Cyber Peace: And How It Can Be Achieved

Private Property in the Dutch-Spanish Peace Treaty of Münster (30 January 1648)

As Critical National Infrastructures are becoming more vulnerable to cyber attacks, their protection becomes a significant issue for any organization as well as a nation. Moreover, the ability to attribute is a vital element of avoiding impunity in cyberspace. In this article, we present main threats to critical infrastructures along with protective measures that one nation can take, and which are classified according to legal, technical, organizational, capacity building, and cooperation aspects. Finally we provide an overview of current methods and practices regarding cyber attribution and cyber peace keeping.

To fashion a successful contractarian argument for the necessity of a certain kind of political institution is no mean feat, and Hobbes purports to have done so. But does his argument work? In my book' I tried to determine whether or not Hobbes can keep the assumptions of his argument and still draw the conclusions he wants. Some of the conclusions I managed to save, but his principle claim that a state must be headed up by a sovereign with absolute power I could not. In his paper, Professor Haji focuses on two of the theses that I claim to have saved: first, that people with the psychology Hobbes attributes to human beings would find the situation in which they were not politically governed a state of extensive conflict; and second, the claim that from this state of war it would be possible for people to generate, via some kind of agreement process, a political remedy. In my book, I point out that it is initially difficult to see how these two theses can fit together into the same argument: if the state of nature really is a state of war, how could its occupants cooperate to end it? And if its occupants are able to cooperate so as to end it, why shouldn't such cooperation be possible in the state of nature, making it a relatively peaceful state? Nonetheless putting these two ideas together is exactly what Hobbes or indeed any contractarian must be able to do if his or her contractarian argument is going to be internally coherent. Haji argues that one cannot keep both theses in a contractarian argument; in this comment I shall review his arguments, and maintain that he is wrong to think that they cannot coexist. Indeed, it is because they can coexist that the contractarian arguments remains a viable form of argument for political conclusions.

Technological and scientific progress, especially the rapid development in information technology (IT), plays a crucial role regarding questions of peace and security. This textbook addresses the significance, potentials and challenges of IT for peace and security. For this purpose, the book offers an introduction to peace, conflict, and security research, thereby focusing on natural science, technical and computer science perspectives. In the following, it sheds light on fundamentals (e.g. IT in peace, conflict and security, naturalscience/ technical peace research), cyber conflicts and war (e.g. information warfare, cyber espionage, cyber defence, Darknet), cyber peace (e.g. dual-use, technology assessment, confidence and security building measures), cyber arms control (e.g. arms control in the cyberspace, unmanned systems, verification), cyber attribution and infrastructures (e.g. attribution of cyber attacks, resilient infrastructures, secure critical information infrastructures), culture and interaction (e.g. safety and security, cultural violence, social media), before an outlook is given. This chapter provides an overview of all chapters in this book.

Intensive campaigns of hostile and subversive propaganda against the territorial integrity and political order of foreign states have constituted one of the most disturbing factors in the international life of the postwar period. Powerful groups, frequently with governmental toleration or support, clamor for the incorporation in their several states of territories inhabited by populations of like nationality. Vigorous and systematic incitement of foreign subjects to disaffection or revolt against their own governments is the method generally adopted to attain this end. The consequent state of tension in the relations of the states concerned presents a real and actual threat to international peace. The dangerous situations which always result from a lack of coincidence between national and political frontiers have been intensified by the rise in several states of dictatorial régimes, which are disposed to press with special vigor their territorial claims. Hostile propaganda, especially if carried on with the sanction of nationalistic governments, “inevitably results in what might be termed the obliteration of the border-line between the state of peace and the state of war.” It tends always to create an atmosphere conducive to the occurrence of those “incidents” which have so frequently led to major conflicts.

Law enforcement is often seen as the de facto, and relatively pure, alternative to contemporary just war. If we are not at war, then the more restrictive law enforcement is the viable paradigm. This chapter interrogates two assumptions underlying this view. It begins by demystifying the unwritten assumption that the liberal law enforcement paradigm associated with Western democracies is the idealized foil to just war. Using France, whose postcolonial legacy complicates the turn to the Western liberal paradigm as an illuminating case, the chapter explores how domestic warlike violence creates a state of fractured order—the violence and potential for abuses of power that permeate society as the government seeks to balance security and individual rights. The chapter then turns to the transnational context to challenge the view that there exists a clear line between the state of war and the state of peace. Mali serves as a paradigmatic case to illustrate how the effectiveness of law enforcement is curtailed in spaces of contested order where heavily armed terrorist groups challenge the authority of the state, thus prompting a turn to Special Forces and drones to restore order. In both contexts, the chapter identifies a shift away from the restrained norms that typically govern the use of force in law enforcement to more warlike uses of force that blur the lines between peace and war. The chapter concludes with a reflection on how this shift might inform the ethics of limited force, which lies between law enforcement and just war.

International human rights law and international humanitarian law are two specialized areas of the public international law, which exist as distinct legal branches. These legal branches have a different origin and legal basis, but a common humanist ideal, and consequently areas of overlap in practice. Both legal regimes share the responsibility to protect human beings’ rights; Humanitarian law in time of armed conflict, human rights law in peacetime and in wartime as well. Because of this, in practice there is sometimes concurrent application of the legal norms of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. At the same time, there are also differences between these two legal regimes that arise from the different circumstances which are relevant in a state of peace and in state of war. Hence, regarding this relationship, many relevant questions arise: Whether these legal branches are mutually exclusive? Under what circumstances does humanitarian law apply, and how does this differ from the applicability of human rights law? Which are the areas of overlap? What are the practical consequences of the legal issues resulting from parallel application of the two legal frameworks? This paper is not intended to resolve all these questions, but to make contributions in the ongoing debate by presenting similarities between human rights law and humanitarian law, areas of overlap, and situations of concurrent application. We will also underline the differences which exist in this relationship, especially the differences in the scope of protection guaranteed within the legal norms, the responsibility for breaking the norms, as well as permitted derogations in implementation of the norms. One part of the paper applies the principle lex specialis in cases where one of the legal branches is more specific in a concrete situation.

The international legal framework has traditionally been divided into a “state of war” and a “state of peace.” Most contemporary authorities still insist upon sharp and tidy categorization in this area, although some would prefer a three-fold or a multi-fold division, instead of the standard two-fold split. This whole approach has come under attack in recent years.A division into “states” of “war” and “peace” should theoretically produce simplicity and clarity. Instead, however, it leads to hopeless complications. This is clear as soon as any attempt is made to define the “state of war.”

Part 1 State of war: introduction - law, strategy and history the Long War of the nation-state - Thucydides and the Epochal war, the struggle begun - Fascism, Communism, Parliamentarianism, 1914-1919, the struggle continued - 1919-1945, the struggle ended -1945-1990 a brief history of the modern state and its constitutional orders - strategy and the constitutional order, from princes to princely states - 1494-1648, from kingly states to territorial states - 1648-1776, from state-nations to nation-states - 1776-1914, the study of the modern state the historic consequences of the Long War - the market-state, strategic choices, strategy and the market-state, the wars of the market-state - conclusion. Part 2 states of peace: introduction - the origin of international law in the constitutional order the society of nation-states - Colonel House and a world made of law, the Kitty Genovese incident and the war in Bosnia, the death of the society of nation-states a brief history of the society of states and the international order - peace and the international order, the Treaty of Augsburg, the peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of Utrecht, the Congress of Vienna, the Versailles Treaty, the peace of Paris the society of market-states - challenges to the new international order, possible worlds, the coming age of war and peace, peace in the society of market-states - conclusion.

International human rights law and international humanitarian law are two specialized areas of public international law. They exist as two distinct branches of law. Each branch has a different legal basis and origin. However, they share humanitarian ideals, and thus some areas of overlap appear in practice. The two systems share the responsibility for protecting the rights of human beings: Humanitarian law in times of armed conflict, and human rights law in times of peace and times of war as well. Because of this, in practice, it happens that the standards of international human rights law and international humanitarian law are applied simultaneously. At the same time, there are differences between these two legal systems that arise from the different circumstances involved in a state of war and a state of peace. Consequently, several questions arise regarding this relationship: Are the two branches mutually exclusive? Under what circumstances is humanitarian law applied, and how does this differ from the application of human rights law? What are the areas of overlap? What are the practical consequences of the legal problems resulting from the parallel application of the two legal frameworks? This paper does not aim to answer all of these questions, but rather its goal is to contribute to the current debate by presenting the similarities between human rights law and humanitarian law, areas of overlap, and situations of common application. We will also focus on the differences in this relationship, especially the differences in the field of protection guaranteed by legal standards, responsibility for violating the standards, as well as the exceptions allowed in implementing the standards. In one part of the paper, the principle of private law is applied in cases where one of the two branches is more specific in a concrete situation.

It is generally believed that some kind of an agreement between some, at least, of the different governments of the world, for the better regulation of their mutual relations, must follow the close of the present wars in order most effectively to promote permanent peace. Such an agreement would naturally take the form of a treaty. It is not too soon for all peoples to consider what should be its essential nature. From a state of peace to a state of war is a short step. From a state of war to a state of peace is a long one. Official overtures of a more or less informal character must come first. A preliminary protocol of some kind must then be framed, either with or without a suspension of hostilities. One or more peace conferences naturally follow, to make more definite and permanent arrangements, and their work must practically be ratified by the legislatures of the Powers concerned. Meanwhile public opinion in each of these countries must be considered and clarified. All this takes time, and the most enduring peace is apt to be one that has not been hurried to a conclusion.It required more than seven years of negotiation to put an end to the Thirty Years’ War. Three were spent in feeble and sporadic attempts at a settlement. Four followed which laid, by the Peace of Westphalia, the foundation of modern political history. Meanwhile fighting continued, and with the bitterness which has always characterized wars of religion. The very men who finally agreed on terms of peace met in separate congresses, one Protestant and the other Catholic, one in Münster and the other in Osnabrück.

The conflicts in eastern Ukraine and Crimea are not the first time sovereign States have clashed under murky and confused circumstances. The law governing international armed conflict, i.e. the law regulating war between States, has long recognized this fact; the threshold to trigger it is a very low one, and it applies “even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” Nevertheless, some perceive Ukraine as a case of “hybrid war” for which the old rules are ill-fitting at best, and no longer capable of regulation or restraint. What happens to international humanitarian law (IHL) when, according to Russian General Valériy Gerasimov, the hybrid nature of recent conflicts produces a “tendency to erase differences between the states of war and peace?” This chapter argues that there are in fact two distinct armed conflicts ongoing in eastern Ukraine. First, there is an ongoing but unacknowledged international armed conflict (IAC) in eastern Ukraine between Ukraine and Russia. Second, there is also fighting sufficiently intense and involving sufficiently organized non-State actors to be considered a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between the Ukrainian State and rebel forces in Donetsk and Luhansk. Adding another layer of complexity, at certain times and places, it may be that this NIAC might have transformed into an IAC because of Russia’s overall control of these non-State actors.

Toward Cyber Peace: Managing Cyber Attacks Through Polycentric Governance

In the article, I examine the relevance of Just War Doctrine to contemporary conflicts. Just War Doctrine, which grew out of Western Christian thinking, presupposes that evil might be confronted with force, if there is no alternative way to restore a just order. But modern trends call into question the certainty and universality of this doctrine. On the one hand, ideas of moral relativism and comparative justice have become more widespread, potentially undermining the use of the notions “just” and “justified” in relation to military conflicts. On the other hand, the nature of war is changing, as warfare is no longer only kinetic in character. I offer examples of how the evolving character of warfare challenges the traditional understanding of Just War Doctrine. For example, there is the growing threat of cyber warfare, but the ethical criteria for its use are not defined. In relation to Just War Doctrine, questions of whether and when pre-emptive cyber attack is permissible arise, what should constitute legitimate targets of cyber warfare and to what degree collateral damage could be acceptable. Another challenge to the traditional understanding of Just of War Doctrine was the putative doctrine of humanitarian intervention.Prima facie,humanitarian interventions do not comply withius ad bellumcriteria of Just War Doctrine, because of the absence of a direct military threat to the intervening state. The justification of humanitarian intervention is based on the assertion of an intolerable violation of accepted values. The weakness of such approach, as discussed in the article, is that it implicitly assumes that one protagonist’s values are superior to others. A further example of emerging challenges to Just War Doctrine is the phenomenon of hybrid war, a term used to describe a type of conflict that is multi-faceted and in which kinetic warfare is not dominant. The orchestration of several strands of conflict, each designed to be below the threshold to provoke a military response, exploits the absence of legal and ethical norms regulating such activity. I conclude the article by suggesting that, firstly, for Just War Doctrine to remain relevant, it should be expanded to include harms caused by non-kinetic actions, and, secondly, the distinctions between the states of war and peace should be redefined to reflect the changing character of war more accurately.

The year 2003 was notable for marking the fiftieth anniversary of the “end” of the Korean War. An end to war would generally imply the presence or creation of certain instruments or institutional mechanisms, formal or otherwise, which serve as the basis upon which to preserve a permanent state of peace following military conflict between belligerent parties. In the case of Korea, however, reliance on this assumption as the point of departure for analyzing inter-Korean relations raises more questions than it answers; not so much due to a lack of such mechanisms, but more so because of the tentative nature of the legal foundation upon which the state of peace has been preserved. In this instance, the 50-year old state of “peace” is for the most part based on a tenuous document known as the Military Armistice Agreement.1 The purpose of this agreement was to achieve a temporary cessation of military hostilities until a permanent political agreement could be reached to formally end the war. Such a political agreement did not ever materialize. As a consequence, the year 2003 could more accurately be described as marking the fiftieth anniversary of the continuation of the temporary cease-fire on the Korean peninsula rather than of an end to the war. While there is no active state of war in Korea, by the same token, nor does there exist a recognized—an institutionalized and legal—state of peace between the two Koreas. Hence the often used phrase of describing the two Koreas to be “technically still at war”—an odd sort of fictional twilight zone of neither war nor peace, with the two Koreas having been locked in time for 50 years to an arrangement that had been intended to be of a temporary nature.KeywordsInternational Atomic Energy AgencyKorean PeninsulaAgree FrameworkNuclear IssueFiftieth AnniversaryThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.