Deliberation, Delay, Decision, June–December 1956

Abstract

When announcing the European FTA proposal to the House of Commons on 26 November 1956, Harold Macmillan stated categorically that it was not the aim of the British government to upset the Messina plans or undermine the movement for European unity; this would be ‘a very wrong decision’ which could not be justified.1 Macmillan in no way misled the House. By November 1956, British policy had matured into the third stage of its metamorphosis, becoming a serious attempt at securing an OEEC FTA around the kernel of the Messina Common Market. But this was not the result of enthusiasm for the Six’s plans and a desire to complement them, despite what ministers would later argue during the FTA negotiations. Instead, it reflected Whitehall’s acceptance of its inability to oppose the Six once they had overcome their differences, and a consequent desperation that British interests would be threatened unless a trade relationship with the Common Market was accomplished. However, it would be inaccurate to suggest that there was one universal Whitehall attitude towards European integration at this stage as ministerial and departmental differences worsened during the second half of 1956. Plan G was ‘so politically explosive’ that it provoked strong Cabinet splits.2 These were only surmounted in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, partly in the hope of providing a jaded Conservative Party with a European fillip, but also because of Macmillan’s adept political manipulation.KeywordsBritish GovernmentFree Trade AreaConservative PartyNuclear DeterrentCommon External TariffThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.