Defending the duty to secure: A reply to critics

Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy by Rita Floyd. Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 230. $99 (Hardback). ISBN: 9780521197564[Article copies available for a fee from The Transformative Studies Institute. E-mail address: journal@transformativestudies.org Website: http: //www, trans formativestudies. ors ©2013 by The Transformative Studies Institute. All rights reserved. JThe aim of the book Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy is to devise a stronger and even more compelling securitization theory. This book proposes a revision of the Copenhagen School's influential securitisation theory that both allows insights into the intentions of securitising actors and enables the moral evaluation of securitization and desecuritisation in the environmental sector of security. Securitisation theory holds that in international relations, an issue becomes a matter of emergency politics/a security issue not because something constitutes an objective threat to the state or to some other entity, but rather because a powerful securitising actor argues that something constitutes an existential threat to some object that needs to be dealt with immediately if the object is to survive.The idea that security is a self-referential practice is not only the essence of securitisation theory; it is also the secret of the theory's popularity and its explanatory potency. More readily than rival security theories, it allows the security analyst to account for the essentially contested nature of security where one and the same concept may mean entirely different, and even opposing, things. Yet although this is a clear, strong point on the part of securitisation theory, the Copenhagen School's preoccupation with it two major shortcomings. According to Floyd, a Fellow at the Institute for Environmental Security and British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK, the securitisation analyst studies who can securitise on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects, whilst questions beyond the practice of security, such as those concerning the intentions of securitising actors (e.g. 'why do actors securitise?'), are ignored.And also, the idea that security is a self-referential practice allows no conceptual room for the theorising of what really is a security issue, nor for what ought to be securitised. Under the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework, the security analyst and the securitising actor are 'functionally distinct' entities with the security analyst in no position to assume the role of the securitising actor at any point of the analysis. This, however, does not mean that the Copenhagen School feels 'obliged to agree' with any given securitisation. On the contrary, the school holds strong views about the value of both securitization and also of desecuritisation. They argue that, in all but a few circumstances, securitisations are morally wrong, whereas desecuritisations are morally right. Notably, they arrive at these conclusions by way of what they take to be the effects or consequences of either action.In the case of securitisation, they take the consequences to be dedemocratisation, depoliticisation, the security dilemma and conflict. In the case of desecuritisation, they expect politicisation, understood as a general opening up of debate. Although it is not the securitization analyst's aim to bring about desecuritisation, the securitisation analyst is potentially able, by providing insights into the effects of securitisation, to reduce both the scale and number of escalations and security dilemmas found in the world. The Copenhagen School anticipates that the securitisation analyst will arrive at the very same conclusions regarding the outcomes of securitisation and desecuritisation.This book, by use of the example of the environmental sector of security, shows that securitisations are not categorically morally wrong, but, rather, that depending on the beneficiary of environmental security policies, securitisation can be morally permissible. …

The paper addresses the security threat perception and securitization of existential threats in Lithuania. It focuses upon the securitization theory and its ability to explain the change of national security agendas as affected by the changes in national identity and existential security threats. It takes into account the internal and external factors that are shaping the objective and subjective national threat perception. The paper applies O. Waever’s securitization theory with an aim to explain how the national security threats are being addressed and perceived in Lithuania. Moreover, the paper is developed against the backdrop of the most recent developments in securitization theory and evolution of its theoretical perceptions of identity, existential threats, and legitimacy. It also discusses the possibility of inclusion of hybrid security threats into an analysis of securitization. The empirical part of the article assesses the most recent security challenges, provides evaluation of changes in national security perception, and portrays the dynamics of national security threats as defined in the National Security Strategies and the Military Doctrine. The paper focuses upon the most recent dynamics in security policy of Lithuania. It also takes into account the hybrid nature of security threats and the reaction to hybrid security elements such as: cyber security, information security, and international terrorism.

This contribution applies Floyd’s just securitization theory (JST) to cybersecurity and develops an own version of JST focused on subsidiarity from the critical discussion of this application. Floyd’s JST pursues a subsidiary approach. It emphasizes that securitization is only legitimate if it has “a reasonable chance of success” to avert threats to the satisfaction of “basic human needs”. From this perspective, cyber-securitization would be only legitimate if it protects critical infrastructure, which is a too narrow scope. Whilst Floyd’s JST focuses exclusively on permissibility and needs instead of rights, I argue that there are cases in which states’ compliance with Human Rights requires the guarantee of cybersecurity, most importantly regarding the human right to privacy. Furthermore, my version of JST strengthens the principle of subsidiarity, in the sense that stakeholders directly affected by a threat should participate in securitization. In order to strengthen a kind of subsidiarity focused on the private sector, I argue for the legitimacy of private active self-defence in cyberspace and emphasize the importance of a ‘whole-of-society approach’ involving digital literacy and ‘everyday security practices’. In contrast to that, I argue that far-reaching securitization on the nation-state level can be connected to hyper-securitization. I argue that the securitization of the digital public sphere following unclear notions such as ‘digital sovereignty’ creates a ‘cybersecurity dilemma’ and a ‘societal security dilemma’. Furthermore, I argue that this kind of counterproductive hyper-securitization involves an ‘invisible handshake’ between Big Tech and governments that should be counteracted by structural desecuritization focused on subsidiarity.

Introduction: Securitization theory posits that securitization happens when actors frame political agenda issues as existential threats through their discourse, prompting states to take action in response. This article explores the challenges in the empirical application of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory in International Relations research. Materials and methods: We conducted a systematic review of articles published in journals indexed in the Scopus database with an impact factor in the first quartile. Initially, we selected 260 articles that mentioned the term “securitization/securitisation” in their titles, abstracts, or keywords. After excluding those lacking an empirical application of securitization theory, 184 articles remained. We then carried out a content analysis of the logical structure of these articles' arguments, categorizing how each one applied the concept of securitization according to the stages of the process (non-politicized, politicized, securitized, securitizing actor) and its variables. Results: Out of the 184 articles, 110 set out to apply securitization theory, but only 11 successfully did so in a way that clearly confirmed securitization. These 11 studies showed how topics were securitized by following the stages outlined in the original theoretical framework. Discussion: The challenges in empirically applying securitization theory arise from two main factors: the researchers themselves and the theory itself. Many articles faced methodological hurdles and lacked rigor in operationalizing the theoretical elements required to confirm the securitization of a topic, revealing limitations among the researchers. Additionally, the theory demands a high level of empirical evidence, which makes its application more difficult. This indicates a need to revisit the theory and consider integrating models that facilitate empirical studies on securitization.

Securitization theory provides a powerful lens for understanding how seemingly ordinary issues can be transformed into urgent security threats, demanding extraordinary measures. This paper, focusing on the War on Terror as a case study, examines the theory's strengths and limitations in illuminating this complex phenomenon. Drawing on the Copenhagen School's framework of speech acts, securitizing moves, and desecuritization, we analyze how terrorism has been discursively constructed as an existential threat to international security, justifying exceptional measures with significant geopolitical, policy, and human rights consequences. The War on Terror exemplifies the strengths of securitization theory in demonstrating how securitized narratives can reshape political landscapes and empower governments to enact far-reaching security measures. However, the case study also exposes the theory's limitations, particularly its potential for over-securitization, the marginalization of non-state actors, and the erosion of individual liberties. Engaging with critiques from critical and feminist approaches, we explore these shortcomings and the ongoing debates surrounding the theory's adaptability to address contemporary challenges like balancing security with human rights and navigating non-state threats. The paper concludes by arguing that while securitization theory, particularly the Copenhagen School framework, requires significant adaptation to remain relevant in the 21st century, it still offers valuable insights into the construction of security threats and the dynamics of contemporary security landscapes. By acknowledging its limitations and fostering ongoing dialogue, securitization theory can retain its valuable role in guiding our understanding of complex security challenges and their consequences for individuals, states, and the international community as a whole.

In this article, the influence of the construction of children as civilians over the processes of securitization in the US intervention in Somalia is examined. This is done through an analysis of the US print news media coverage of that event. The study employs two key theoretical frameworks: the first is the social understanding of civilianhood, and the second is the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization. The work concludes that a failure to unpack the value of referent objects of security diminishes the insights that securitization theory can offer. The grammar of securitizing moves cannot be fully comprehended in instances of militarized humanitarian interventions, in particular, without this kind of analysis. Children as suffering civilians draw considerable attention from the world’s media and thus an investigation of their role in securitization can be highly informative.

Objective: The Securitization Theory by the Copenhagen School frames the unchecked spread of infectious diseases as an existential security threat, broadening traditional militarized security concepts to include public health. This review enhances understanding of the securitization of infectious diseases and its implications for interpreting contemporary “existential” security threats. Data Sources: Using Prisma guidelines, two independent researchers identified relevant literature using the PubMed, Science Direct, Google Scholar, and Medline databases. Study Selection: The search strategy focused on articles published in the past 15 years in English. Boolean Operators and key terms used include: “emerging infectious diseases” AND “securitization theory” OR “securitization,” “security–public health nexus,” “infectious diseases” AND “health security,” and “securitization of COVID-19” AND “securitization theory.” Concept papers, peer-reviewed articles, books, and policy analyses (policy briefs) were included. Non-English publications, editorials, or conference abstracts, and any other literature lacking clear relevance to the securitization of infectious diseases were excluded. Data Extraction and Synthesis: The data collection took four months, resulting in 137 citations from database searches and 31 from supplementary sources. After removing duplicates, 61 citations were included, with three non-English papers excluded. Conclusions: The in-depth deliberation on the securitization of infectious diseases presented in this article offers a modern pragmatic worldview of utilizing securitization theory as a practical security analysis tool while reconciling with critics of the theory to facilitate policies and public health responses for pre-emptive global health security, governance, and regulation.

While securitization studies have paid considerable attention to the moral value of desecuritization, they have paid almost no attention to the morality of securitization. In this article, I attempt to rectify that situation by proposing a revision of securitization theory that specifies three criteria that – if fulfilled at the same time – would render a securitization morally right. The criteria are: (1) that there is an objective existential threat; (2) that the referent object of security is morally legitimate; and (3) that the security response is appropriate to the threat in question. Although what is suggested here is considerably removed from the Copenhagen School’s original securitization theory, it is akin to that framework insofar as it retains the functional distinction between the security analyst and the securitizing actor. Indeed, the development of criteria that determine the moral rightness of securitization is analogous to the Copenhagen School’s devising criteria that determine both the existence and the success of securitization.

This research examines the War on Terror policies by the selected public speeches of the two former Presidents of the USA, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, with the object of discovering the referent object(s) and existential threat(s) – the two significant aspects of securitization theory. The process of securitization of Muslim communities, which expanded in parallel with the war on terror policy followed by the Bush and Obama administrations in the USA after September 11, has also been examined. The study claims that the concepts of referent objects and existential threats had realized through discursive political practices of the Presidents. The study finds that President Bush mobilized public opinion against different people, groups, terrorist organizations, and nations by securitizing them. In contrast, President Obama securitized some terrorist groups while seeking to desecuritize a previously securitized but less serious issue.

Background: Diplomats or consuls can be declared persona non grata (PNG) by receiving states. In many cases, it is declared for security reasons, claiming that issues caused by sending states are matters of national security of receiving states. The extant literature focused on legal aspects of it regarding diplomatic immunities and privileges, but the declarations of PNG in international affairs require considerations from security studies. Methods: Security is a social construct, and the process of construction is explained by securitisation theory by the Copenhagen School and the Paris School. The paper conducted an overview of PNG by a general examination of the declarations of PNG with securitisation theory. Further examinations were done focusing on series of the declarations of PNG during the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Along with the overall examination of PNG during the crisis, the analysis of the declaration of PNG to a Japanese Consul in Vladivostok, Russia was conducted as a unique case. Results: Generally, declaration of PNG is a result of securitisation within normal politics as the Paris School theorised, not exceeding normal politics as the Copenhagen School theorised. Also, two implications to the theory were found: 1) the need to focus on the existential threat; and 2) the need to consider a sphere of gradation between normal and emergency politics. The massacre in Bucha, Ukraine triggered many declarations of PNG, indicating that the cause of the securitisation of PNG was the massacre as an existential threat. The case of Vladivostok was a deviation from normal politics with a possible illegal detention of the consul, but the declaration of PNG itself is within normal politics. Rather than seeing the case simply as in the realm of emergency politics, it is better interpreted as a mixture of normal and emergency politics.

Intervening in recent debates on normativity in securitization theory, I draw on Aristotle’s notion of phronesis and Morgenthau’s formulation of prudence to articulate an ethical theory that takes seriously the idea that securitization is a deeply intersubjective process. First, I critique Rita Floyd's extant “just securitization theory,” which develops universal moral criteria akin to those of just war theory. While insightful, I argue that both her approach to the study of securitization as an empirical phenomenon and to moral theory are flawed. Then, I develop a novel theory by articulating how securitizing actors ought to exercise phronesis as a mode of ethical reasoning rather than a set of rules to follow. Securitizing actors exercise phronesis when they continuously deliberate about the ends of their actions, consider potential long-term consequences, utilize both abstract knowledge and experience, engage in critical self-reflection, and practice restraint. Throughout the paper, I redeploy the “universal” just securitization concepts of just cause and proportionality as rhetorical devices to help stimulate phronetic judgement.

Securitization theory has attracted much attention since it was first developed by the so-called ‘Copenhagen School’. In a nutshell, the Copenhagen School argues that an issue is transformed into a security issue (i.e. securitized) after a securitizing actor presents it as an existential threat and this ‘securitizing move’ is accepted by the ‘audience’ (Waever 1995; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998). The original formulation of securitization theory is heavily influenced by linguistics, and more precisely the concept of ‘speech acts’, that is, discourses that do not ‘report on things’, but rather ‘do things’. Whilst the potential of this approach for contributing to the debates on the meaning of security in the post-Cold War era has been widely acknowledged, a consensus has also emerged around the idea that securitization theory in its original formulation by the Copenhagen School suffers from several weaknesses, including the significant under-theorization of several aspects of securitization processes (Barthwal-Datta 2009; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; Stritzel 2007; Wilkinson 2007).

INTRODUCTION: This article explores how securitisation theory is mobilised in contemporary social work discourse, policy and practice. We draw on recent child protection research to support our claim that a new practice issue, described previously as securitised safeguarding, has emerged.APPROACH: We demonstrate its emergence using securitisation theory as a conceptual mode of analysis to describe how a securitised safeguarding response depicts particular families as an existential threat which, in turn, prompts a response characterised by forms of muscular liberalism.CONCLUSIONS: We argue that this emerging practice issue requires critical consideration and suggest it will have a significant impact on social work – one that is unlikely to be beneficial for the profession and, more importantly, families being worked with. By describing a process of de-securitisation, we offer an alternative and more nuanced approach that perceives families holistically, and mobilises a welfare safeguarding model. This more closely resembles traditional social work values of emancipation, liberation and empowerment within social work practice.

<div class="page" title="Page 2"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"> Securitisation theory is at the centre of understanding how an issue becomes accepted as a threat. A concept that has received considerably less attention is “desecuritisation”, the withdrawal of securitisation. This article examines the audience in different types of desecuritisation strategies<em>, </em>where a more comprehensive understanding of the audience is lacking. In considering multiple <em>spaces of desecuritisation, </em>this article focuses on the audience’s active role in enabling desecuritisation and, as a result, develops a more comprehensive understanding of the audience. In this way, this article suggests a more thorough theoretical understanding of one of the fundamental puzzles within desecuritisation: how and when desecuritisation occurs. The theoretical development concerning the audience is conducted through engaging with a wide range of theories on spatiality, the everyday and the broader critical field of securitisation theory. Instead of what has previously been the case, where the audience was thought of as a passive, static and binary receiver of a (de)securitisation move, the audience in this article is theorised as changing and dynamic. This view of the audience has implications for securitisation theory in general, and for desecuritisation theory in particular. Envisioning the audience as an active part in shaping the conditions of desecuritisation provides a theoretical understanding of how securitisation’s logic of particularisation, the distinctive separation between threat and referent object, can be loosened and, eventually, abandoned. Ultimately, this article contributes to the literature on desecuritisation by refocusing attention on the audience and theorising it as an important and enabling actor in the interactive game of desecuritisation. </div></div></div>

Critical infrastructure has become a central focus of European security governance amid increasingly complex physical, digital, and hybrid threats. This article applies securitization theory, drawing on both the classical Copenhagen School and its sociological developments, to analyse how the EU constructs and governs critical infrastructure through the CER Directive and the NIS2 Directive. The comparison shows that these instruments articulate distinct, yet complementary, referent objects: the CER Directive securitizes the continuity of essential services in the physical and organisational domain, while the NIS2 Directive securitizes the security and reliability of network and information systems underpinning the internal market. Together, they reveal a dual securitization logic, physical operational continuity, and digital systemic integrity, embedded in a multi-level EU security architecture that operates through legal instruments, regulatory practices, and technical standards. By linking securitization theory with the material politics of infrastructure governance, the article demonstrates that critical infrastructure is not merely a technical domain, but a key arena through which contemporary European security is defined and enacted.