Death in a Transnational Metropolitan Region

Atmospheric volatile organic compound measurements during the 1996 Paso del Norte Ozone Study

This chapter recalls that prison gangs—not the drug cartels—were the true facilitators of the drug trade along the border in El Paso, especially on the US side. It also mentions that prison gangs in Paso del Norte were the important facilitators for much of the wholesale trade across the border and were responsible for the lion's share of the retail trade in El Paso. With such in mind, the chapter highlights that understanding prison gangs meant understanding the drug trade. It then begins with a discussion of how the business model of illicit drug entrepreneurs unfolded in Phoenix. Since the Valley of the Sun had its share of street and prison gangs, the chapter seeks to understand their role in the drug trade. It also examines the claims of Arizona law enforcement that over 90 percent of the crime that occurs in the state is attributable to gangs. To understand the Phoenix-area gang makeup, the chapter recounts the author's conversations to a wide range of people, including community workers, police officers, and current and former street and prison gang members. It concludes by analyzing how prison gangs continued to have a significant presence in the Arizona prison system. As in Texas, Arizona prison gangs generally self-segregate by race.

The Care Children Deserve

Violence in Mexico rose sharply in response to President Felipe Calderón's military campaign against drug cartels which began in late 2006. As a consequence, the number of Mexicans who have sought asylum in the United States has grown significantly. In 2013, Mexicans made up the second largest group of defensive asylum seekers (those in removal proceedings) in the United States, behind only China (EOIR 2014b). Yet between 2008 and 2013, the grant rate for Mexican asylum seekers in immigration court fell from 23 percent to nine percent (EOIR 2013, 2014b). This paper examines—from the perspective of an attorney who represented Mexican asylum seekers on the US-Mexico border in El Paso, Texas—the reasons for low asylum approval rates for Mexicans despite high levels of violence in and flight from Mexico from 2008 to 2013. It details the obstacles faced by Mexican asylum seekers along the US-Mexico border, including placement in removal proceedings, detention, evidentiary issues, narrow legal standards, and (effectively) judicial notice of country conditions in Mexico. The paper recommends that asylum seekers at the border be placed in affirmative proceedings (before immigration officials), making them eligible for bond. It also proposes increased oversight of immigration judges.

Bi-national water issues in the Rio Grande/Rı́o Bravo basin

Mexico & US: Great Lakes Chemical & Laurel Industries – antimony trioxide

Reviewed by: Gangs of the El Paso–Juárez Borderland: A History by Mike Tapia Eladio Bobadilla Gangs of the El Paso–Juárez Borderland: A History. By Mike Tapia. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2019. Pp. xiii, 188. Paper, $29.95, ISBN 978-0-8263-6216-2; cloth, $45.00, ISBN 978-0-8263-6109-7.) Mike Tapia's Gangs of the El Paso–Juárez Borderland: A History presents a sociohistorical and criminological look at the gangs of the region mentioned in the title, describing the dozens of mostly Chicano gangs who have historically inhabited the area, as well as their roots, cultures, and transformation over time. First appearing in the region during the 1910s and 1920s, gangs began as ethnic subcultures engaging in petty crime, seldom soliciting much attention from law enforcement. By the 1930s, these gangs had entered a new phase as expansive criminal networks, though they still posed little more than a "nuisance" to the public, as Tapia explains (p. 14). In the decades that followed, criminal operations became more sophisticated—and splintered—with gangs fighting one another for territory and economic power, often using weapons such as chains, brass knuckles, knives, Molotov cocktails, and even rocks. By the 1950s, "zip guns" (single-cartridge guns) came into fashion, and over time, the degree and frequency of violence intensified, peaking in the 1990s (p. 25). In more recent years, Tapia notes, gang culture has declined, though it has not disappeared entirely. Although focused on the twin border cities of El Paso on the U.S. side and Ciudad Juárez on the Mexican side, Tapia sidesteps questions about migration and border security, choosing instead to focus on the street-level criminal gang networks and the relationship between geography and their development and [End Page 930] transformation. The author expertly describes the intricacies of gang culture (often rooted in symbols), structure (generally decentralized), and tactics (largely opportunistic). Organized into six concise chapters, Tapia's book relies on oral histories, newspaper accounts, archival materials, and on-the-ground fieldwork to document the numbers and geographical affiliations of dozens of gangs, some of which, like Barrio Azteca, are made up of almost a thousand members, while others, like One Nation Alone, are only thirty-eight individuals strong. Tapia pays special attention to geography, mapping out the contemporary and historical "gang landscapes" that have defined the region for one hundred years (p. 8). He finds that, unsurprisingly, the region's proximity to the criminal networks active in Juárez have deeply influenced the history of gangs and gang culture north of the border, although paradoxically, El Paso has been one of the safest cities in the United States. One of the weaknesses of the book is that Tapia alludes to this paradox several times, but he does not offer a definitive explanation for it. Similarly, there is scant discussion of the roots and meaning of the intraethnic violence that defines this history, or a discussion of the possible reasons why gangs, present in El Paso and across the country for almost a century, have seemingly changed since the late 1990s. In his writing, Tapia also sometimes slips into anachronisms—using the terms Chicanos and Latinos interchangeably, for example. These quibbles notwithstanding, Gangs of the El Paso–Juárez Borderland is an excellent monograph, one that will be of use not only to sociologists but to historians as well. Readers will especially appreciate the thoughtful and nuanced way that Tapia explicitly avoids glorifying the culture of violence that defines gangs while simultaneously illustrating how moral panics and overreactions emerging from fear of gangs have played an important role in the development of over-policing and the modern "homeland security" state, an issue that is especially important in the borderlands (p. 9). What results from this approach is a nuanced look at gang development, culture, and crime that evenhandedly outlines the causes and consequences of gangs on the border, a force that is neither entirely catastrophic nor wholly benign, but a phenomenon born of complex socioeconomic, geographical, and historical processes and relationships. Eladio Bobadilla University of Kentucky Copyright © 2020 Southern Historical Association

This presentation summarizes a register-based study on women who have been identified as belonging to three violent extremist milieus in Sweden: violent Islamic, violent far-right, and violent far-left extremism. We studied the women in these milieus along a number of analytical dimensions, ranging from demographic and educational to criminal background and network relationships, and compared them to three reference groups: (i) non-extremist biological sisters to female extremists in the study population; (ii) men in the respective extremist milieus; and (iii) female members of other antagonistic milieus such as organized crime. Our results showed that there are both similarities and differences between groups. In some cases, like age and region of birth, there are commonalities between violent far-right and violent far-left women. Regarding region of birth and migration background, women affiliated to violent far-right and violent far-left extremism are predominantly born in Sweden. Women affiliated to violent Islamic extremism tend to be born in Sweden to a greater extent than men in the same milieu, but to a much lesser degree than women in the violent far-right and violent far-left. When it comes to education, women in the violent Islamic milieu are closer to women in violent far-right extremism. Women in violent far-left extremism perform best at school, with consistently higher grades. The average score of women in violent far-left extremism is identical to that of their sisters, and women in violent far-left extremism perform on average substantially better than men in the same milieu. Women in violent Islamic extremism, in contrast, perform on average similarly to men in violent far-left extremism, and they perform better than their biological sisters. Regarding labor market attachment, violent Islamic extremists have the weakest attachment and the highest dependency upon financial assistance as well as a low employment share (36 percent in 2016), but also a relatively high share of individuals with a high number of unemployment days, suggesting that women in violent Islamic extremism experience higher social exclusion. We find the highest employment share among women in violent far-left extremism, where 89 percent are gainfully employed in 2016 (80 percent for at least three of the last five years) and about a 20 percent unemployment share. Men in violent far-left extremism have an employment share around 10 percent below that of the women in far-left extremism for 2016. The highest fractions of individuals that have not been in contact with the health system due to mental disorders are among violent Islamic extremism, with the women’s fraction at 84 percent, compared to their non-extremist sisters and men in the same milieu that are just above 79 percent. Women in violent far-left extremism have the highest share of in-patient major mental disorders among the extremist milieus (3 percent), higher than men in the same milieu (less than 1 percent) as well as than women and their sisters in the other categories. During the period 2007–2016, 68 percent of individuals in the extremist milieus are covered by the register of suspected individuals. The coverage is substantially higher for men, 72 percent than for women, 43 percent. Compared to their sisters, women in all three milieus are criminally active to a much higher extent. However, women in all three milieus are less criminally active than women in other antagonistic milieus, among whom 67 percent have been suspected at least once. In all three milieus, the share of men with a criminal record is about twice as large as that of women. As far as the gender aspect is concerned, we know that extremist milieus generally have a conservative view of the role of women in society. In our results, this is reflected in the low rates of crime in women compared to men, and relatively marginal positions in the co-offending networks. The fact that women in violent far-left extremism have stronger positions in their networks than the other women in the study population is expected, given that the ideology of this milieu allows for greater equality. This means that women in violent far-left extremism participate more often than, e.g., women in violent far-right extremism, in political actions where violence is common. This pattern of gender roles and criminal involvement also holds concerning women in violent Islamic extremism. This milieu has a more traditional view of the role of women than views among even violent far-right extremists. Women in violent Islamic extremism are less involved in crime and, in particular, violent crime.

The Internal Revenue Service recently overturned 90 years of United States foreign and tax policy by finalizing and codifying its efforts to report interest income earned at domestic banks for accounts held by nonresident aliens. While the IRS felt its need to collect the data and revenue outweighs concerns raised against the proposal, the rule change has broad ramifications in the areas of tax, commerce, international policy and law, and the war against transnational criminal organizations and terrorism. This article argues that the rule change has the potential to wreak havoc on a fragile economic recovery by leading to a steep loss of foreign bank deposits within the United States. The rule change will also foreseeably lead to the targeting and kidnapping of nonresident aliens by criminal gangs and drug cartels, who are likely to obtain financial information which could be utilized to target individuals for the purposes of kidnapping, extortion, ransom, and quite possibly, torture. Far from assisting the war on criminal gangs and drug cartels, the rule change will undermine it and likely subject the government of the United States to litigation in domestic courts through the Federal Tort Claims Act and Alien Tort Claims Act. Moreover, the rule change weakens the foreign policy commitment of the United States against torture, deteriorates the United States’ general commitment in the fight against terrorism and drug cartels in the Mexican drug war, and generally weakens international law. For many economic, legal, and moral reasons, the article contends IRS’ rule change is the wrong policy choice.

Objetivos: evaluar las estrategias y resultados de la guerra contra las drogas en Colombia y México, por medio de iniciativas como el Plan Colombia y la Iniciativa Mérida.Metodología: se recurre al método cualitativo con el fin de analizar los programas de cooperación anti-narcóticos en las Américas, en especial entre Estados Unidos, Colombia y México. El análisis se concentra en la producción y tráfico de drogas; organizaciones criminales o cárteles del narcotráfico y los niveles de violencia. Además, se recurre al método comparativo para contrastar el contexto político-institucional e histórico en México y Colombia, así como los esquemas de cooperación bilateral y multilateral.Resultados: las estrategias aplicadas en la guerra contra las drogas han fracasado en sus principales objetivos, como son: erradicar la producción y tráfico de drogas y aniquilar a las organizaciones criminales o cárteles del narcotráfico. El Plan Colombia y la Iniciativa Mérida han sido un fracaso considerando la consecución de sus objetivos primordiales.Conclusiones: México no asimiló las lecciones del Plan Colombia, ya que gran parte de la estrategia que se adoptó para combatir a los cárteles del narcotráfico fue la militarización del país, una medida contraproducente y fallida como lo demuestra el caso de Colombia.

Giant reed is an invasive weed throughout the southern half of the United States, with the densest stands growing along the coastal rivers of southern California and the Rio Grande in Texas. The objective of this study was to use aerial photography to map giant reed infestations and to estimate infested areas along the Texas–Mexico portion of the Rio Grande. Aerial color-infrared photographs were taken along the Rio Grande between Brownsville and El Paso, TX, in June and July 2002. Based on the aerial photographs and ground surveys, the portion of the river from San Ygnacio to Lajitas, which has a river length of 898 km (558 mi), was found to be infested with giant reed. To estimate infested areas along both sides of the river, 65 (13.5%) of the 480 aerial photographs taken between Lajitas and San Ygnacio were randomly selected. The aerial photographs were digitized, rectified to Google Earth imagery, and then classified using maximum-likelihood classification techniques. The infested areas on both sides of the river, as well as water area and river length, from each photographic image were determined. Based on the estimates from the 65 aerial photos, the ratio of giant reed area to water area and the ratio of giant reed area to river length were calculated. The total giant reed area along the Rio Grande between Lajitas and San Ygnacio was estimated to be 5,981 ha (14,779 ac) with 3,714 ha or 62% on the U.S. side and 2,267 ha or 38% on the Mexican side. This study provides the first accurate estimates of giant reed infestations along the Texas–Mexico portion of the Rio Grande and will be useful for both land owners and government agencies for the estimation of water usage and economic loss and for the management and control of giant reed.

At the end of the Cold War, the term "narcoterrorism" was coined. This concept originally meant ties between drug dealers and terrorist organizations and the countries of the Soviet bloc. The definition of this phenomenon, developed later, is ambiguous and means both methods attributed to terrorists, applied by drug cartels and the financing of their activities by terrorist groups through drug trafficking. This article deals with the first of these meanings and discusses the situation in two Latin American countries. The Colombian Medellin cartel was the first to use typical terrorist measures. Criminals carried out bomb attacks on public buildings, planes and attacks on politicians. In doing so, they wanted to achieve the goal of preventing the extradition of cartel leaders. Mass drug production has been going on since the 1930s in Mexico, but at the turn of 21st century, local criminal groups monopolized drug trafficking routes to the US. In 2006, an attempt by the state to combat this practice resulted in a long-term "drug war", in which several hundred thousand people were killed. There has also been an unprecedented increase in crime in the world, to the point where about 100 people are killed at the hands of the cartels in Mexico on a daily basis. The international community has almost unanimously labeled the activities of the Mexican drug cartels as terrorism. Only the opinion expressed in Mexican literature differed in that respect. The cooperation of these cartels with terrorist organizations turned out to constitute another threat to international security. This kind of cooperation can bring mutual benefits to terrorist groups and the countries supporting them – especially in the case of money laundering. The long-term operation of cartels has created the phenomenon of "drug culture" in Latin American communities, glorifying the terrorist activities of cartels and the figures of their leaders.

To study overweight and aerobic fitness among children in the third and fourth grades of elementary schools in a city in the United States of America (El Paso, Texas) and a city in Mexico (Chihuahua, Chihuahua) that are on or near the border between those two countries, and to compare the results from those two cities with earlier findings for other children in the United States. We followed the El Paso children (427 boys and 385 girls, 93% of them of Mexican descent) from third to fourth grade and assessed the change in their body mass index (BMI). In the city of Chihuahua we cross-sectionally measured the BMI of a sample of third grade children (221 boys and 237 girls) and a sample of fourth grade children (268 boys and 215 girls). BMI and triceps skinfolds were measured for all the children studied in the two cities. BMI was used to assess risk for overweight (at least the 85th percentile BMI for age and gender) and overweight (at least the 95th percentile BMI for age and gender) in all the children. The distance that El Paso children ran in nine minutes was used to assess their aerobic fitness (aerobic fitness was not measured in the Chihuahua children). The data from El Paso were collected in 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the Chihuahua data were collected in 2000 and 2001. In the El Paso boys, overweight significantly increased in the one year from third grade to fourth grade, from 22% to 28%, while risk for overweight significantly increased, from 37% to 44%. In the El Paso girls, risk for overweight significantly increased over the same one-year period, from 29% to 37%. The El Paso boys and girls were significantly less fit when compared to samples of children from throughout the United States. Third and fourth grade children from Chihuahua had similar rates of risk for overweight and of overweight when compared to the children from the same grades in El Paso. Children in both El Paso and Chihuahua were more overweight than were non-Hispanic white children throughout the United States. In addition, the children in El Paso were less aerobically fit than were non-Hispanic white children and than were other Mexican-American children in the United States. These results clearly show that efforts should be made in the border regions of both Mexico and the United States to develop physical activity and nutrition programs to help stem rising rates of overweight.

Retrospective Study of Incidence and Survival for Patients with Hematologic Malignancies Residing at the U.S./Mexico Border

South American countries afflicted by drug-related violence are seeking to promote a global discussion on the legalisation of narcotics. Increasingly, they feel that a prohibition-based strategy places most of the burden on them, rather than on consumer countries, as they suffer from extreme violence caused by competition between drug cartels.