Dead Souls

У статті проаналізовано концептуальні засади геополітичної доктрини «русский мир», що стала політичною ідеологією й підґрунтям гібридної агресії Росії проти України. Виявлено імперську сутність путінської Росії як спадкоємниці Російської й Радянської імперій. Осмислено концепт «русского мира» як вагомий елемент політики реваншу Росії щодо України й українців. Доведено, що керівництво Кремля та його прихильники в Україні активно використовують цю доктрину для заперечення сучасної етнокультурної реальності, а саме: не визнають українців окремим, самобутнім народом, а лише субетносом великого російського. Охарактеризовано базові елементи «русского мира» – це передусім Російська православна церква, інформаційна складова, російська мова, культура, освіта, наука тощо. З’ясовано злочинну роль «русского мира» у підготовці і перебігу неоголошеної російсько-української гібридної війни. Саме ті регіони України, де «русский мир» набув найбільшого розповсюдження і популярності серед антиукраїнськи налаштованого місцевого населення, згодом стали чи легкою здобиччю агресора (як Крим), чи ареною кровопролитного протистояння (як Донецька і Луганська області). І навпаки, де проукраїнські сили перебували в більшості, вони змогли зупинити наступ «русского мира» – і так званої «русской весны». Зазначено, що очільники Росії та їхні прихильники цілеспрямовано заперечують й ігнорують сучасну етнокультурну реальність та активно впроваджують в духовний, інформаційний, мовний, культурний, освітній і науковий простір України ідеї й принципи «русского мира», що, зрештою, призводить до ослаблення Української держави, української нації та української національної ідентичності. Запропоновано шляхи подолання й остаточної ліквідації ідей, ідеологічних засад, ідеології та базових елементів «русского мира» Українською державою. Насамперед це усунення так званих ліній розмежування в українському суспільстві, набуття українознавством вагомого стратегічного значення державної ваги, в тому числі як української «м’якої сили» соборницького, дипломатичного і політичного характеру, та розбудова Української Самостійної Соборної Держави на україноцентричних засадах (поєднання і синергія українського сучасного оновленого націоналізму й українознавства як навчальної гуманітарної дисципліни, інтегративної науки й патріотичного світогляду).

The article attempts to investigate the origins and genesis of the Russian imperial paradigm over the past 500 years. In particular, pay attention to the role of Ukraine in the imperial paradigm of the “Russian world”. The stages of transformation and the main historical and modern components of Russia’s imperial paradigm are highlighted. In his articles, the author reached the following conclusions: The imperial paradigm of the “Russian world” began to take shape at the end of the 15th – during the 16th century. Its genesis continues to this day. Over the past 500 years, its components have hardly changed, mostly only the means and methods of their implementation have evolved. The main historical and modern components of the imperial paradigm of the “Russian world” are: the historically formed imperial consciousness of the ruling elite and the population; the despotic repressive power of the rulers; deindividualization and slave mentality of the people; the hierarchy is not of vassals, but of the sovereign’s slaves; the ideological concept “Moscow - the Third Rome”, on the basis of which the messianic idea of the divine election of the Russian people was formed (later the concept of “messianicity” became a secular construct, and the religious concept of “messiah” was replaced by the secular image of “autocrat”); aggressive expansionist and aggressive foreign policy; the concept of world distribution and the idea of world domination; the principle of “legitimate influence”, which was understood as the legal, inalienable right of Russia to ensure its own ideas about security (preemptive conquests, determined not by the needs of the economy or the development of new lands, but by the idea of ensuring the country’s security on its distant approaches); the right of zaymanshchyna, which was interpreted as belonging to Russia on lands where a Russian set foot for the first time without taking into account the rights of the autochthonous population; the “superiority” of Russians over other Slavic peoples; the idea of an “eternal” enemy; selective observance of norms of international law, universal human and Christian values in relation to other “unfriendly” nations, which can and must be destroyed; the destructive nature of the legal order, in which there are no moral assessments of behavior, inhumane principles and illegal ways of solving the tasks set by the authorities operate; distorted religious beliefs; cult of the personality of the ruler; the idea of destroying advanced civilizations; the idea of “sinlessness” of the Russian population and lack of guilt for illegal acts; xenophobia and conservatism. This list is far from exhaustive. The main “theses” of the imperial concept of the “Russian world “ in relation to Ukraine are: Russians and Ukrainians are a single people; the Ukrainian language does not exist, it is Russian corrupted by Polonisms; The Orthodox Church of Ukraine cannot exist; Moscow – the Third Rome; gathering the “Russian world” is a joint matter of the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church; leveling Ukraine’s course towards the EU and NATO; creation of a single economic and humanitarian space with the Russian Federation; denazification; forcing Ukraine by all means, including military aggression, to integrate with Russia. Key words: Russian imperial paradigm, “Russian world”, Ukraine, Russia, Moscow – the Third Rome.

This article discusses how the discursively and culturally constructed “Russian world” intersects and communicates with the “Turkic world” as an adjacent—and in some respects alternative—civilisational construct. The object of our analysis is the Russian world in situations of multiple encounters with Turkic world in regions that might be termed cultural crossroads. The research is based on two cases of Tatarstan and Adjara, regions possessing a certain degree of administrative autonomy (that is evidently always a matter of bargaining with the centres, Moscow and Tbilisi correspondingly) and cultural authenticity. Both regions can be discussed as hybrid meeting points of different narratives, imageries and representations rooted in the overlapping and competing concepts of Russian and Turkic worlds. The two cases can be compared to each other, firstly, due to their close associations with the multiple spaces of the Russian world. Tatarstan is a republic within Russia with an almost equal balance of ethnic Russians and Tatars, while Adjara contacts the Russian world mostly through Russian mass culture, tourism, and the religion promoted by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and venerated by its Georgian counter-part. Secondly, both regions are homes to sizeable Muslim communities that to a significant extent are sensitive to (though not necessarily shared completely) ideas of pan-Turkic identity and solidarity.

The article analyzes the repressive policy of the occupiers during the undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war against the religious communities of Ukraine in 2014–2022. It has been established that the “russian world'' is a neo-imperial, geopolitical, ideological doctrine aimed at the theoretical substantiation and practical restoration of the "great historical Russia" within the borders of the Russian Empire at the peak of its power in 1914. By way of the "russian world," an important "soft power" of the Kremlin, Russia first planned to capture the mental space of Ukraine and the brains of its citizens; then, if necessary, they would deploy troops and annex this territory to their state. The Russian Orthodox Church played an important role in Russia's neo-imperial plans, as it was an active embodiment of the “russian world" in the spiritual, political, cultural, and humanitarian spaces of Ukraine. Russia's undeclared war against Ukraine and Ukrainians, which began in 2014 and temporarily occupied a large part of Ukraine, was a real ordeal for the Ukrainian state and its citizens and a terrible tragedy for believers of all faiths. Examples of crimes against humanity committed by Russian terrorist forces on the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine against religious communities are highlighted. The consequences of the criminal and aggressive policy of the Kremlin and the "russian world" introduced by the Russian terrorist forces and its impact on the situation of believers are shown. There are two tendencies that characterize the attitude of the Russian aggressors and their servants towards the believers of different denominations in Ukraine. During the first stage of the hybrid war (February 20, 2014 – February 23, 2022) the occupiers and their proxies on the temporarily occupied territories of Eastern Ukraine (parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions) and Crimea in accordance with the "russian world" doctrine favorized the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of the Moscow Patriarchate, because they rightly considered it their ally in the conquest of Ukraine. During the second phase of the fullscale aggression of Russian troops (February 24, 2022) and the collapse of the so-called Russian blitzkrieg, the occupiers became inhumane and began destroying religious buildings, killing clergy and believers regardless of religion.

The theme of the ‘Russian World’ is permanent in national literature, and rather often it is closely connected with socio-political processes. The 16th century played a special role in the history of Russia, determining, to a great degree, the ways of further development of the country and posing significant political, philosophical, and social issues; the key historical figure of the period was Ivan the Terrible, whose reign is associated with the strengthening of an united centralized Russian state headed by Moscow and the expansion of the state. The discussions in his letters to Ivan the Terrible (the correspondence between Andrey Kurbsky and Ivan IV the Terrible of Russia) became a dispute about the Russian World. The correspondence reflected polar views on the same issues: the power and the figure of the ruler, the form of government, the ratio of statehood and the Orthodoxy, the loyalty of subjects to the ruler. The discussions in the letters of Kurbsky and Ivan the Terrible form a special image of the ‘Holy’ Russian Land, the ‘Kingdom of God’, and the phrase ‘the Russian land’ is used in the correspondence in the civilization sense. The message of Ivan the Terrible reflects the motive of the selection of Russia as a stronghold of the Orthodoxy; the Tsar speaks about the protection of the Orthodox faith by any means, even the cruelest ones. Autocracy, according to Ivan the Terrible, is inseparable from the Orthodox Christianity. The dialogue between the tsar and the prince is considered in the context of the opposition lines of ‘mine or ours, my or our own’ – ‘alien’, ‘the Russian world’ and ‘non-Russian one’: Kurbsky writes from abroad and is perceived as a traitor. The material of the letters highlights the signs and features of the Russian World as a special integral phenomenon: the Orthodoxy, selectivity, commonality and similarity of history and culture, Messianism.

The article examines the essence, basic principles, and methods of formation of the so-called “Russian world” by the leadership of the Russian Federation, as well as the prospects for the implementation of this geopolitical project. Russia sought to ensure its political, economic, cultural and informational dominance over the newly independent states in the geospace of the former Soviet Union. The geopolitical (and at the same time, geocultural) project “Russian world” was founded to create an informal empire in the post-Soviet space under the control of the Russian Federation, as well as to expand the sphere of its political influence in many countries of the world. The concept of “Russian world” was created to substantiate the ideological, spiritual, and cultural affinity of the population of the newly independent countries, the commonality of their geopolitical interests, and the grandiose prospects of the integration of these states under the auspices of Russia. The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), headed by Patriarch Kirill, is making a lot of efforts to popularize the “Russian world”, and networks of church organizations subordinate to the ROC are actively promoting ideas about uniting the peoples of “Holy Russia”. It has been established that the implementation of the geopolitical project is carried out thanks to the powerful political support and funding from the authorities of the Russian Federation. The Federal Agency “Rossotrudnichestvo”, the “Russian world” Foundation with its networks, the International Council of Russian Compatriots, and other organizations direct their activities to the popularization of the Russian language and culture in the countries of the world, the consolidation of Russian diasporas abroad, the enhancement of Russia's authority, and the strengthening of its political influence. In the contemporary conditions of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the structures of the “Russian world” in the territory controlled by the Ukrainian State have practically come to naught. The further development of Russia is probably to take place in accordance with the geopolitical model of the “Surrounded Fortress”. The “Russian world” project will have prospects, first of all, on the territory of Russia itself, for ideologically ensuring the stability of the political regime and preserving the internal integrity of the federal state.

The paper analyzes two artistic artefacts, one graphic reportage and one novel from and about post-Soviet Georgia, focusing on the problem of religious difference within Orthodox Christianity. In imperial history, the fact that Georgia is an Orthodox Christian country was employed by the Russian side to legitimate the Georgian Church’s inclusion into the Russian ecclesiastic hierarchy and, what is more, of Georgia into the Russian empire. Georgian Orthodoxy was thus at least partly and in certain periods denied its religious autonomy. This parallels other strategic renouncements of differences from the Russian side, as for instance in the contemporary usage of the concept “Russian World” that combines the claim of “unity in faith” with language use and cultural consciousness into a mobilizing nationalist trope. The analysis of Viktoria Lomasko’s travel feature about Georgia and of Lasha Bugadze’s documentary novel “A Small Country” shows how contemporary artists and writers reassess the question of Georgia’s religious heritage and its difference from the Russian religious heritage. Whereas Lomasko is critical of the Georgian Church’s moral authority, she also gives ample room for presenting Georgian Orthdoxy’s difference as advantageous with regard to the Russian Church. Bugadze, by contrast, scrutinizes the Georgian Church’s fatal entanglement with the state that engendered both, nationalism and an uncanny allegiance with Russia.

The article analyzes the political and ideological concept of the «russian world» as an important element of the revanchist policy of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The imperial essence of Putin's Russia as the successor to the Russian and Soviet empires has been revealed. Although formally Russia is a federation of many peoples, in reality it is an imperial state that not only tries to preserve the status quo after the collapse of the USSR, but also makes active attempts to regain its geopolitical influence in both the near and far abroad. The basic elements of «russian world» are characterized. These are, first of all, the Russian Orthodox Church, the information component, the Russian language, culture, education, science, and so on. The criminal role of «russian world» in the preparation and course of the Russian-Ukrainian war has been clarified. It was those regions of Ukraine where «russian world» became most widespread and popular among the anti-Ukrainian local population that later became either easy prey for the aggressor (like Crimea) or an arena of bloody confrontation (like Donetsk and Luhansk regions). Conversely, where pro-Ukrainian forces were in the majority, they were able to stop the offensive «russian world» and the so-called «russian spring». The ways of overcoming and final liquidation of ideas, ideological bases and ideology and basic elements of «russian world» by the Ukrainian state are offered. First of all, it is the development of the Ukrainian Independent Conciliar State on the basis of Ukraine-centric principles (combination and synergy of Ukrainian modern renewed nationalism and Ukrainian studies as an educational humanities discipline, integrative science and patriotic worldview). Ukrainian Independent Conciliar State in the XXI century. should become the leader of Central and Eastern Europe and enter the top twenty most developed countries in the world.

The topicality of the article is motivated by the present situation of Ukraine under conditions of Russian military and information aggression and of the active spread in the information space of the aggressive concept of the "Russian world". The purpose of the article is to investigate the causes and essence of conflict processes in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, in particular, to analyze the role of the Russian centralism in them in the past and in contemporary realities. It is determined that the causes of conflicts in the sphere of Ukrainian Orthodoxy aч re largely related to the act of ecclesiastical submission to the Moscow Patriarchate in 1686. The situation of Ukraine under conditions of Russian military and informational aggression, in which the church matters also played an important role, refer to the exploration of Russian centralism as a conflict factor for Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The actual character of the issue is also determined by the modern planting in the information space of the aggressive theory of the "Russian world" as well as the necessity to find the ways for consolidation of the Ukrainian society, in particular in the sphere of interconfessional relations. In order to weaken the opposition of the Ukrainian ecclesiastical superiors to imperial centralism, the Russian government deliberately resorted to incitement between the secular and the ecclesiastical elites. Such measures were taken by Empress Anna Ioanovna, who ordered Prince Oleksii Shakhovskyi, the ruler of Little Russia at that time to persuade the Cossack elders secretly to protest against the giving of land possession to the Church. In the same way the Empress Catherine II acted and consciously orientated the ruler of the Little Russia Earl Piotr Rumiantsev to support conflicts between the Ukrainian nobility and clergy according to the principle “divide et impera” (divide and rule). Contemporary Russian information aggression has revealed various forms of propaganda in Ukrainian society, one of which is the project of the “Russian world”. A major point in overcoming the influence of the Russian neoimperial factor in Ukrainian society as well as the contemporary conflicts on the level of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is the development of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine founded a result of the age-old aspirations of Ukrainian society for church unity. The important steps for strengthening if the church unity were outlined by the Bishops' Council of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine convened on December 14, 2019.

The article notes that for an in-depth analysis of the worldview and socio-political exhortations of the "Russian world" ideology carriers, it is insufficient to identify only the natural and historical prerequisites for the formation of these exhortations. It is necessary to reveal the deep metaphysical foundations of the Russian ethnic group spirituality. The fact these foundations have transformed into one of the essential elements of the "Russian world" aggressive spiritual substance, increase the relevance of this problem in modern conditions. The author of the article offers an overview of understanding of this problem by the representatives of Russian journalism and philosophy of the beginning of the 20th century, Maxim Gorkiy and Nikolai Berdyaev. The article notes that M. Gorky in his essay "On the Russian Peasantry" criticizes the illusory views of Russian writers of the middle and the second half of the 19th century on the nature of the Russian peasantry (and at the same time the Russian ethnic group in general, because Russian society was mostly peasant) as a wise seeker of truth and justice, a person with a broad and generous soul, a carrier of world humanistic values. The specificity of the development of Russian history, the geographical living conditions formed, in Gorky's opinion, the traits of cruelty, aggressiveness, and contempt for the human personality that define the behavior of the Russian peasant. These features, imprinted on the deep supra-individual level of the Russian peasant, are invariant with respect to the class and political affiliation of their bearers. They can be eradicated only through radical social transformations and long educational processes. The article pays special attention to N. Berdyaev's views on the metaphysical roots of historical and spiritual manifestations of the Russian soul. Under this review, he analyzes the existential ideas of Russians about the value of human life, about their attitude to God, to the ideas about good and evil, as well as their attitude to the state and other peoples. Berdyaev considered the main source of aggressiveness, irrationality and unpredictability of Russian deeds to be the underdevelopment of the personal principle in the spiritual and social life of Russian society. He considers the consequences of such underdevelopment in the history of the social structure of Russian society, in the religious practices of Russians. The conviction of Russians in the divine origin and universality of their values gives them confidence that Russia must become the liberator of the nations.The author of the article expresses the opinion that the value orientations of Russians rooted at the metaphysical level regarding the messianic character of their actions in relation to other peoples, confidence in their chosenness do not provide grounds to hope for changes in these orientations as a result of a change in political, spiritual leaders or political power.

The problem of the literary reception of the plot about the baptism of Princess Olga is of topical importance with regard to the experience of solving the dilemma of choosing the civilizational strategy of Rus'-Ukraine, reflected in this episode. The early modern period in the history of Ukraine is characterized by a dramatic confrontation between two vectors of development: integration into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth while preserving its own identity or union with the Moscow Tzardom on the basis of confessional identity. The article aims to show how the biased interpretation of Princess Olga's choice between Rome and Constantinople became an essential tool for Ukraine's exit from the European civilizational space into the web of the “Russian world”. The author operates using the method of deconstruction of literary stereotypes and historical mythologies. The chronicle interpretation of Princess Olga's adoption of Christianity, presented in “The Tale of Bygone Years” under the year 6463 (955), became one of the factors consolidating the Kyiv Metropolis in the sphere of influence of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, inspired by the church schism of 1054. In the course of the polemics over the jurisdictional affiliation of the Kyiv Metropolis, which unfolded after the proclamation of the Union of Brest in 1596, Princess Olga's acceptance of baptism in Constantinople from the hands of the patriarch with the participation of the emperor is used as an argument in favor of the Ukrainian Church's original affiliation to the sphere of influence of the Hellenistic East. Meanwhile, historical sources refute the very possibility of the princess's stay in Constantinople in 955. Instead, the curious plot of ”The Tale of Bygone Years” about Olga's baptism is very appealing to the playful conceptualism of Baroque discourse and fits quite naturally into it. Although it was in the 17th century that a critical analysis of hagiographic sources began, carried out primarily by the Bollandist congregation, Ukrainian authors, paying tribute to the comparative analysis of ”The Tale of Bygone Years” and other historical monuments, sought to preserve the anti-Western basis of the plot of the baptism of Princess Olga. Dimitriy Tuptalo reinforces the Byzantine accents, looking for parallels between the Ruthenian princess and the Roman empress in the choice of the Christian name “Helena”, with whose name a number of far-reaching initiatives from the era of establishing Christianity as a legal religion are associated. The conclusion from the observations is the fatal role of the Baroque mythologizing of the episode of Princess Olga's baptism in the self-identification of Ukrainian Christians and their determination of Rus’-Ukraine’s place in the civilizational space of Europe.

The “Russian world” conceptualised as a notion of civilizational unity grounded in linguistic, historical, ethnocultural, and religious components, has been the subject of various interdisciplinary studies. This paper aims to investigate linguistic strategies for delineating the distinctions between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, as well as for showcasing a divergence from the “Russian world” ideology and its principal components, such as the Russian language and culture, the Russian Orthodox church and shared memory and history. Employing a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach, this study examines speeches, statements, social media posts, and select interviews of Ukrainian high-ranking officials, including Volodymyr Zelenskyi, Dmytro Kuleba, Oleksii Danilov, Mykhailo Podoliak, and Metropolitan Epiphany.

The XXth century has provided numerous examples of different forms of religious extremism, in particular the Orthodox Christian extremism. XXIth century demonstrates an explosion of neo-pagan and Orthodox extremist views in Russia grounded on syncretic theory of «Russian World»

The chairman of the Department for External Church Relations (DECR) of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) was dismissed from his office on the 104th day (June 7, 2022) of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Was Hilarion dismissed because of his ‘silence’ on the Russian invasion? We study the 104 ‘war days’ of Metropolitan Hilarion from four dimensions: leadership as position; leadership as process; leadership as result; and leadership as person. Our findings are multivocal: the Russian invasion of Ukraine did become a leadership challenge for Hilarion the way that previous military interventions (in Ukraine and Syria) and thorough broadening of the collaboration between the Church and the military in Russia during his 13 years as the Chairman of the DECR did not; Hilarion refrained from the rhetoric (religious demonization of the adversaries) and narratives (e.g. ‘spiritual brothers cannot be in conflict,’ labelling the conflict ‘an internecine strife’) used by Patriarch Kirill, but Hilarion still opted to leave his position of professor in Fribourg University instead of condemning (delegitimizing) the Russian invasion of Ukraine; Hilarion had contributed to Patriarch Kirill’s doctrine of the ‘Russian world’ since 2009 and did not revoke any of his related positions during the 104 days of war. As the ‘religious’ concept of the “Russian world” is the key narrative whereby religious leaders of the ROC have legitimated Russian imperialism over the territory and population of Ukraine, the key indicator for Hilarion’s assumed ‘silence’ should be the rejection of the Russian world doctrine, not his commitment to the principle “war is not a conflict solution method.” Finally, we observe his successor (Metropolitan Anthony) to be even less vocal than Hilarion on religious and geopolitical issues related to Ukraine. This period studied started with a secular critical juncture (start of invasion) and ended with a critical juncture in religious relations on Ukrainian territories occupied by the Russian Federation, when with the June 7, 2022, decision of the Holy Synod of the ROC to relocate dioceses of the Orthodox Church in Crimea into direct subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate, the latter initiated cuius regio, eius religio paradigm in its relations with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (of Moscow Patriarchate).

The article explores the semantic potential of social narratives associated with the creation and constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which caused a interpretations conflict, marked by conflicting interpretations and differences in meanings that are applied in different contexts. The narrative arranges events in a certain time sequence, accumulates and translates meanings, individual and social experience. The presence of meanings in the interpretation of the narrative depends on the perspective, interpretation horizons and the subject's ability to analyze information and its correct application. The social narrative accumulates a set of stories and messages that are fragmentary and disordered, constructs a coherent plot aimed at finding and defining meanings, and forming social discourse. Social narratives materialized in social structures, orientations, expectations, and stereotypes of their bearers due to everyday modification in the form of simple images, attitudes, and principles. Since each social narrative claims to be exclusive and correct in its own way of understanding events, a clash of narratives and their interpretations is inevitable. A large-scale event determines the modification of social structures, standards, and evaluation criteria, is accompanied by the transformation of everyday life, reveals deep mental layers, and opens up new perspectives. The extraordinary event that was marked by the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is accompanied by diametrically opposite assessments from the clergy, believers, politicians, experts – from the statement about autocephaly as the only opportunity to achieve unity and recognition of Ukrainian Orthodoxy to the political subtext justification of the new religious organization creation. Church circles represented by representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate claim that the state interferes in the internal Affairs of the Church. The Constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine takes place in the context of the confrontation of two social narratives – the «ukrainian world» and the «russian world». The social narrative «ukrainian world» is based on values rooted in the national soil, but the social narrative «russian world» denies the existence of the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian state. Under the patronage of the Russian Orthodox Church, the expression of the ideas of the «russian world» is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which enshrines in the minds of believers ideologies about «the common origin of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples», «the common baptismal font», «the unity of the historical space of Holy Rus», «the identity of the East Slavic Orthodox civilization». The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate did not support the decision of patriarch Bartholomew to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Metropolitan Onufriy did not give his blessing to the hierarchs to participate in the Unification Council, which is called «a non-canonical assembly of schismatic groups». The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, according to its primate, has de facto autocephaly, so it is the only canonical local Orthodox Church in Ukraine. In the face of the conflict of public narratives, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, along with meeting the spiritual needs of believers, contributes to the formation of national identity, the formation of a worldview matrix that will determine the vision of the future development of the country.