Debt-Trap Diplomacy of China towards the Turkestan Republics

Purpose: This study aims to critically examine Kazakhstan's involvement in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), challenging prevailing realist interpretations and exploring the nation's agency within the framework of this expansive development strategy. By analysing the multifaceted nature of the BRI and its impact on Kazakhstan's economic development, the research seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of the initiative's implementation and outcomes.Research Methodology: The study employs a matrix approach to analyse the BRI's functions and sectors, with a particular focus on Kazakhstan. This methodology involves the creation of two comprehensive matrices: one delineating the overall BRI framework and another specific to Kazakhstan's engagement. The matrices were developed through an extensive literature review, expert consultations, and iterative refinement. This approach allows for a systematic examination of how various BRI functions manifest across different sectors, providing a structured framework for understanding the initiative's scope and impact.Originality: This research contributes to the existing literature by offering a constructivist perspective on Kazakhstan's involvement in the BRI, countering dominant realist narratives. The study's originality lies in its development of a novel matrix approach to BRI analysis, which provides a comprehensive and nuanced view of the initiative's multifaceted nature. Furthermore, the research challenges prevailing misconceptions about the BRI, particularly the notions of 'debt trap diplomacy' and China's purported rigid plan for global dominance.Research Findings: The study reveals that Kazakhstan has effectively leveraged the BRI to its national advantage, utilising open-ended multi-vector policies to selectively engage with the initiative. Contrary to realist interpretations, the research finds that agreements between Kazakhstan and China are based on mutual benefit and equal footing. The economic development impacts of the BRI on Kazakhstan are found to be largely positive, advancing the nation's progress across various sectors. The study also highlights the complex and less cohesive dynamics of BRI implementation, challenging the notion of a monolithic Chinese strategy. Additionally, the research demonstrates that BRI funding helps address the infrastructure gap in developing nations, offering alternative investment opportunities with fewer conditionalities than traditional Western-led initiatives.

This paper aims to examine the political economy of the Hambantota Port project in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and how it was used (incorrectly) as a case study for Debt Trap Diplomacy (DTD). Our analysis shows that the port construction pre-dated the BRI and was a result of strong domestic electoral political incentives, not driven by the BRI. The Port lease, however, was motivated by domestic economic incentives as opposed to domestic political gains. Leasing Hambantota port to China was not a debt-equity swap and was a response to Sri Lanka’s external economic vulnerabilities and provided a short-term solution to foreign currency liquidity constraints and fiscal constraints. Although it was not driven by BRI plans, the port deal is portrayed as an example of DTD. We reconfirm the existing literature which argues that Hambantota port is not an example for DTD and provide documentary evidence to show that lease and loan were two different transactions and port lease was not an asset seizure. DTD narrative was largely driven by geopolitical rivalries and domestic political sentiments in US and India. Misinterpreting the Hambantota Port lease as a case study provided much-needed validation for the DTD narrative.

PurposeThis purpose of this paper is to explore China’s choice to focus early Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Africa outreach on Eastern Africa. The BRI specifically seeks to achieve ten economic and policy objectives, as outlined in the two launch speeches of 2013. In terms of realising these, the economic development and digitisation levels, that progress of the demographic transition, and the important security context of the sub-region, logically make East Africa relatively important to BRI in continental context. Kenya specifically is important in being an African frontier therein, and, also, because it shares a few important borders with landlocked countries, including Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda, alongside a strategic coast and ports. From this lens, as well the fact that in the Ming Dynasty Chinese fleets reached what is modern-day Kenya, China’s early BRI outreach to Africa having had a historical precedent in initially focusing on Eastern Africa, might be usefully understood.Design/methodology/approachTo realise that aim a comprehensive survey of related literature and policy documents, in Chinese, English and Swahili, was undertaken and relevant data compiled and analysed.FindingsTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, first, this paper is the first to argue that the Belt and Road Initiative in Africa may build on abstract long-run logic in terms of economics, demographic change and security. This provides a contrary perspective to the pre-existing established “debt trap diplomacy” and no consistent logic narratives. Second, it is the first to offer a synthesised analysis of the BRI in Africa, East Africa specifically, looking across economic, demographic and security angles.Research limitations/implicationsThe paper is a synthesis of development and regional economics literature that forges some prospective rationales only. It is not an empirical research paper drawing very specific and definitive conclusions.Practical implicationsAmid widespread geo-economic tensions and uncertainty, around the Belt and Road Initiative in particular, this paper offers a new economic development-oriented logic for the choice of an important node of the China's Belt and Road Initiative, that of East Africa, Kenya especially. This may impact existing related narratives and policy responses.Social implicationsEquivalently to the above this may then have an impact on the ground in East Africa and beyond.Originality/valueThe first such or even close to synthesis.

There has been a widespread concern over China using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to pursue ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ (DTD). This study examines China’s rhetorical counter to DTD. To that end, it draws insights from counterframing and blame avoidance and dissects a corpus of Chinese official documents. To challenge the DTD frame, China proffered two counterframes: scapegoat and force for good. Upon unpacking them into frame elements, the analysis uncovered China’s recourse to six blame-avoiding strategies: attacking blame-attributors, shifting blame to others, invoking mitigating circumstances, foregrounding the positive while backgrounding the negative, stressing China’s benevolence, and appealing to the imperative of development. This study contributes to the debates about the BRI and Chinese overseas lending and the study of China’s international blame management.

This article argues that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can be understood via the lens of regional ordering, whereby China attempts to redefine the shared goals and values for the region of Eurasia and to socialise regional states into the new values in order to have their consent to its leadership. The success of this strategy would then depend, to a large extent, on how its target regional audience reacts to the order-remaking strategy and practices. Taking an ‘eye of the beholder’ perspective, this article focuses on Indian perceptions of China’s order-remaking strategy in South Asia. It posits that India uses the ‘debt trap diplomacy’ narrative to delegitimise China’s infrastructure investment activities based on state capitalism, which have been perceived as a move to upend the status quo and challenge New Delhi’s traditional leadership in the region. To counter China’s growing influence, India is networking with other like-minded countries to promote a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ through groupings such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, the Quad, Malabar exercises, and increasing political and economic bonds with the ASEAN countries. A serious contest over order between China and India in the Indian Ocean is looming on the horizon.

This paper focuses on China's outward foreign direct investment (FDI), arguably one of the most prominent forms of 'new' capital entering the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in recent times, not least since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. Despite initial warmth and hopes for Chinese capital to uplift the economies of the region, recent years have witnessed some high profile pushback against China by some ASEAN members. Key concerns include but are not limited to new, often project-related concerns as well as old, if unspoken, fears that 'China is buying the world' through a spate of 'debt trap diplomacy'. This paper aims to shed light on this issue, focusing on China's outward FDI into ASEAN. Through an analysis of statistical information, it shows that Chinese FDI in ASEAN economies is considerably 'smaller' than what popular rhetoric suggests. Firstly, Chinese outward FDI, while increasing in value, is not more significant than the region's traditional investors, mainly Japan and ASEAN itself. Secondly, the quality of Chinese outward FDI is considerably less sophisticated and sustainable than what is commonly expected. Much of it is directed towards tertiary industries such as real estate activities, which contain a rather speculative element.

Balance-of payments constraint management, 166 dilemma in practice, 178-182 money and debt in international context, 169-172 policies to deal with external constraint, 172-178 reasons for and against public debt in domestic economy, 167-169 reform to lift external constraint, 182-185 Balance-of-payments-constrained growth model, 170-172 Balance-of-payments-constrained model, 176-177 Bank of Japan, 197 Banking system, 169 Beijing's widening global reach, 224 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 223-224 unpacking BRI and debt-trap diplomacy narrative, 224-226 "Better Migration" program, 94 BlackRock, 71 Bretton Woods institutions, 112-113 British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), 60 Capital, 36-37 flight, 171 flows, 170-171 Capitalism, 25-26 Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA), 29 Chagos Archipelago case, 60 Charter of Algiers, 114 Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974), 151 China and debt-trap diplomacy unpacking belt and road initiative and debt-trap diplomacy narrative, 224-226 China EXIM Bank, 226-227 China's challenges as global creditor

This paper researches which types of connectivity have been developed between Southeast Europe and China within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework. The BRI in Southeast Europe evolves in synergy with “the China and 17 CEECs” model of cooperation. Both models of cooperation are similar in many aspects but what distinguishes them is the BRI’s concept of “five connectivity” focused on projects capable of building networks among the BRI’s partners in the area of policy coordination, infrastructure, trade financial integration, and people-to-people bonds. There are a few projects of that kind in Southeast Europe. Analyzing the fourth area of connectivity, “financial integration,” the paper shows that SEE6–China cooperation in that area could not be coupled with so-called “debt trap diplomacy.” The cooperation between Southeast Europe and China has been exposed to different kinds of interpretations based on data and empirical research but also to analyses that explain the cooperation without giving concrete evidence for their claims that BRI’s connectivity is evolving as China’s “new geopolitics” in Southeast Europe. The paper provides empirical evidence that SEE6–China connectivity has no links to geopolitical values, goals, policies, and projects.

Changing Realities:China-Africa Infrastructure Development Mandira Bagwandeen (bio) Through an extensive portfolio of infrastructure investments, China has played a crucial role in helping Africa reduce deficits in its infrastructure. Over the past decade and a half, Chinese state-owned or state-aligned construction and engineering companies have strategically entered African markets with assistance from the Chinese government. Under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese companies took on mega-infrastructure projects, especially in the energy and transport sectors, that could aid African countries with achieving higher levels of development. However, these mega-BRI projects came with hefty price tags that have contributed to compounding the debt stress of several African nations. In this regard, many international (and especially Western) actors have accused China of predatory lending practices and debt-trap diplomacy. This narrative has been further amplified amid the Covid-19 pandemic, which has had significant ramifications for BRI projects in Africa and around the world. The pandemic has created some doubt about whether Chinese-funded and–built infrastructure projects can be completed and, more importantly, whether African states have the fiscal capacity to repay these development loans. With reduced revenues available to African governments, the risk of defaulting on loan repayments is high. Moreover, because of the burden of loan repayments, African states are handicapped in their response measures to Covid-19 and its economic consequences. The Eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2021 demonstrated that due to changing realities—including China's domestic economic concerns, U.S.-China trade tensions, the global economic impact of Covid-19, and Africa's pandemic-induced debt stress—Beijing seems to have realized that it cannot continue to be Africa's go-to bank for financing infrastructure development. This essay outlines that China may not be as willing as it was in past years to finance infrastructure development projects in Africa. It explores the impact of Covid-19 on the development of BRI infrastructure projects in Africa and briefly assesses the validity of the debt-trap and predatory lending accusations leveled against China. Additionally, the essay addresses [End Page 18] the Eighth FOCAC summit, which indicated that China is likely to reduce its focus on development financing for hard infrastructure in its cooperation with African countries. China's Belt and Road Infrastructure in Africa and Covid-19 As of 2019, China was the single-largest source of finance for African infrastructure, having "finance[d] one in five projects and construct[ed] one in three."1 Although the continent's enormous infrastructural investment gap cannot solely be met by Chinese financing, Beijing's role in contributing to the development of the region's infrastructure has been crucial. The China-Africa infrastructure partnership was strengthened under the impetus of BRI, which was introduced in 2013. The initiative closely centers on the Chinese proverb that "if you want to get rich, build a road first" and the argument that "infrastructure investments presuppose economic growth and enhance quality of life."2 This logic is particularly appealing to African states that are desperate to reduce their deficits in infrastructure. Several African scholars have opined that BRI could play a critical role in Africa's industrialization and infrastructure development through the building of synergies between Agenda 2063, the pan-African development plan of the African Union (AU), and BRI.3 Even individual African leaders and the AU welcomed China's infrastructural drive on the continent motivated by BRI. In January 2015, China and the AU signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate on developing major transport infrastructure networks (high-speed railways, aviation, and highways) and industrialization infrastructure. With the ambition to connect all 54 African states through transport infrastructure projects, this memorandum complements and aligns with Agenda 2063, which in turn aims to accelerate continental integration through the development of transport infrastructure and industrialization. Massive national and regional projects worth billions of dollars, mostly in the transport and [End Page 19] energy sectors, began to pop up across the continent. As of April 2019, China had BRI projects in 42 different African countries,4 and by January 2021 a total of 46 out of 54 African countries had signed on to become official...

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not debt trap diplomacy; rather, it is an effort by China to coalesce and capitalize on the sentiments of its participants who have expressed concurrence with China’s view of international relations. At a time when the dominant international relations narrative is being challenged, specifically by China, the BRI has provided China with an opportunity to obtain affirmation for its foreign interests and principles. This claim is made evident by evaluating, as metrics of geopolitical influence, United Nations resolutions representing China’s interests and how BRI participant nations voted on them, as well as official BRI statements that these nations have made regarding China’s foreign policy stances.

Based on panel data from 2000 to 2021 covering African 52 countries under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and utilizing a system generalized method of moments with instrumental variables, the study finds that China’s financing has played a positive role in both export and import intensities of African countries with China. However, the impacts of different financing types on trade intensities vary by different country groups and periods. First, Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has a much bigger impact on both export intensity and import intensity, and aid has a much bigger impact on export intensity in resource-rich African countries than other countries. Second, Chinese OFDI has a much bigger impact on export intensity and aid has a much bigger impact on both export and import intensities in low-income African countries than other countries. Third, the regression results from different periods indicate that Chinese financing has enhanced the bidirectional trade relations between China and Africa since BRI launch. The study is conducive to the exploration of multinational corporations and foreign aid’s role in trade relations and will help African countries use Chinese capital to promote bilateral cooperation and get rid of poverty.

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an important initiative to strengthen connectivity and promote economic growth in many countries. China's strategy to stimulate economic growth by diversifying infrastructure investment under the Belt and Road Initiative demonstrates its commitment to promoting connectivity and sustainable development on a global scale. Through a proactive diversification policy, China reduces risks and seizes opportunities, ensuring sustainability and stability in a minimal economic environment. By embracing digitalization and upgrading financial infrastructure, China is accelerating the pace of economic transactions, supporting innovation and promoting inclusive growth along all BRI routes. As China continues to define future global investments under the BRI, its strategic approach offers a model for accelerating economic growth and connectivity across broad territories and populations. This paper examines the methodology of China's strategy to stimulate economic growth through a variety of infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). He emphasizes the importance of diversification, digitalization and development of financial infrastructure. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has attracted worldwide attention as one of the most ambitious infrastructure and economic development initiatives in modern history. Since its inception in 2013, the BRI has sought to revive old trade routes, enhance connectivity and develop economic cooperation in Asia, Europe and Africa.By embracing digital innovation and upgrading financial systems, China is expediting economic transactions, fostering innovation, and promoting inclusive growth along all BRI corridors. As China continues to shape the future trajectory of global investments through the BRI, its strategic blueprint serves as a model for accelerating economic growth and connectivity across vast regions and diverse populations. Through a comprehensive examination of China's approach, this paper contributes to a deeper understanding of the dynamics driving economic development and connectivity within the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. Keywords: diversification, Belt and Road initiative (BRI), digitalization, perfect storm, infrastructure, COVID-19, logistics, sustainable development.

China's Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for Southeast Asia Hong Yu (bio) During state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013, Xi Jinping announced the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, respectively. Shortly after that, these two initiatives were combined to form one unified concept, known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This grand initiative, comprising various routes by sea and land, is intended to connect China with Southeast and South Asia, Central Asia, Pacific Oceania, Africa, and Europe. BRI is centered on both soft and hard infrastructure connectivity, aiming to forge an integrated and extensive network of regional infrastructure with China at its hub. BRI has gradually emerged as a top Chinese national strategy. Given China's emergence as a global power through industrial redeployment and outward investment, this initiative could reshape the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape of Asia and beyond. BRI signals a shift in China's foreign policy and a departure from its long-held low-profile approach. Since Xi came to power in 2012, the Chinese government has adopted a far more proactive foreign policy stance, driven by global thinking.1 BRI serves as the key driver to advance China's interests overseas and demonstrates China's growing confidence and aspirations to be a rule-shaper in the economic governance of the region and beyond. Meanwhile, the demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), following the withdrawal of the United States, offers China further leeway to promote its New Silk Road agenda. The TPP's failure will increase the international momentum behind BRI to accelerate regional economic cooperation and integration through forging infrastructure, trade, and investment linkages. For the Southeast Asian countries, regional economic integration plays a very important role in mitigating external uncertainties and global economic vulnerabilities. The collapse of the TPP hit certain participating countries within Southeast Asia very hard, particularly Singapore. Being a tiny nation without an economic hinterland, Singapore has developed as the [End Page 117] most open and trade-dependent economy in the region. China's realization of BRI depends on the support and participation of other countries; in particular, the neighboring Southeast Asian countries are vital to the success of this grand initiative. The Southeast Asian countries, particularly developing countries like Indonesia and the Philippines, have largely welcomed BRI, which aims to promote close regional trade and investment linkage based on the improvement of interregional physical connectivity. Southeast Asia needs to focus consistently on constructing infrastructure in order to unleash the region's economic growth potential. The Southeast Asian countries consider that participating in BRI will help address their serious infrastructure deficits and accelerate industrial and economic growth. China has offered much-needed investment for connectivity-related infrastructure construction.2 This essay will first examine the opportunities for Southeast Asian countries to participate in BRI and then consider their perspectives on the challenges for the initiative. Opportunities for Southeast Asia Arising from BRI China's rise to become the world's second-largest economy and the largest trading nation has exerted a very powerful pull on the Southeast Asian economies. China has become the largest trading partner for all Southeast Asian countries except for the Philippines. The region, for its part, has benefited enormously from China's economic growth. It has taken advantage of the Sinocentric regional production network created since China's admission to the World Trade Organization in the early 2000s to export raw materials, intermediate goods, and mineral resources to China for final manufacturing into industrial goods before their export to the major consumption markets in the West. Setting aside for the moment the underlying geostrategic and geopolitical considerations, the potential benefits from BRI for Southeast Asia could be enormous. China has committed enormous financial resources to build a number of large-scale transportation projects aiming to improve interregional connectivity. For example, construction has already started on the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway in Indonesia and on a railway linking Mohan, on the Chinese border, with Vientiane, the capital of Laos. These two projects, both largely financed by Chinese banks and being [End Page 118] built by Chinese companies, mark Beijing's efforts to...

During a visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced the launch of a new cross-Eurasian initiative. Nearly ten years on, approximately 140 nations have followed Kazakhstan’s lead and signed onto the multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This chapter aims to provide a concise yet critical overview of the BRI’s evolution in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the European Union, examining the main BRI investments, strategies, and controversies over the past decade. More specifically, the chapter reflects on how individual projects under the BRI banner are coordinated and funded before examining the stated aims of the BRI. The development of two Eurasian land corridors is then explored as well as the emergent, overlapping strands of BRI discourse, including discourses on the “Human/Cultural,” “Green,” “Health,” and “Digital” Silk Roads. The chapter ends by exploring the key debates happening around China’s intentions at the state, academic, and popular levels across the Eurasian region, highlighting fears of so-called “debt-trap diplomacy.”

Since the inception of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s trade relations with participating nations have experienced substantial growth. This study utilises data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) covering the years 2003 to 2021 to explore the dynamics of China’s foreign trade and assess the impact of the BRI on trade interactions with China. One of the central objectives of our research is to determine whether participation in the BRI has significantly contributed to trade growth with China, thereby strengthening economic ties and fostering bilateral cooperation. Another important objective is to analyse the changes in the BRI’s role in driving global economic growth amid China’s slowing growth. Through empirical analysis using data from over 180 countries, we evaluate the heterogeneous effects of the BRI across different continents. Our findings indicate that the BRI has had the most pronounced trade-stimulating impact on the continents of America, Europe and Africa, while trade volumes with Asian countries have seen only marginal increases. The relatively smaller trade growth in Asian countries can be attributed to the already high volume of trade activities due to their geographical proximity to China, which diminishes the marginal impact of the BRI. Additionally, the significant infrastructure investments under the BRI have been predominantly directed towards Africa and Europe, further explaining the smaller trade-enhancing effects observed in Asia compared to other continents. Furthermore, we identified the spillover effects of the BRI on non-participating countries. Moreover, significant differences in the BRI’s impact on global economic growth were observed before and after China’s economic slowdown. This article offers actionable policy recommendations to inform future decisions based on these findings.