Abstract
Epistemic arguments for democracy claim that democratic institutions are epistemically and not just morally superior to non-democratic alternatives. Democratic institutions do a better job at discovering the truth, at justifying decisions and policies, and at gathering and creating knowledge. But epistemic arguments have also faced serious criticism that questions whether political decisions are best framed in terms of truth and, if they are, whether democracy is actually the best way of arriving at the truth. I argue here that these concerns can be addressed by making two modifications to epistemic arguments. The first is that we attend to other epistemic concepts—notably understanding—which are often left out of the equation. The second is that we also revisit and revise the concept of truth in which the epistemic argument is typically framed.
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