on realism and the rational actor model of international relations. Review of related literature was done using various search engines utilizing the keywords of the study. A mixed research design and sampling techniques were used to generate a sample of eighty study participants from a target population that included policy makers in the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs, Non-governmental organizations, National Government Officials, and international relations experts. The main methods for gathering data were questionnaires and interviews. This study revealed that, the implications of East-West Strategic competition on Kenya’s Défense policy include rationality in decision making in regards to military assistance the country receives, a conscious choice of possible trading partners during procurement and acquisition of military equipment and arms, selective entry and signing of military pacts on military training and technology transfers. Moreover, the Kenya defense policy is non-aligned in regards to choice of allies. The defense policy further seeks to maintain traditional allies in the West while also courting of new allies in the East. Finally, the defense policy is assertive in fostering international peace and security as well in counter violent extremism. This study recommends Kenya defense policy strategist to maintain the status quo of balancing the East and the West so as to remain neutral in the wake revamped East West rivalry in the Horn and Eastern African region.

This research aims at analysing the nature and transformation of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy since 2014. Having been founded in the post-Cold War peace environment, the Common Security and Defence Policy had an expeditionary characteristic compatible with the European Union’s soft/normative power. However, this peaceful security environment changed after the Ukraine Crisis in 2014. With new security parameters, the transformation of the Common Security and Defence Policy needs to be analysed in an academic context. In this regard, the research question of the article has been conceptualized as “To what extend has post-Ukraine Crisis security perception affected Common Security and Defence Policy transformation?”. There are two main findings of this research. First, the characteristics of the Common Security and Defence Policy have evolved from being expeditionary to being territorial/collective defence in nature. Second, the fragmentation in the European Union is deepening in terms of defence and security policies. This research suggests that the likely outcome is that the European Union will choose to conform to the United States’ NATO policies in order to deter the Russian Federation

Accounts of French defence and security policy are replete with references to the so-called internal consensus on defence policy. Few scholars, however, have attempted to investigate in detail its nature or its impact on defence policy. Yet whilst academic analyses of the nature and especially the impact of consensus have been scarce, French officials have repeatedly stated not only that a high degree of consensus exists on French defence policy,3 but also that it acts as a device which reinforces French international standing, allowing France to be 'heard and respected on the international scene',4 increasing the freedom of manoeuvre enjoyed by the President of the Republic in formulating his own defence policies.5

Introduction The accession of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968 as prime minister of Canada, a post that he would hold for almost sixteen years, save nine months in opposition, began with the new leader explicitly exerting control over defense policy. Trudeau questioned the traditional premises of Pearsonian internationalism, particularly the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and specifically intended to redefine Canada's military commitments in the name of peace and the new global realities (McCall and Clarkson 1994, 335). At first, it appeared that he was able to change Canada's defense priorities unilaterally and was reflected in his government's 1969 NATO decision and 1971 defense white paper. Yet, for all the furor of anticipation generated by the defense white paper at the time, rooted as it was in Trudeau's foreign policy paper released a year earlier (Canada, Department of External Affairs 1970), the prime minister did not subsequently make the kind of impact on Canada's defense policy that we might have anticipated from the kind of influence that he apparently had on the 1971 paper. The reasons for are various. Granatstein and Bothwell (1990) compellingly argue that Trudeau not only lost interest in defense and foreign policy matters but, explicitly, he may well have gained understanding of military issues. Because Trudeau did not have a defense plan nor, more importantly, did he have adequate knowledge or expertise, his impact on defense policy waxed, and then waned, as he learned about the intricacies of Canadian defense matters. According to Granatstein and Bothwell (1990, 378), Trudeau to office mistrustful of NATO and not a little ignorant of the arguments for and against the alliance. Trudeau's lack of knowledge is important for understanding the resurgence of NATO in his government's thinking because, as interestingly put by Granatstein and Bothwell, the prime minister had to discover that even a good social democrat, like Germany's Helmut Schmidt, found value in military commitments. Von Riekhoff (1978, 276) makes a similar sort of assessment, arguing that Trudeau greatly valued the experience and that this explains certain shifts in [the prime minister's] foreign policy orientation. Trudeau, after all, was an intellectual who understood and valued the pursuit of knowledge. The prime minister's ignorance of the consequences of his defense decisions was offset by his capacity to learn and change his mind. This was clearly apparent when Western Europe's initial resistance to Canada's trade overtures came up. This resistance was traced, in part, to the disapproval of European allies, particularly West Germany, of the Canadian government's 1969 troop reduction. The Trudeau government responded by reaffirming Canada's NATO commitment. (1) It seems, then, that by examining Trudeau's beliefs through the years, we can account for the shifts in Canada's defense priorities. However, by tracing shifts in Canada's defense priorities primarily to Trudeau's learning experiences, do we not assume too much about Trudeau's capacity to influence defense policy? A central debate historically in the study of Canadian defense policy been whether individual policymakers exercise any choice in making defense decisions because of the constraints placed on the Canadian state by the international system. Given, at the time, the enormity of the Soviet threat relative to Canadian military capabilities, Trudeau's initial NATO decision and his emphasis on national sovereignty protection must be placed within the larger context of Canada's security policy. As Middlemiss and Sokolsky (1989, 213) have pointed out, Canada, by allying itself in NATO and the North American Air (later Aerospace) Defense command (NORAD), has already made its strategic In that way, as they assert, choices in Canadian defense policy would only be evident in posture and procurement decisions. …

Which is the relationship between defense policy and foreign policy? How does defense policy influence foreign policy? The investigation is based on both questions. After a review of Argentinian literature analyzing the link between these policies, the article presents a new way of approaching the relationship between national defense and foreign policy based on the geopolitical concept of “axial point”. In this sense, the research suggests that, unlike traditional interpretations that place national defense as a secondary and complementary sphere to foreign policy, it is possible to argue that the former has a strong impact and influence on the latter. To empirically illustrate this new way of seeing the relationship between both policies, the article analyzes –using qualitative methodology linked to a single case study and based on the analysis of official documents and literature from that period– the bilateral relationship between Argentina and Chile, taking as central point of the analysis the Beagle Channel Conflict and considering the channel as an axial point. The paper concludes by showing how the case study illustrates the way in which defense policy impacts and influences foreign policy.


 
 
 This article investigates the changes to and achievements of Nigeria’s foreign and defence policies from 1985 to 1993. It also examines the economic, political, and sociocultural implications of these policies on the nation. The article argues that despite some identified failures of Ibrahim Babangida’s regime, certain innovations and actions, especially the foreign and defence policies that were introduced and carried out by his government, were signif icant in nature. The article also addresses the interlocking relationship between defence and foreign policy execution and concludes with recommendations on how this can be managed to promote the effectiveness of Nigeria’s external relations. The article depended largely on archival materials from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, supported by scholarly journal articles, books and newspaper materials.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dele Jemirade, Department of History, Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Email: delej@yorku.ca
 
 

This chapter examines what the international literature tells us about French security and defense policy, but also what the French case teaches us about this literature. French scholarship on security and defense policy has demonstrated three main trends: the legacy of Charles de Gaulle’s vision and policies, a strongly policy-oriented production, and the influence of sociological approaches in French political science more generally. These trends have given the impression that the Fifth Republic’s security and defense was unique among Western democracies. The chapter tries to bring together the main elements of a research agenda that can connect the French case to the international literature, including: expanding the sociology of security and defense policy actors and institutions; analyzing the changing articulation between defense policy and war; and tracking the reaction of the French “strong state” to the the privatization of defense functions, the civilianization of the military, and growing international cooperation.

The history of American foreign and defense policy is framed by an enduring debate over the appropriate role of federal power in national politics. From the very beginning, parties formed around the role of the armed forces and how America should conduct its diplomacy. Competition between the branches of government, and the parties therein, over who should direct foreign and defense policy is central to their history. This chapter charts the contours of that competition, most notably between the president and Congress, and then considers the ideas that have driven these often overlapping public policies. It concludes by arguing that whilst this competition is basic to the history of the subject, continuity in foreign and defense policy is also an important part of the story.

In 2003, Javier Solana introduced the European Security Strategy (ESS). Since then, there have been important developments regarding the security and defense of the European Union member states. This article examines the impact of Europeanization on the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Specifically, I analyze how the Europeanization of CSDP has been incorporated into the logic of Greece’s domestic security and defense policy. Hence, the Europeanization process is identified and presented according to Claudio M. Radaelli’s definition. Furthermore, this analysis identifies the impact of CSDP on Greece’s political structures, which are related to the country’s defense and security policy. These changes are presented in terms of an explanatory schema for better understanding the Europeanization dynamics in the Greek case.

La política exterior y la política de defensa constituyen los principales instrumentos a través de los cuales el Estado se posiciona en el sistema internacional. Esto requiere una vinculación y coordinación muy estrecha entre ambas. Al mismo tiempo, las dos políticas se nutren de elementos similares, como la historia, la geografía, los procesos políticos internos; además, ambas son –o deben ser– Políticas de Estado. Paralelamente, existen en la política exterior elementos de naturaleza estratégica como la compatibilización de los intereses diplomáticos y militares del Estado, el poder militar y la influencia política y el aporte de la diplomacia a la ejecución de las políticas de adquisiciones militares. Todo esto hace suponer que la vinculación y coordinación entre ambas políticas resulta natural y sencilla; y sin embargo, en la práctica ello no es así; antes bien, por su misma naturaleza, las políticas exterior y de defensa son difíciles de coordinar y alinear adecuadamente; lo mismo es válido respecto de las agencias encargadas de de nirlas y aplicarlas, las secretarias o ministerios respectivos. Existe dos niveles de coordinación entre ambas políticas: el nivel primario que requiere que se den ciertas premisas básicas y el nivel avanzado, que implica la definición de una gran estrategia nacional. Este tema es aplicable, en la especie, a Chile, dado que tradicionalmente, sus políticas exterior y de defensa han seguido cursos separados y a veces conflictivos. Esta situación que era explicable y aun aceptable en el pasado, no lo es ya más y debe ser corregida en forma urgente.

Since 1947, India's defense posture and policies have evolved in response to its external and domestic circumstances. Examined in this article are the impact of the international system on India's defense behavior; the impact of regional military developments and crises on Indian behavior; the relationship between leadership style and leadership interest, especially in the 1980s, and Indian defense posture; the influence of internal bureaucratic politics, triggered by external developments, and its impact on defense policy and posture, and the relationship between diplomacy and force in the pursuit of Indian security. The first part of the article outlines the Indian strategic concept, the distribution of military capabilities, and the external and internal setting concerning each period. The second part is analytical, tracing the pattern of development of Indian security systems as it stands today. The final section deals with the irreversible broadening of the Indian defense debates, i. e., a shift away from the small and closed decision‐making of the Nehru and Indira Gandhi years to a broad‐based articulation of defense concerns and resources.

In this short article, Theodore Konstadinides ( Lecturer in Law, University of Surrey) demonstrates the limited development of European defence cooperation within the auspices of CSDP. The author addresses two key questions, first on the degree of commitment to CSDP that Lisbon generates, and second on the level of integration achieved indirectly through EU coordination of the internal market aspects of the Member States’ defence policy in relation to armaments procurement. It is argued that although demonstrating a certain degree of progress, Lisbon’s reforms have not pushed towards an integrationist approach transforming, therefore, CSDP to an autonomous operational facility in defence matters. The Member States’ reticence to cede full authority to the EU in the field of defence is reflected in the Treaty’s wording which leaves intact national sovereignty in relation to military defence. As ever, the EU still relies on Member States and NATO with regard to all defence capability and force generation initiatives in post-Lisbon Europe.

IntroductionThe idea of was implemented approximately a century ago as purely civilian aspect of diplomacy, which aimed to inform foreign populations and citizens about goals of a given country's foreign policy through use of and programs.1 Within framework of Clausewitzian philosophy, which held that war continuation of politics by other means, was always linked to diplomatic realm, but was never part of it.2 On other hand, for a long time military meant simply business of attaches; their mission was to be the Nation's eye and ears abroad in days before satellite photography and sophisticated electronic collection techniques.3Along with changes that past several decades have seen in makeup of arena, particularly regarding new constellation of alliances, revised goals of foreign policies, and altered threat assumptions, content of public diplomacy has changed, and its targeted programs have expanded.4 At same time, understanding and definition of concept of security has changed since collapse of Iron Curtain and breakdown of Soviet Union. Nowadays, security is defined above all by notion of a comprehensive approach. Security is now viewed as a set of interconnections between civilian and means and approaches, while use of force remains a last resort. Therefore, programs and means from areas of and public diplomacy have received increased attention and have gained a more prominent status.For this reason, this essay will attempt to trace close relations of modern defense strategies, policies, and diplomacies. The guiding research question for this essay shall be, Is there in modern foreign affairs and defense policy a relation between diplomacy and public diplomacy? If so, what characterizes this relation? Along that line, this essay will examine nexus between public diplomacy and diplomacy, with assumption that relations and defense policies are aimed at overlapping areas, especially when it comes to diplomacy. The hypothesis therefore can be encapsulated thus: without naming it in official policy documents, and without a focused strategy, an area has recently developed where public diplomacy and diplomacy are proceeding in concert, with a common toolset. I will use German armed forces as a special case study in order to demonstrate that they have actually been practicing public diplomacy within their posture for decades.As a first step, essay will offer a general overview about idea, definitions, and different concepts of public diplomacy, which will provide basic background for further observations. In contrast, a brief examination of idea and concept of diplomacy will show approach from a different perspective. In a third step, essay will highlight common strategies and tools in order to display areas of overlap and similarity. Following these sections, essay will present two case studies of German Armed Forces, which will demonstrate hypothesis on foundation of observation drawn from first two steps. Finally, essay's conclusion will draw some general findings on relationship between public and diplomacy in our times.The Concept of Public DiplomacyPublic diplomacy is to some extent part of a traditional branch of diplomacy, one that refers to government sponsored-programs and initiatives that aim to influence and inform foreign audiences. These programs are also sometimes called international information or cultural programs. Usually these programs are used to transmit a certain message regarding a nation's foreign policy, political aims, economic cooperation efforts, or even touristic developments.It is inherent in concept of public diplomacy that addressees of activities carried out under its banner are mainly non-governmental actors. …