Democracy in crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011

It is widely feared that the onset of populism poses a threat to democracy, as citizens’ support for democracy is essential for its legitimacy and stability. Yet, the relationship between populism and democratic support at the citizen level remains poorly understood, particularly with respect to support for liberal democracy. Data measuring citizens’ populist attitudes in conjunction with a comprehensive range of measures of democratic support have been lacking. Using unique data from the Netherlands, we study the relationship between individuals’ populist attitudes and their attitudes towards democracy in three studies. We examine the association between populism and support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy (Study 1), populism and support for liberal democracy (Study 2), and populism and support for majoritarian conceptions of democracy (Study 3). We find that while citizens with stronger populist attitudes are dissatisfied with how democracy works, they are no less supportive of the principle of democracy. Contrary to most theorizing, we find that citizens with higher populist attitudes not less supportive of key institutions of liberal democracy, but reject mediated representation through political parties. At the same time, individuals with stronger populist attitudes are highly supportive of forms of unconstrained majoritarian rule. These findings suggest that the relationship between populism and support for (liberal) democracy is more complicated than commonly assumed.

In the wake of the “Great Recession” and its severe fiscal implications, many European countries enacted significant pension reforms aimed at reducing public spending and limiting contribution rates. Unlike most changes carried out before, they were implemented swiftly and without building a broad political and social consensus, usually being suggested or even mandated by inter- and supranational organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the European Union (EU). While some of these cuts were at least partly revoked during the following years of economic recovery, European welfare states still tend to face lower “pension burdens” in the upcoming decades than had been expected during the 2000s. Financial sustainability, however, puts adequacy at risk for present and future retirees, many of whom no longer achieve sufficient working careers anyway.

critical analysis of antiimmigration discourses in European Union, 101-106 discourse, 98-101 political parties, 97-98, 101 Apple, 164-165 Arab Spring, 5-6, 33 Artificial intelligence, 86 Communiqu on International Role of Europe, 138-139 Concentric circles model, 9 Conference on the Future of Europe, 4 current problems affecting European integration, 4-8 new quests in EU, 9-12 scenarios for future of European Union, 8-9 Cooperation with non-EU countries, 114-115 Cooperative security, 185 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, 160 Copenhagen Criteria, 5, 237-238 Cotonou 2.0, 266 Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), 262, 265 historical background, 262-266 1980 Coup D'tat in Turkey, 6 COVID-19, 226 in Europe, 228-231 and financial problems in European Union, 37-39 as global health crisis, 35-37 pandemic, 7, 37,

It is likely that ten years of economic crisis have eroded the support of democracy in Europe. But how much? The existing research is divided on this issue. Some claim that the degree of satisfaction with democracy has declined across the whole of Europe during the Great Recession. Other researchers have found no empirical evidence that the support of democracy as a core value has declined across Europe. They claim that merely the specific support has decreased in some countries. This article will use the data from the European Social Survey to verify both claims. It shows that the Great Recession did not lead to a legitimacy crisis of European democracies and that the diffuse support of democracy remains high in most regions. The degree to which the specific support of democracy has been weakened is moderated by the type of welfare regime. In countries where the economic crisis did strike hard and the welfare state is weakly developed, the support of democracy has dropped dramatically. This outcome takes a middle position between two extremes in the ongoing academic debate on the support of democracy. Both positions regarding the increase or decrease of support of and satisfaction with democracy are in need of more nuance by taking into account the impact of welfare regimes. Existing research often assumes a uniform European context that shows either increasing or decreasing levels of satisfaction with democracy. Our research has shown that the response of citizens to the Great Recession has been influenced by the welfare regime.

In everyday political life, closeness or proximity to citizens is often cited as a key factor in generating political trust. Closeness to citizens is regularly taken for granted, especially at the local level in the European Union (EU). Our paper compares two main indicators of closeness to citizens, namely personal interactions (facework commitment) and the role of perceived expertise (faceless commitment). It then asks if a transfer (or spillover) of trust from the local level to the European level can be observed. Our analysis is based on data from a novel survey in six EU member states and 12 regions ( N = 8700), which aimed to determine citizens’ proximity to and trust in parliaments in the multi-level system of the EU. The results of the paper highlight the importance of generating ‘faceless commitment’ (perceived expertise) as an indicator for closeness to citizens, which can be an important driver for increasing political trust. We found no spillover effects of trust from the subnational level to higher levels in the EU, which raises doubts about the potential of the subnational level to serve as a source and a promoter for trust in European institutions. Points for practitioners Personal contact is not always key for generating trust. Citizens expect politicians to rest their decision-making upon perceived living conditions and opinions of their constituencies instead. Large institutions like the European Parliament can benefit from these results since they can hardly seek direct contact with all citizens. Social sciences data and research can be one source of information to gather such expertise about living conditions. Trust cannot be simply transferred from one level (subnational) to another level (national, European).

The Unfinished Architecture of Europe's Economic Union

The European Rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF Lending to Central and Eastern European Countries

Priorities for the COVID-19 pandemic at the start of 2021: statement of the Lancet COVID-19 Commission

Building, bridging, blocking: the EU’s approach towards sub- regional integration in its broader neighbourhood

The European Union (EU) has been proactive in environmental protection and conservation within and outside Europe. However, among various policy realms, the most severe non-compliance by the EU member states exists in the realm of environmental protection and conservation. In this policy realm, nature protection and biodiversity conservation constitute the largest portion of non-compliance by the member states. In addition, in this policy area, development of common rules entailing transfer of member states competence has been obstructed continuously. This phenomenon contradicts with an existing potent theoretical account that stresses the importance of the demand for a single common rule at the EU level from non-state actors, and autonomous activities of EU supranational organizations seeking to attain transfer of member states competence at the EU level. The theory emphasizes that this collaboration between non-state actors and supranational organization will activate both negative and positive integration in a sustained fashion. Yet it focuses primarily on the cases of negative integration, including deregulation and market liberalization. Although we can observe that apparently quite similar factors have worked in the case of EU nature and biodiversity policy, this policy area has not experienced transfer of member states competence. This article addresses why and how this has happened and provides implications contributing to theorization of positive integration. This article traces initiation, adoption, implementation, and enforcement processes of the 1979 Birds Directive and the 1992 Habitats Directive, the common rules constituting the core of EU nature and biodiversity policy. The analysis of these two directives reveals the limitations of the existing theoretical framework primarily concerned with negative integration. Although the Birds and Habitats Directives were both initiated by supranational organizations in response to the strong pressures from citizens and environmental organizations, due to the distributional conflicts among the member states, the Commission was unable to play a role as policy entrepreneur. Again, responding to the demand from environmental organizations, supranational organizations, especially the European Court of Justice, enforced the Birds and Habitats Directives against the member states from the perspective of strict environmental protection. Yet this aroused oppositions from the member states and led to the revision of the common rules on nature and biodiversity, thus hindering transfer of member states competence. This strict enforcement has reinforced the confrontation between environmental interests represented by environmental organizations and supranational organizations, and economic interests supported by the member states and firms, thus further obstructing transfer of member states competence.

The European Union (EU) has been engaging its eastern and southern neighbourhood in various multilateral and bilateral schemes of cooperation. Tools and instruments used in this undertaking are aimed at transforming the neighbouring countries into safe, prosperous and democratic polities. This task is however difficult, as many of the neighbouring countries do not share EU values, especially those connected to democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. These values often clash with other fundamental norms such as economic prosperity and security. The main aim of this contribution is to explore how the issue of migration features in the contestation of democracy as a fundamental value used by the EU in dealing with its neighbours. In order to investigate this issue, data from selected EU member states has been analysed. The corpus includes documents issued by various national actors – government, political parties and civil society, in which the fundamental norm of democracy and democracy support is contested on the basis of migratory considerations.

This article addresses the puzzle of why the European Union (EU) struggles to learn from ineffective attempts to support democratization in the Arab world but instead continuously (re‐)produces democracy support malpractices. To better understand this phenomenon, we draw from practice theory and conceptualize EU democracy support as practices performed by a community of insiders who act within a complex constellation of communities of practice. Due to the way in which communities function, decision‐makers do not critically reflect on the background knowledge on which they base their practices and thus do not learn how to improve them. This constellation model offers a unique take on non‐learning within the EU and in (policy‐making) groups more generally. We illustrate the proposed conceptual framework through an empirical analysis of EU democracy support in Egypt, showing that the EU performs practices similar to those before the 2011 Revolution due to its inability to learn.

Amid widespread concerns about the crisis of democracy, scant scholarly attention has been given to the views of elite politicians who are at the helm of democracy and, for instance, have the ability to halt democratic erosion and improve citizens’ support for democracy. In this paper we addresses this important gap by investigating whether and why top politicians in Belgium and Australia are optimistic or pessimistic about democracy and its evolution. Drawing on 44 in-depth interviews with party leaders and ministers, we conduct a qualitative content analysis to examine the reasons behind elites’ optimism or pessimism about how “their” democracy is evolving. From their reflections, we learn that there is quite some variation in politicians’ views but that many, especially in Belgium, are pessimistic about how democracy evolves. The main source of pessimism stems from the tension between citizens’ expectations and politicians’ ability to deliver on these expectations. Elites say that politicians these days tend to overpromise what they can deliver, and citizens – fueled by (social) media and extremist opposition forces – are viewed as harboring unrealistic expectations. Yet, while top politicians are ultimately responsible for shaping democracy, they do not seem to take responsibility for halting the crisis of democracy.

Purpose The aim of the paper is to provide a review of potential Britain’s exit from the European Union (EU) and its implication on financial markets regulation in the EU and UK. It explores the terrain for financial markets regulation in the EU, pointing out how it impinges on the national legal system of EU countries and what it could mean for the UK. It navigates the legal reforms the UK will have to undertake to fill the void caused by its exit from the EU. Lastly, the paper proffers its thoughtful analysis of the reform to undertake if the UK exited the EU, both in the UK and the EU. Design/methodology/approach The paper has internalized empirical data generated by different interest groups on the implication of potential British exit from the EU on markets and other core issues which underpin the UK/EU relationship. These data were available in most major UK newspapers, academic journals and textbooks, especially in expositing conceptual and theoretical issues underpinning the paper. It has drawn comparisons with other jurisdictions, especially in East Africa, to demonstrate the inherent challenges in integration of regional markets on individual member countries. The paper also articulates other regulatory issues such as mutual recognition and the cost of Brexit on businesses in the EU/UK. Findings The findings of the paper confirm that British interests are likely to be better protected if it remains the member of the EU but could be undermined if it relinquishes its membership. Studies have been carried out by academic think tanks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and they all indicate that British exit from the EU could be counterproductive for the UK. Contemporary global challenges need global solutions, thus Britain will still need to forge alliance with EU countries. Research limitations/implications The limitation of the paper was that there are not many comparative studies carried out on countries which have exited regional market initiatives and their experiences after that. The paper has alluded to the experience of Uganda, which quit the East African Community (EAC) in 1977 and rejoined it 23 years later. In a crucial issue like Brexit, the paper would better evaluate the potential Brexit is drawing on experiences of countries which have exited and how they have fared after that. There were not many comparable case studies on countries which have exited regional markets. Practical implications The paper discusses important practical issues relating to Brexit and its implications on the UK/EU government and economies. It is practical because it weighs in on important policy and legal issues on regulation of markets in the post-Brexit era in the UK and EU. As the UK government goes for a referendum to decide its future relationship with EU, it will need to evaluate its decisions by internalizing academic literature on Brexit, such as this paper. Social implications The paper has social implications because Brexit will affect people and markets in varied ways. It addresses pertinent issues related to the UK and its implication in the post-Brexit era on the UK/EU economies. Originality/value The paper is timely, original and a must read because it discusses pertinent issues of the potential British exit and its implication for the UK and other stakeholders in a distinctive way.

ABSTRACTThe global financial crisis has transformed the relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). Until the crisis, the IMF had not lent to EU member states in decades, but now the two organisations closely coordinate their lending policies. In the Latvian and Romanian programmes, the IMF and the EU advocated different loan terms. Surprisingly, the EU embraced ‘Washington Consensus’-style measures more willingly than did the IMF, which much of the contemporary literature still portrays as an across-the-board promoter of orthodox macroeconomic policies. We qualify this stereotypical characterisation by arguing from a constructivist perspective that the degree of an organisation's autonomy from its members depends on the interpretation of its mandate. IMF staff viewed the Fund's technical mandate as an opportunity to react rather flexibly to the challenges of the latest crisis. By contrast, European Commission, as well as European Central Bank (ECB), staff interpreted the vast body of supranational rules as necessitating stricter adherence to economic orthodoxy. Thus, IMF lending policies were more flexible and, at least on fiscal issues, also less contractionary.