Abstract
Abstract Chapter 16 argues that there are everyday cases in which rationality requires you, as a non-idealized human thinker, to have inconsistent beliefs while recognizing the inconsistency. This view is defended against objections by Doris Olin and others. Three versions of the preface paradox are considered as candidate cases, including Makinson’s original version of the preface paradox. None of these is free from objection; however, there is a fourth version, Modesty, that supposes that you believe that at least one of your beliefs is false. It is argued that this case escapes all the objections to the other versions, including the objection that given certain closure principles for justified belief, justified inconsistent beliefs saddle you with a pair of justified beliefs that are in explicit contradiction.
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