Democratic Duties

On Logins’s Erotetic View of reasons, normative reasons are the possible appropriate answers to normative ‘Why?’ questions. These questions can be interpreted in two ways: as requiring either an argument/reasoning or an explanation. Consequently, this view posits not only normative reasoning reasons but also normative explanatory reasons. Against this view, this paper argues for two claims. First, putative normative explanatory reasons are not fundamentally distinct from normative justificatory reasons. Second, although normative ‘Why?’ questions could sometimes guide someone normatively, these questions themselves are not genuinely normative.

Vallier, Kevin. <i>Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation</i>.New York: Routledge, 2014. Pp. 286. $145.00 (cloth).

This book, based on Grice's 1979 Locke Lectures at Oxford and published posthumously, elaborates the notions of reasons, reasoning, and rationality, with particular emphasis on the unity of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning. It begins with a look at the nature of ordinary reasoning and distinguishes between ‘flat rationality’, the formal capacity to apply inferential rules, and ‘variable rationality’, the excellence or competence of good reasoning (Ch. 1). Grice then proposes an ‘Equivocality Thesis’, arguing that a structural representation can be given for justificatory (normative) reasons that allows for modals (ought, must, etc.) to be used univocally across the alethic/practical divide in terms of general acceptability statements (Chs. 2–3). In addition, he shows that valid inferences can be drawn from alethic to practical acceptability statements (Ch. 4). Finally, Grice provides a characterization of happiness as it features in practical thinking, and suggests it to be an ‘inclusive end’, consisting of the realization of other ends that are desirable for their own sake as well as for the sake of happiness (Ch. 5). An extensive introduction by Richard Warner provides a helpful summary and explanation of key aspects of the book.

Grice begins this chapter by discussing to what extent the notion of variable rationality can be derived from that of flat rationality, and thus from the concept of a rational being alone. He then draws a distinction between ‘explanatory’ (motivating) and ‘justificatory’ (normative) reasons, as well as ‘personal’ reasons that combine the two by being reasons acted upon and regarded as justifying by the agent. Finally, he introduces a structural representation for practical and alethic justificatory reasons that shows that ‘common modals’ (ought, must, necessary, etc.) are used univocally on both sides of the practical/alethic divide. This representation consists of a single modal operator ‘Acc’ (‘it is acceptable that’), two mood‐operators ‘!’ (practical ) and ‘⊥’ (alethic), and a phrastic ‘r’ that these operators apply to.

Chapter Two - Immanent Justice Reasoning: Theory, Research, and Current Directions

Because the normative notions of practical and theoretical rationality seem, due to their respective names, to be species of one genus, it is often assumed that there should be a very strong parallel between the two notions. In particular, it is often assumed that for practical rationality, the business of normative reasons is to count in favor of (or against) doing something, and that for theoretical rationality, the business of normative reasons is to count in favor of (or against) believing something. And in both cases it is assumed that reasons do this by providing justification which either is requirement, or which would tend, if the reasons became stronger or more numerous, to mount in strength and become requirement. A closely related position holds that if a belief is held for no reason, or if an action is done for no reason, then the respective belief or action is unjustified and irrational. As more theoretical reasons are found for the belief, or as more practical reasons are found for the action, or as existing reasons become stronger, the belief or the action becomes increasingly justified . If the justification becomes strong enough, then the belief or the action is required . The above position, that sufficient justifying reasons will always yield requirement, is consistent with two interpretations. The first interpretation, (a), allows some actions and beliefs to be justified but not required.

I consider a small but growing corner of the global justice literature: conceptions of human rights advanced under republican lights. I outline three recent republican justificatory arguments for principles of global justice embodied in human rights: Stuart White's appeal to the republican emphasis on civic virtue, and the appeals to a republican conception of liberty advanced by Philip Pettit and James Bohman. I argue that in all three accounts, too little attention is paid to constraints on the reasons that can be offered to a diverse domain of agents. I sketch an outline of the criteria plausible justificatory reasons must contain. In the appeal to virtue, no such reasons are forthcoming. In the appeal to liberty, such reasons may be forthcoming if republicans give up the claim that human rights are justified by appeal to ‘liberty’ itself. I conclude that a suitably modified appeal to the republican conception of liberty may be plausible.

The Prospect of Pragmatic Confucian Democracy: Reply to Dryzek, Macedo, Ackerly, and Li

This paper foregrounds one argument in Rawls's work that is crucial to his case for one, determinate, form of political economy: a property-owning democracy.1 Section one traces the evolution of this idea from the seminal work of Cambridge economist James Meade; section two demonstrates how a commitment to a property-owning democracy flows from Rawls's own principles; section three focuses on Rawls's striking critique of orthodox welfare state capitalism. This all sets the stage for an argument, presented in section four, from the complexity of economic interactions to the strategy of making markets fair in the only feasible way that they can be made fair, namely, by "patterning" their effects. Section five concludes by asking whether any scheme of this general type is a realistic form of utopianism for a society such as ours.Many early readers of A Theory of Justice took Rawls to be advocating a form of "Keynesian capitalist liberalism."2 However, if we define a capitalist society as one where people who do not own capital work for wages paid to them by capitalists (those who exclusively hold property and other forms of capital), then Rawls's conception of a property-owning democracy would involve the rejection of capitalism. James Meade, the proximate influence on Rawls's ideas, was indeed a Keynesian. However, given the working definition of a capitalist society that I have noted, it seems that liberal Keynesianism can reasonably be characterized as anti-capitalist in both Meade's and Rawls's variants.Meade's conception of a property-owning democracy emerged when he sought new avenues for egalitarianism in Britain given that the achievements of the Attlee government of 1945 were receding into the past.3 His aim was to combine Keynesian demand management with the public ownership of natural monopolies and the institutions of a property-owning democracy. Meade further proposed educational reform, a publicly funded unit trust, and state investment funds to supply an unconditional basic income. In a break with the policies of the then Labour government, Meade believed that welfare state redistribution was a threat to overall economic efficiency. Furthermore, relying on trade unions to redress the balance between labour and capital generated constant inflationary pressure in a way that explained the perceived "failure" of post-war Keynesian demand management: [G]radually, as in our imperfectly competitive society separate groups learned to press their monopolistic bargaining powers to obtain each for itself the best possible share of the available income, the system broke down.4 Meade's new strategy for redressing the balance between labour and capital was to rely on market prices to protect individual liberties and economic efficiency, but to increase the bargaining strength of labour by giving workers capital: If private property were much more equally divided we should achieve the mixed citizen—both worker and property owner at the same time—to live in the 'mixed economy' of public and private enterprise. The ownership of private property could then fulfill its useful function of providing a basis for private enterprise and for individual security and independence without carrying with it the curse of social inequality as it now does.5 Rawls's adaptation of Meade's ideas contains a cleaner break with welfare state capitalism, particularly in his late, summative statement of his views in Justice as Fairness where welfare state capitalism is unequivocally described as unjust.6 In the first edition of A Theory of Justice Rawls stated that: The aim of the branches of government is to establish a democratic regime in which land and capital are widely though not presumably equally held. Society is not so divided that one small sector controls the preponderance of productive resources.7 The branches of government dealing with the economy are the Allocative branch that deals with externalities, competition, and anti-trust. The Stabilisation branch is the most Keynesian branch of government, concerned with demand management and full employment. The Transfer Branch ensures the payment of a decent social minimum compatible with economic efficiency overall, via a negative income tax. Finally, the Distributive Branch raises money for transfer and for the regulation of the top end of distributions via a flat rate expenditure tax and the imposition of inheritance tax.The upshot, then, is this: in Rawls's ideal property-owning democracy, markets operate in a context structured pervasively by fairness. The state intervenes not only to supply public goods and to counter negative externalities, but also to impose that which Rawls called "adjusted procedural justice." Some effects are the unintended outcomes of intended behaviour; the "invisible hand" part of Rawls's view is that the market, of its nature, decentralises economic power and protects freedom of occupational choice. It does the former by protecting free association and free equality of opportunity and does the latter by giving rise to differential earnings.8The main difference between Rawls's and Meade's version of property-owning democracy, then, concerns the strategic role of progressive taxation. In the first edition of A Theory of Justice, Rawls states that steeply progressive taxes may very well be justified "given the injustice of existing institutions."9 But in ideal theory the role of progressive taxation is minimal. Equally striking is the residual "invisible hand" role, in both Meade's and Rawls's ideal, played by markets. This is an important point to which I will return below. In order to explain why progressive taxation plays such a marginal role in the ideally just society we need a better grasp on how a property-owning democracy is justified by Rawls's principles interpreted as working together as an interlocking group.Which of Rawls's principles make the case for a property-owning democracy? All of them, but in different ways. One of the most interesting aspects of Justice as Fairness is that in his comparison of a property-owning democracy and welfare state capitalism, to the detriment of the latter, Rawls interprets the build up of private concentrations of wealth permitted in welfare state capitalism as a potential threat to basic liberty. In his earlier work, Rawls had indeed conceded that on any view that has permissible inequality, the equal basic liberties would be of different worth to different people. But that thought was not troubling if people had a broadly comparable fair value in their political liberties: their ability to hold office and to participate, broadly, in the political determination of office. The political liberties, here, are the gatekeeper for the liberties as a whole.10 Martin O'Neill has objected that this argument is overdone: there are a variety of insulation strategies that a liberal democracy can pursue that can prevent accumulations of private wealth influencing the political process. So if Rawls objects to welfare state capitalism not because of bad effects that it brings about directly, but on the grounds of a general exposure to a political risk that it does not prevent, that part of his argument is implausible.11This is not the place to discuss my disagreement with O'Neill in any detail, but in fact I think that Rawls was not only right to emphasise this argument, but also that he needed to do more within the ambit of his own theory to address it.12 The measures he actually suggests to protect the fair value of the political liberties are disappointingly thin. My answer, unsurprisingly, is that Rawls is here demonstrating that his first principle of equal basic liberty, if it is to be implemented in conjunction with the fair value proviso for the political liberties, demands implementation in a property-owning democracy. The latter is the only way to prevent the concentration of private wealth that will lead to illegitimate interference with the political process.13What of the first part of the second principle, governing equality of opportunity? Here the case for a property-owning democracy is even clearer when one notes that "property" in this phrase is standing in for capital as a whole, and human capital counts as a form of capital. Fair equality of opportunity requires an adequately funded and free public education system that brings everyone's marketable talents up to their full potential, given that education is a public good not likely to be promoted in an unconstrained capitalist market. This measure, if fully implemented, would have a transformatory effect on the labour market by substantially increasing the supply of qualified labour, thus reducing the unearned rents currently accruing to the limited supply of labour for particular occupations.14I think it is important to bear in mind that this restructuring of the labour market by the full implementation of measures genuinely designed to protect the fair value of the political liberties, liberty as a whole, and the fair equality of opportunity forms the context for the introduction of the difference principle.15 The distinctive way in which Rawls makes the labour market fair, namely, by structuring the context in which it operates in order to pattern its effects has been very insightfully highlighted by Paul Smith: The idea that the equalization of property ownership would transform the labour market, by equalizing bargaining power and eliminating the economic coercion to accept drudge jobs at low pay and thus forcing employers to make all jobs attractive, all things considered, is crucial to Rawls's idea that, in a competitive labour market located in a just basic structure, income inequalities would tend just to compensate the costs of different jobs, that is, tend to equality, all things considered.16 Smith believes that this explains some of the distinctive features of Rawls's egalitarian strategy: Economic equalization is more likely and reliably to be effected, as Rawls thinks, by institutions and policies that equalize bargaining power than by an egalitarian ethos restraining the exercise of unequal bargaining power (and egalitarian institutions and their distributional results are what, if anything, could produce an egalitarian ethos).17 I will say more about this Rawlsian strategy and its underlying rationale below. But the basic idea is to structure the labour market so that what looks like the introduction of special incentives under the difference principle works under a set of macro-economic arrangements that make such incentives tend to be merely compensatory.18 This is crucial to any response to the concern that introducing such incentives encourages motivations within individuals that run counter to justice and lead to Rawls's theory as a whole becoming unstable.19This takes me back to my original point about the lexical ordering of Rawls's principles; the case for a property-owning democracy is over-determined. I would argue that it is required directly by the first principle, but, even if it were not and it only arrived on the scene with the principle of fair equality of opportunity, these two prior principles would be threatened by an unconstrained difference principle that did not operate in a context structured by the dispersion of capital implemented by a property-owning democracy. That is why, in spite of G. A. Cohen's disdain for the traditional Marxist argument that liberalism guarantees only a formal equality that is then undermined by substantial material inequalities, his own critique of Rawlsian incentives can naturally be extended in that way.20 The introduction of the difference principle would rebound to undermine the first principle and the complementary "fair value proviso" for the basic liberties. That is why, in order to resist Cohen's well-known critique of Rawls, we ought to see all three principles as operating as a connected package, as being mutually reinforcing, and making an over-determined case for a property-owning democracy.So much, then, for the positive case for a property-owning democracy from within Rawls's own ideas. But was he right? Was Rawls right, in particular, about the normative superiority of a property-owning democracy to the welfare state capitalism with which we are most familiar?Rawls's critique of welfare state capitalism runs as follows: Welfare-state capitalism … rejects the fair value of the political liberties, and while it has some concern for equality of opportunity, the policies necessary to achieve that are not followed. It permits very large inequalities in the ownership of real property (productive assets and natural resources) so that the control of the economy and much of political life rests in few hands. And although, as the name "welfare-state capitalism" suggests, welfare provisions may be quite generous and guarantee a decent social minimum covering the basic needs, a principle of reciprocity to regulate economic and social inequalities is not recognized.21 I think this passage contains an interesting mix of normative claims and a critique of existing social arrangements. The normative issue highlights the ambivalence of the republican values that underpin the idea of a property-owning democracy which have, surprisingly, made it attractive across the whole range of the political spectrum from conservatism to socialism.22Underpinning the idea of a property-owning democracy is a republican connection between the holding of private property, in the specific form of capital, and virtue. Because the connection here is vague, it has been left open to various different interpretations, and these help to classify the "Left wing" and "Right wing" appropriations of the ideal of property-owning discourse. Aristotle's view was that the secure holding of private property underpinned the virtue of self-sufficiency. Throughout the history of political philosophy some traditions have justified private property via its connection to personal flourishing, but in the specific case of holdings of capital the connection is, rather, with security of status and the qualities of mind that that security of status, in turn, permits. That aspect of the ideal clearly extends through to Meade and to Rawls. One aspect of "security" that is particularly worthy of note is not simply the positive benefit to the worst off involved in holding property, but also the security that it affords them in protection from the debt that is a standing risk for those wholly dependent on income. In our own, far from Rawlsian, societies it is the worst off who are disproportionately vulnerable to chronic debt at punitive interest rates. The worst off, here, include not just those receiving welfare payments, but also the "working poor." As James Baldwin famously remarked, "anyone who has ever struggled with poverty knows how extremely expensive it is to be poor."This is a case where the difference between actual world and ideal world theorizing is salient. One line of of welfare state capitalism is that it encourages welfare and the of a welfare That critique seems in a currently society where those who are worst off, and receiving are in that through of their that these people are without it is to impose justified by the fact that welfare to and social However, those to Rawls's views it that the of comparison is a just society that has implemented his principles in the form of a property-owning democracy. the of the payment of the social minimum required to make a a of justice at what role is there for welfare state in such an Rawls other than social security in its of providing believed that there was good to welfare state arrangements as such and that the context in which they operate is because it permits concentrations of wealth in private hands. A property-owning democracy, on the other in the of such concentrations of wealth just as republican political aim to state capitalism permits an context I would a are clearly in which a society to make a democratic to a society that is just by Rawls's But I think Rawls is right to about a society an between the very and a of the well off, who their to be by the of and even well welfare state Rawls's ideal of a society of free and equal is not compatible with the of a of and who are not of any scheme for likely ever to be even if they are of a decent social This is Rawls's that welfare state capitalism the of a principle of The worst off under welfare state capitalism live in a society that is both and ever to just via any feasible democratic would like to one back from Rawls's specific to on an issue of argument is a very interesting strategy in Rawls that does not on a property-owning democracy in particular, but on a general way of justice that is to lead to a property-owning democracy, very much like I have in mind are those Rawlsian that from the and complexity of a economy that the implementation of principles of justice can work only by structuring the context in which market so as to impose a pattern on their Justice As Fairness Rawls his own with a of the latter general set up fair and for fair individual and that all outcomes the run are made Rawls that this view the to individual that may fair, but which are actually undermined by concentrations of wealth that are to undermine "fair equality of opportunity, the fair value of the political liberties, and so That is why, in order to these we to procedural This an of which Rawls claims justice as is one Justice as focuses first on the basic structure and on the required to justice for all equally … we rely on an of between principles required to justice and principles that directly to particular between individuals and this of is set individuals and are then left free to their within the of the basic structure, secure in the that in the social system the necessary to justice are in is a point about complexity this I it Rawls is we do not a realistic on the one the context in which a market operates in order to make its effects fair, and the of each in a market one at a to the same is a an has that Smith was right to the value by as generated by the underlying of economic in society that makes This any individual in a of Smith the of in which a in economic society as all Economic a for is best explained as in the of that both to and in progressive to Smith also takes the differential talents and involved in this system as of education and normative that from ideas are that it is to individual productive The income that from talents is an from a of social that of the economy is by working The for an that are through the of involved in a that is simply a in a of This line of argument seems to me of the particular form that Rawls's egalitarian strategy it is simply not feasible to regulate individual market because the very idea of an individual market is a That is why Rawls believed that the only way to make a market fair is to make its effects achieve that by structuring the context in which that market operates to pattern its That is how a property-owning democracy think a of this aspect of Rawls's overall strategy G. A. Cohen's critique of Rawlsian special incentives to which I have takes this strategy to make Rawls a latter in his of to that a society that the benefit to all would do so as the unintended effect of by individuals that was and I think that is a if as an of the point is that if this restructuring of the market is the only feasible way to be an egalitarian then there is feasible way to a conception of justice as fairness. in a political economy structured in this way and their motivations in their labour this commitment to justice and do not That is in the phrase in the from Rawls where he notes that individuals are left free to pursue their permissible within a just also on to point of between Rawls and namely, their of can have positive that are not intended by any in the market. I the phrase "invisible hand" with given of of this phrase that is of But Rawls, like clearly believes that markets involve a mix of externalities, positive and some some In particular Rawls a connection between his first principle the basic liberties, equality of opportunity, and the of a think this point is important as it has a on the between a property-owning democracy and a market Rawls his own interest in ideas about political economy in particular, an economy of One of the in Rawls's between property-owning democracy and liberal is whether the latter is to a property-owning democracy as it democratic control of Rawls's for a property-owning democracy on this point as a liberal Rawls was to idea that there was an function to virtue in the and the of the democratic ideal into a place for good we most of our line of argument seems to me Rawls is quite right to the of why, if was right, an economy ought not to be made up of such given that they are such attractive to The is to be in the connection that Rawls makes between the regime of liberty by his first principle and market It seems to me that and are also that, if worker have positive for society as a whole, there is a rationale for giving them tax to their further and the of a they were equally to emphasise that given competitive and a regime of liberty, we can that some people will trade democratic control of their for other that Rawls is a political liberal with for the of Rawls then he is to the idea that political is itself a part of the good do not have to lead in which political is one of their they simply have to their role as a of when it to of public this it does not then, if a works in a that does not democratic there is in the context of society as a the republican the political liberal people to work in that their for but it is not that a mixed economy of both worker and need have this Furthermore, there is unintended in a property-owning democracy by Paul namely, that employers are to have to more for given the supply of labour and the of in a property-owning democracy will not be on to the market by drudge jobs, and as part of making jobs attractive will have to increase for making at work make if they do connection that Rawls makes between a regime of liberty and the market via explains why, as and we can a property-owning democracy to a of of both I not here to competitive as Rawls argument that a society as a whole could a and not concerned with of capital a regime of liberty we can people to trade other values for the value of democratic control of his so does in my any of the of political liberalism do not political all of the even democratic control of where they If they to trade this value this is not to say that it is not a but that the regime of liberty by Rawls's first principle permits them to do need be overall of the of virtue if it is in and life more only is this issue of worker ownership not a point between a property-owning democracy and market it also seems to me a point in of property-owning democracy. This is because the secure control capital given to each in the latter people to more in where they to work with their on income from labour more likely to to work in a that them democratic would like to by one important to the idea of property-owning democracy and a positive as a for The is that all that can be by an property-owning democracy is giving people a in their own more we are simply to the of the It is to note that the in to ownership to those with in other a at The then, is this: simply everyone's exposure to the of the first point to make is that this view the role played in a property-owning democracy by human capital. It the way in which the of the principle of equality of opportunity requires the of of So a property-owning democracy is not just about ownership and share even if it there is the of whether the to a property-owning democracy just all to risk to the of of the in that very Rawls's is in the we are working here in ideal it will be free from the generated on the of regulation from the very concentrations of wealth that a property democracy to The role played by a of regulation in the is a The response to this concern is that part of Meade's was a publicly unit that share ownership across the whole of the market thus a of protection from its However, my main response is simply that it is not who is to do any better in capital and that most of are in this notes the large of of the public funds in the and Meade's a striking to how the capital assets of some of are being and In I think on is the most realistic way to to make a property-owning democracy a would like to with a positive very much at the real world that would the first a property-owning democracy. The some in this with the introduction of the and the but both of these were in My is much more and comparable to and for a payment of to My is but in one way more and in way more A in the is a way of people to by their with a from a of government, and private when the its are to a first a small for a capital holding that is I think a good place to is with the in most that do not to on the open market The first is to make a state for of hold an capital for by various unit by This capital is, up My is simply to the as part of a to the potential of a property-owning democracy for at the state would a capital on their state to and This capital like a would the form of only for limited for education enterprise the of a first property as a back in a The is that while and simply to the money at this up on a will see that by an In my are being up part of own underlying in the that will be adequately by the security and it brings the of to The can simply their capital back in to an investment in The will have all the of a capital holding at a when it can make a difference to whether they ever a own will also them a of protection from In with the full implementation of Rawls's this will both make a property-owning democracy a and also address the of how a like this is to be

The laws that advance the aims of the republic, institutionalize its forms, and establish regulatory controls need to be supported by republican civil norms; the legal republic needs to become a civil reality. One reason that widespread civility is needed is that people can be assured of their non‐domination only so far as others recognize normative reasons for respecting them, not just reasons connected to fear of legal sanctions. Another is that if the republic is to be systematically sensitive to the interests and ideas of people—often newly emergent, newly articulated interests and ideas—then there have to be people who are virtuous enough to press appropriate claims; this applies both in the politics of difference and in the politics of common concerns. And a last reason why widespread civility is needed is that the public authorities cannot hope to identify and sanction all offences against republican laws and norms; ordinary people also have to be committed enough to perform in that role or to support the efforts of the authorities. Widespread civility is likely to be supported by the intangible hand of regard‐based sanctioning, since the honourable are destined in most circumstances to be the honoured, and the state must be careful not to impose forms of sanctioning, which might get in the way of that process. Civility or civic virtue may not be so difficult to achieve, as it often seems. It involves not just the internalization of public values and the disciplining of personal desires; given the communitarian nature of freedom as non‐domination, it also involves identification with larger groups, even with the polity as a whole, and access to new and satisfying identities.

U radu se bavi normativnim značenjem multikulturalizma i idejom promicanja kulturne različitosti putem politika identiteta, politika različitosti i politika priznavanja te multikulturalističkim politikama kao odgovorima na izazove povezane s kulturnim i religijskim različitostima. Iznošenjem triju multikulturnih teorija – liberalnog multikulturalizma, egalitarnog multikulturalizma i dijaloškog multikulturalizma i njihovom kritikom želi se upozoriti na ograničene dosege i nesuglasja u vezi s načinima uključivanja različitih kulturnih skupina u društvo. Da bi se upozorilo na propuste multikulturalističkih politika u integraciji migranata, raspravlja se o kritici multikulturalizma iz aspekta političkih lidera Njemačke, Velike Britanije i Francuske, povezanosti etničke različitosti, multikulturalizma i socijalne države te o integracijskim učincima multikulturalističkih politika u zemljama s izdašnom socijalnom državom. Na kraju se predlažu napuštanje jednodimenzionalnog shvaćanja multikulturalizma i uvođenje pristupa koji će u sebi objediniti politiku ekonomske redistribucije i politiku priznavanja različitosti.

On 28 October, the Heads of State and/or Government signed the new EU Constitution.2 Ratification pending, the summit closed a long and intense debate on the constitutional foundation of the EU whose initiation many commentators place at the speech of Joscha Fischer in 2000 before the Treaty of Nice. Although the Draft consolidates more than innovates pre-existing Union acquis, the importance of this text and the constitutional event (the Convention) should not go unnoticed. Their interpretation as an Ackermanian constitutional moment marked by civic virtue can probably be ruled out (Walker; 2003). In another sense, the ʻfounding constitutional act that grounds a world-historically new practice – a practice meant to bring forth a self-determining community of free and equal citizens (Habermas; 2001: 775) – transcends probably the single event of the convention.

Whether surfers should be fed at public expense is a question that confronts anyone who advocates a property-owning democracy of the kind that John Rawls endorsed. So too is the question of whether the responsible members of political society should rescue the feckless from their dithering and folly. How these questions relate to property-owning democracy, and how the advocates of this political-economic regime should respond to them, are matters that I take up in this essay. My main purpose, though, is to argue that property-owning democracies will be better served by institutions that limit the occasions in which these questions become pressing concerns than by either soft- or hard-hearted responses to those who prefer leisure to work or risk to responsibility. If a property-owning democracy is to have a reasonable chance of success, in short, it will need to give its citizens a suitably civic education.Rawls himself is largely responsible for making the surfer a stock figure in discussions of distributive justice. In “The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good,” Rawls added a footnote to a discussion of primary goods in which he remarked, “those who surf all day off Malibu must find a way to support themselves and would not be entitled to public funds.”1 He reiterated the point in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, in which he declared, “Surfers must somehow support themselves.”2 How strict Rawls intended his “well-ordered society” to be with surfers and others who choose play over work is not completely clear. Samuel Freeman thinks that Rawls would still grant the surfer public assistance, albeit less than the social minimum guaranteed to those who work at low-wage jobs, but others disagree.3 In any case, Rawls would be less generous to the surfer than would those, such as Philippe van Parijs, who would grant every member of society an unconditional basic income.4Rawls's surfer is a problem for theories of distributive justice in general, then, and not only for those that incorporate, as Rawls's does, property-owning democracy (POD). The surfer is a special problem for proponents of POD, however, because POD is more concerned with achieving the proper distribution of property and opportunity in society than with the redistribution of income and wealth. As Rawls says, POD differs from “welfare-state capitalism” in that it puts the emphasis on the beginning of productive activity rather than on redistribution at the end. Welfare-state capitalism “permits a small class to have a near monopoly of the means of production,” and thus to gain indirect control of political life. POD, in contrast, avoids this possibility “not by the redistribution of income to those with less at the end of each period … but rather by ensuring the widespread ownership of productive assets and human capital (that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning of each period, all this against a background of fair equality of opportunity.”5 In this way POD aims to spread the ownership and control of productive property as widely as possible so that citizens may be self-supporting and contributing members of society. In property-owning democracy, one might say, there will be more hard-working, self-supporting people, and fewer recipients of public welfare, than in the regime of welfare-state capitalism.According to Rawls's brief characterization, however, the surfer will be neither hard-working nor self-supporting. Surfers may devote long hours and considerable energy to the quest for the perfect wave and the mastery of their sport, and some may even find a way to make a living at it. But what is a POD to do about those who, given the opportunity to engage in socially productive work, go surfing instead—or birding, stamp collecting, and so on—and do so day after day, year after year? These are people, we may assume, who know that they are encouraged and expected to work—to make productive use of the property available to them—but instead choose a life of leisure. In a POD, however, they do so at the expense of those cooperative members of society whose productive efforts make it possible for surfers, birders, and others to follow their passions. Should they be allowed to go hungry, as the hard-hearted response would have it, or indulged as free riders?Nor are surfers, in either the literal or extended sense of the term, the only ones who pose a problem for POD. There are also those who are keen to put their property and assets to use but who simply make a hash of things. I met such a person several years ago while driving him and others to and from a group activity. He would have driven himself, this young man told us, but he had lost his car in an accident. His insurance company had sent him a check for $3,000.00 to make good his loss, he said, but that was not enough to buy a decent car. So he took the insurance money to Las Vegas in hopes of winning enough to buy a really good car. He ended up losing the $3,000.00, of course, which is why he was riding with me—and why he had less property at his disposal than he had before his accident.Feckless behavior takes more than one form, and the results are often more devastating than they seemed to be in this young man's case. By some accounts, the housing collapse of recent years was in large part the result of people gambling with their houses—taking out risky mortgages and home-equity loans and, in a phrase that acquired some currency at the time, treating their houses as if they were ATMs. The story is no doubt more complicated than that, and the policies of government agencies, financial institutions, and mortgage brokers surely encouraged this risk taking on the part of home buyers and owners. Even so, this willingness to gamble with what is usually a family's most valuable asset is something that must be worrisome to the advocates of property-owning democracy, especially in view of their desire to make the ownership of residential property widely available.6How, then, should proponents of POD respond to the challenges posed by surfers and gamblers? Without slighting or foreclosing other options, such as policies to make housing more affordable and mortgages less risky, I want to suggest that education must be a significant part of the answer to these challenges. It is neither possible nor desirable, I suspect, to eradicate the attitudes that lead some people to devote themselves to socially unproductive activities and others to take risks with their assets. We all know of cases where daydreaming, woolgathering, and other apparently unproductive activities have led to highly productive results, just as we know of cases where risk taking yields great rewards. But we also know the value of prudence and a sense of balance, two virtues that will be of great importance to the citizens of a POD. To the extent that education can foster these and what Rawls calls “the cooperative virtues,” it will make a signal contribution to the success and stability of POD.7There are two reasons, broadly speaking, to think that a proper education is necessary to the success of POD. One has to do with the personal dimension of POD, and the other with its civic aspect.Rawls speaks to the first point in a passage quoted above, where he states that POD aims to ensure “the widespread ownership of productive assets and human capital (that is, education and trained skills) ….”8 The point is even clearer, however, in this passage from the subsequent page of Justice as Fairness: In property-owning democracy … the aim is to realize in the basic institutions the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal. To do this, these institutions must, from the outset, put in the hands of citizens generally, and not only of a few, sufficient productive means for them to be fully cooperating members of society on a footing of equality. Among these means is human as well as real capital, that is, knowledge and an understanding of institutions, educated abilities, and trained skills.9This passage is noteworthy in several respects, including one that bears on the civic dimension of education in POD. First, though, it is important to notice that Rawls gives at least as much attention to “human” as to “real” capital in this passage. Human capital is in large part a matter of native endowments, but we need food, shelter, health care, and other goods and services if native endowments are to become productive means. We will also need education, so that these endowments can become “educated abilities.” Our abilities are among our assets, in other words, but they must be educated—drawn out, cultivated, nurtured—before they can be put to use as human capital. On this view, people have property in themselves—quite literally personal property—and one purpose of education is to help them to develop and refine it. To be sure, the nature of this property will differ from one person to another. We do not all have the same native endowments and abilities, nor should we expect that all can be trained to be equally skillful in the practice of each and every craft. But the fact that talents vary simply reinforces the need for proponents of POD to attend to the personal dimension of education.That is not to say that education in a POD must differ dramatically from current practices. We would still expect curricula to focus in the early years on the basic skills and knowledge that everyone should have, and then to offer more variety and tailoring to individual interests and aptitudes as children mature. But we should also expect that a POD will take pains to ensure that human capital is, in Rawls's words, “put in the hands of citizens generally.” If a society is to be a property-owning democracy, then all of its (potential) citizens must have genuine opportunities to educate their abilities and acquire trained skills. Education has a personal dimension in a POD, but it is a civic responsibility.Part of this civic responsibility, in turn, is to foster a sense of responsibility in (potential) citizens. This is the specifically civic dimension of education, and in POD it will be as important as the personal dimension. In Rawlsian terms, as the indented quotation above indicates, we should want to establish POD because it will help us to realize “the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal.” If this idea is to be realized, education must be civic as well as personal. Students should gain “knowledge and an understanding of institutions” so that they can make their way in the world, but they must also learn that they have parts to play in those institutions. In particular, they need to learn that they, as citizens, have a responsibility to help realize that idea of society as a fair system of cooperation—a responsibility that includes what Rawls elsewhere calls “the duty of public civility.”10Citizens, or potential citizens, will also need to learn the importance of being reasonable. This is a term that carries a special weight and meaning in Rawls's lexicon, and it is best understood by contrast with instrumental, or means-end, rationality. To be reasonable, for Rawls, is to be committed to fair cooperation.11 This is a commitment neither to altruism nor to the narrowly rational pursuit of personal interest, but to the middle ground of reciprocity. As Rawls says, “Reasonable persons … are not moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits with others.”12 To say that Rawls's citizen is a reasonable person, then, is not to say that she is someone who dedicates herself entirely and selflessly to the good of others or to the general good of society; but neither is she someone who will exploit the cooperative efforts of others whenever she can advance her personal interests by doing so. Instead, Rawls's citizen is someone who will do her part in political society, understood as a fair system of cooperation over time, even when doing her part will involve significant sacrifice. What the citizen will insist on, though, is the assurance that the other persons involved in this society will also act as citizens by doing their part to maintain the cooperative enterprise.What this means for POD is that its proponents must recognize the need for an educational system with a civic as well as a personal dimension.13 Questions of content and pedagogy—of what civic education should include and how its lessons can best be imparted—are too complex to take up here, save for brief comments in the next section of this paper. Nor do I mean to suggest that civic education will suffice to lead to the establishment or ensure the preservation of POD. Policies involving taxation, home ownership, business incentives, and others will be necessary too, as I have indicated elsewhere.14 But civic education will be necessary. In keeping with the adage about ounces of prevention and pounds of cure, civic education should aim to promote citizenship as reasonableness.To return to our stock examples, those whose proclivities would lead them to become surfers or gamblers should learn, along with everyone else, that they are partners in a cooperative enterprise—a fair system of cooperation of free and equal citizens over time. Or they will be, at least, if their polity is well ordered. They are free to surf and to take risks of various kinds, but they must also understand that their ability to do so depends on the efforts of others. Surfers, in the literal sense of the term, must rely on those who make surfboards, manufacture wetsuits, provide weather forecasts, supply fuel for their cars, treat their injuries, prepare their food, and build and patrol the roads they use as they travel from beach to beach. They should learn that it is unreasonable for them to expect these people, and others, to provide these benefits for them while they give little or nothing in return.15 Some of these people, of course, will demand that the surfers pay them up front—no money, no fuel, no food, no surfboard, and so on. But if the surfers pay with money that they receive from the public treasury, they will be acting unfairly and unreasonably. This is a lesson that civic education should impart. Another is the lesson that it is possible to pursue one's passions without failing to meet one's responsibilities to others. Someone who chooses a low-paying job because it allows her more time for leisure than jobs that would pay better is neither irrational nor unreasonable, no more than is one who learns to take measured risks.This plea to take education, in both its personal and civic dimensions, to be a vital element in POD has a number of implications, both theoretical and practical. The most significant theoretical implication is that the distance between Rawlsian and republican versions of POD virtually vanishes when education receives its proper attention. I say this because Rawls's discussions of education, whether in the context of POD or not, suggest that civic virtue is as important to him, a self-professed liberal, as it is to thinkers in the republican tradition.16 His remarks on the education of children are especially significant in this regard. In addition to apprising them of their “constitutional and civic rights,” Rawls says, education should prepare children “to be fully cooperating members of society and enable them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations with the rest of society.”17 The “political virtues” he refers to here are the virtues of cooperative citizens that we have already encountered—“the virtues of reasonableness and a sense of fairness, and of a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway.”18 Rawls stops well short of endorsing the Spartan conception of civic virtue, of course, but there is nevertheless a conception of civic virtue at work in his theory.More important for present purposes are the practical implications of taking education to be a vital element within a property-owning democracy. If taking education seriously is a necessary but not sufficient feature of POD, as I have claimed, then we must ask how education relates to or bears upon other features, or possible features, of this kind of political-economic regime. What, in other words, are the policy implications within POD of taking education seriously? This is too large a question to attempt to answer here, but we may gain some insight into what an adequate answer might be by looking to the example of cash assets.Following Thad Williamson, we can distinguish two strategies for achieving the kind of dispersion of cash assets that POD intends to achieve—strategies he refers to as the “one-time lump sum” and the “annual cash grant.”19 Leading examples of the lump-sum strategy are the “stakeholder society” proposal of Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott and the United Kingdom's short-lived Child Trust Fund program. Philippe van Parijs's previously noted proposal for a guaranteed basic income for all citizens is a well-known example of the annual cash-grant approach.20 The details may vary, but following the first strategy would call for granting a substantial sum of money, provided in whole or large part at public expense, to every citizen as he or she reaches a designated age, such as 18 or 21. In 1999, when they published The Stakeholder Society, Ackerman and Alstott proposed a grant of $80,000 for every U. S. citizen upon his or her twenty-first birthday, with an allowance for those attending college to begin drawing on their “stake” at 18.21 Following the second strategy would involve smaller grants, and perhaps less risky ones for that reason, but these grants would be awarded year after year throughout every citizen's life. According to Williamson's calculation, “this would amount to a grant of roughly $3700 a year for each family of four, or $925 per capita,” if the United States were to dedicate two percent of its annual GDP to these annual cash grants.22Does taking education seriously as an element of POD give us a reason to prefer one of these strategies to the other? The answer is yes, in my view, with the preference going to the lump-sum strategy. That is because the lump-sum approach offers a stronger connection to both the personal and civic dimensions of education than does the annual cash-grant strategy. The latter may limit the amount of squandering one may indulge in at any particular time, but it also holds out the assurance—especially if the cash grant is unconditional—that the money will be available, year after year, regardless of how reasonable, in Rawls's sense, or how cooperative one is. Whether the money will be sufficient to allow one to surf off Malibu on a full-time basis will depend on how generous the grant is. If it is generous enough, the temptation to be an unreasonable surfer will be significant; if it is not, as Williamson's estimates suggest, there is then a serious limit to how much good the grant can accomplish.With the lump-sum strategy, the risk of squandering may be greater, but the opportunity to use the grant to promote civic responsibility and personal growth is also correspondingly greater. Indeed, one of the aims of the Child Trust Fund in Britain, according to one of its leading proponents, was to encourage “financial literacy and responsibility.”23 Ackerman and Alstott's stakeholder proposal also speaks directly to educational considerations, as in the encouragement it gives young adults to use their “stakes” to pay for higher education. They also would withhold the grant, at least for several years, from those who do not graduate from high school and from those who commit serious crimes.24 In addition, there is reason to believe that schooling itself would take a new direction, and perhaps gain a sharper focus, as teachers and others help teenagers to think more clearly and seriously about what they will do with the significant sum of money that can be theirs in a few years. And there is, finally, the lesson of the importance of reciprocity found in the “payback” provision, according to which everyone who receives a stake at public expense will be expected to pay it back, with interest, upon death.25 In these ways and others, the lump-sum strategy offers a powerful incentive for (potential) citizens to take both their education and their civic responsibilities very seriously indeed.Should surfers be fed at public expense? Should the feckless be saved from their folly? My argument is that proponents of property-owning democracy should approach these questions by trying to render them moot. A suitably civic education—one that gives proper attention to both the personal and civic dimensions of education—can work with other programs and policies to foster the cooperative virtues of political life and to lessen the chance that some will try to free ride or take unreasonable risks at the expense of others.To lessen the chance, of course, is not to eliminate it altogether. Even a POD that provides a suitably civic education will not be completely immune from the problem that surfers and gamblers pose. When that education is provided, though, it will be easier to insist, with Rawls, that “[s]urfers must somehow support themselves.”26 It will be especially easy when lump-sum or similar grants provide young people with the opportunity to continue their education, to start a business, to buy a house, or to gamble or surf until their grant is exhausted. In these circumstances, the citizens of a POD will have done as much as can be reasonably expected. From that point on, full-time surfers and reckless gamblers will have to find ways to support themselves.There will still be room for surfing and gambling in a property-owning democracy, in sum, but for the most part these will be the activities of reasonable surfers and gamblers—that is, of those who will find a way to pursue their passions while meeting their civic responsibilities as contributing members of a fair system of social cooperation. Such should be the case, at least, when there are jobs available, and when one's society may be reasonably regarded as a fair system of social cooperation over time.

Contemporary liberal democracies confront governance problems elicited by the discord between the principles of equality and difference, and between the concepts of majority and minority. Citizenship came to be recognized as a vital governance tool in response to this challenge evidenced by growing academic and political interest in the concept. The basic precept that citizenship refers to is a constitutionality-based relationship between the individual and the state, implying a unique, reciprocal, and unmediated bond between the individual and the political community. It is argued that citizenship has three main aspects. First is the legal status aspect, which enfolds citizenship in terms of civil, political, and social rights, plus duties such as obeying laws, paying taxes, and performing military service. The second aspect is the identity dimension of citizenship, which regards individuals' membership in different social and political groups in multiple categories of race, class, ethnicity, religion, gender, profession, and sexuality. The third aspect is related to citizens' capacities, responsibilities, and willingness to cooperate, in short the civic virtue that the citizens possess and perform. The sense of identity that citizens have; their maneuvers to deal with competing identities; their willingness to participate in collective decisions and access to political processes; their sense of belonging to the social, political, and economic order; and their initiative potency all refer to different features of civic virtue. All in all, modern citizenship is perceived as the combination of legal status, social roles, and moral attributes that necessitate good citizenry. It has been suggested that these three aspects of citizenship—legal status, identity, and civic virtue—are interrelated; as the sensitivity to identities increases, demands for legal rights increase correspondingly. It is also claimed that identity affects the way people perform their duty of civic participation and their conception of responsibility. From another point of view, it is also argued that the three components of citizenship conflict with one another under certain circumstances. For instance, claims for cultural recognition of minorities may conflict with equal citizenship status. An empirical investigation of citizenship is complementary to understanding the interaction between these three aspects. This study undertakes the crucial task of providing evidence from the field to illuminate the complex correlations and divergences within citizenship and the relational bond between the legal status, identity, and civic virtue aspects. In this article, the results of qualitative research on a particular group of citizens—Turkish citizens with Jewish background—are discussed in the light of the parameters set above. The study provides empirical evidence to illuminate the dynamics at stake in the relationship between the legal status, identity, and civic virtue aspects in the specificity of Turkey's Jews and the conduct of Turkish citizenship. With the use of in-depth interviews conducted with the sample group of Jews, the study attempts to understand how being a non-Muslim minority group living in a Muslim-predominant society influences the perceptions and experiences regarding citizenship. The discussion developed in the article is presented in three parts. In the first part, an overview of Turkish citizenship and the status of non-Muslim minorities per se is put forth. This part also sets forth the essentials of Turkish citizenship with its legal status, identity, and civic virtue aspects. In addition, the paradoxical consequences of the dominant paradigms inherent in citizenship in Turkey regarding non-Muslim minorities are demonstrated. The second part focuses on the field research conducted with the Jewish community in Turkey. After a brief summary of methodology and a portrayal of the general characteristics of the sample group, it discusses how members of Turkey's Jewish community experience and perceive Turkish citizenship through its aspects of legal status, identity, and civic virtue. The respondents' perceptions and experiences regarding being Turkish citizens and a non-Muslim minority are also covered. The third part offers a discussion on Turkish citizenship in the light of the research results and gives a citizen-centric account through the lenses of respondents.

This chapter investigates whether, according to Aristotle, participation in judicial practices promotes the development of the moral, intellectual or civic virtues of the rhetorician or the audience. A close reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric reveals that Aristotle did not understand the art of rhetoric as having an inherently moral purpose. Rather, for Aristotle the art of rhetoric in a judicial setting implied an understanding of the available means of persuasion and entailed the ability of appealing to the emotions of the audience in order to win a lawsuit. For this purpose the rhetorician may arouse emotions that, in themselves, are morally questionable. Therefore, Aristotle emphasized the need for laws that govern the judicial process and prevent or curtail corrupting practices. Based on a reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the chapter takes issue with the participatory democracy approach, which traces its roots to Aristotle’s political thought, and presents the argument that political activity, including jury duty, necessarily constitutes an experience that promotes the moral or civic development of the citizen.