Culture under Attack: The Destruction of Cultural Heritage by Non-State Armed Groups

Contemporary prosecutions in international criminal tribunals have exposed a long-standing debate over the role of cultural heritage-based crimes in international criminal law. This chapter presents an historical analysis that reveals that the pendulum has swung back and forth with regard to support for including offenses that expressly refer to the destruction or seizure of artistic, historic, and scientific property and of ‘historic monuments’. While cultural heritage destruction was proposed as an offense after the First World War, a pervasive reluctance to include it largely prevailed from the postwar Nuremberg trials until the late 1980s. This chapter attributes this reluctance in part to coinciding developments in cultural property protection that were occurring outside international criminal law, such as the 1954 Hague Convention and the early drafts of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Before the end of the century, though, the pendulum swung back in favor of including the deliberate and unnecessary destruction of certain cultural heritage as a discrete and separate war crime. Both ad hoc international criminal codes and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reflect lasting recognition of the role that cultural heritage destruction can play in the larger narrative of oppressing, persecuting, and even eradicating targeted collective groups.

The end of Cold War marked the beginning of major changes to the international armed conflicts. The presence of private militaries in the arena of armed conflicts made states no longer be the only actors in the scene. Today's armed conflicts, whether international or non-international, are scenes for totalitarian troops of private militaries, not soldiers and government armies. The expansion of the activities of these armies and the development of services provided by them, including direct and indirect participation, have caused the international community to be concerned about the consequences of such presence and activity. There are important legal challenges regarding the nature and legal status of the private military, and in particular the responsibility of the private militaries. In accordance with the humanitarian law of any persons who participate in any armed conflict for any reason, will be responsible for failure to observe the rules and principles governing the conflict. Establishing the areas of international responsibility, including government responsibility and the criminal responsibility of members of private military forces, is required in accordance with international instruments to create a coherent legal framework. States associated with private militaries will be liable in the event of a breach of obligations by the state in relation to the actions of these armies, in accordance with the obligations arising from international law and international humanitarian law. In addition to this responsibility, violations of humanitarian law in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions can lead to criminal liability for members of the private military. Given the acceptance of the presence of these armies in armed conflicts, questions arise as to what the legal nature of the private militaries is? What are the private militaries responsible for their actions and activities? What is the guarantee of violating international humanitarian law by private militaries?

Is International Law a Law?

Nature of International Law: Is International Law a Law?

Since the 1990s, situations in which culturally significant heritage sites serve as symbolic targets for intentional attacks, leading to the 'destruction of enemy communities,' have frequently occurred. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established to prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law within the former Yugoslav territories, addresses prominent cases of intentional attacks and destruction of cultural property during the armed conflict, specifically targeting the annihilation of ethnic identity. This article examines the implications and limitations of international legal norms regarding the protection of cultural heritage during armed conflicts, focusing on the Dubrovnik Old Town shelling incident, a representative case of cultural property destruction prosecuted by the ICTY. Firstly, the intentional destruction of cultural heritage is undeniably a significant violation of values that the international community must protect. The pursuit of individual criminal responsibility for the destruction of cultural heritage within the international criminal tribunal signifies a substantial advancement in international efforts to protect cultural heritage during armed conflicts. The negative impact of the intentional destruction of cultural property on human dignity and universal human values is undeniable. However, ensuring effective protection of cultural property in the current normative context, where attacks on cultural property for military purposes may be justified, remains challenging. Secondly, military necessity, rooted in customary international law, limits attacks on enemy forces to military objectives, focusing on the centralization of enemy forces, balancing the military necessity of concentrated attacks on enemy forces with humanitarian considerations to protect civilian objects. However, determining what qualifies as a military objective can be challenging, as it depends on the circumstances of combat and operations. Regardless of whether the principle of proportionality is applicable, evaluating the military necessity from the perspective of cultural heritage protection is crucial. ICTY recognizes that even when military necessity justifies attacks on civilian objects, the intentional destruction of cultural heritage can have a significant impact on the psychological well-being of civilians and may upset the balance with military superiority. Thus, careful consideration is necessary when assessing the military necessity in cases where the protection of cultural property, with a higher need for protection than general civilian objects, is involved. Moreover, even if a target has dual-use, being considered a military objective, evaluating proportionality in the attack is essential to prevent harm to civilians, in accordance with the principle of proportionality. In conclusion, the intentional destruction of cultural heritage should be treated as a threat to the common values of the international community, necessitating appropriate legal and policy responses in line with the actual circumstances of the armed coflict. Military commanders should not only view attacks on cultural heritage as inevitable collateral damage but also recognize the gravity of such acts as war crimes and consider them strategically within military operations.

International law protects cultural property in armed conflict from damage and destruction and from all forms of misappropriation against belligerents who have always looked to raze or plunder the enemy’s cultural heritage. ‘Cultural property’ may include buildings and other monuments of historic, artistic or architectural significance, as well as artworks, antiquities, manuscripts, books, archaeological sites, and archives. This chapter focuses on the relevant bodies of international law and international humanitarian law designed to protect cultural property during armed conflict, including multilateral treaties such as the Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments (also known as the Roerich Pact) and the Hague Convention of 1954 and its two Protocols. It also examines international human rights law, international cultural heritage law, and international criminal law under the respective rubrics of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The article presents both theoretical and practical reflections on international humanitarian law as a part of public international law. The author analyses the principle of legal certainty as an integral component and foundation of any normative legal regulation within a specific legal field. A correlation is drawn between international humanitarian law and related branches of international law, such as international criminal law and international human rights law. The study discusses the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law in the context of contemporary approaches to its interpretation as jus in bello, with references to previous definitions. The article analyses the definition of international humanitarian law in the context of balancing its two main principles: military necessity and humanity. A distinction is made between international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The study explores scholarly approaches to understanding the interrelationship and mutual influence of international humanitarian law and international human rights law based on the principles of complementarity and affinity. Consequently, the differences between international humanitarian law and international human rights law are identified. The author analyses practical examples of differentiating these branches of public international law at the present stage based on the lex specialis principle. The article also identifies future trends in the continued mutual development of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It explores the influence of international criminal law on international humanitarian law, establishing that the field of international criminal law complements international humanitarian law, especially when it comes to the practical application of international criminal law norms in punishing acts that fall under the prohibitive norms of international humanitarian law. Finally, the article systematizes approaches to the integration of elements within the system of public international law.

This book fills a major gap in the scholarly literature concerning international criminal law, comparative criminal law, and human rights law. The principle of legality (non-retroactivity of crimes and punishments and related doctrines) is fundamental to criminal law and human rights law. Yet this was the first book-length study of the status of legality in international law - in international criminal law, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law. This was also the first book to survey legality/non-retroactivity in all national constitutions, developing the patterns of implementation of legality in the various legal systems such as Common Law, Civil Law, Islamic Law, and Asian Law around the world. This is a necessary book for any scholar, practitioner, and library in the area of international, criminal, comparative, human rights, or international humanitarian law.

The relevance of studying the legal foundations of the organization of the protection of cultural property in the context of armed conflict is increasing against the background of recent international events, as well as the aggravation of relations between the Russia and a number of foreign states, including the Baltic states. These circumstances require not only theoretical understanding, but also practical application of the norms of international law. The object of the study is the protection of cultural heritage in the event of an armed conflict. The subject of the study is the regulation and implementation of international legal protection of cultural heritage in the event of an armed conflict. The purpose of the article is to develop proposals for improving the international legal mechanism for the protection of cultural property in the event of an armed conflict, enshrined in the law of the Russian Federation. The methodological basis of the research presented in the article is a systematic approach and a doctrinal method. The following methods were used in the research: analysis, synthesis, generalization, deduction, formal legal analysis, and others. The paper examines the legislative, institutional and practical aspects of the legal framework for the protection of cultural property in the event of an armed conflict. The main international and regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation regulating these issues are given. The author suggests possible ways to improve the national legislation of the Russian Federation on the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict and ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law. The position is argued on the need not only to inform, but also to test military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the protection of cultural property and responsibility for violations of international law (including the destruction, misappropriation and vandalism of cultural heritage). The novelty of the research lies in a comprehensive approach to analyzing the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, identifying shortcomings in existing norms and offering specific recommendations for their improvement.

Refugee status determination is difficult by its very nature but it becomes even more complex when the issue of exclusion under article 1F(a) is raised and it is alleged that there are ‘serious reasons for considering’ that the applicant is ‘guilty of having committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments that have been drawn to make provision for such crimes’. The ‘War Crimes and Refugee Status’ Research Project’s Canadian jurisprudence dataset, consisting of 98 article 1F(a) cases, reveals that more than 91 per cent of these cases cite international humanitarian law (IHL) or international criminal law (ICL), but only 13 per cent of the cases cite UNHCR guidelines or directives. Interestingly, nearly two-thirds, 65.8 per cent, of these appeal cases are denied. Five of the most frequently cited judgments in this sample of cases were Ramirez , Moreno , Sivakumar , Harb , and Pushpanathan , in that order. After analyzing these five appeal court judgments in depth, seven legal principles were identified respecting the application and interpretation of IHL and ICL in Canada: (1) violations of international law can be committed by private individuals as well as states, or public officials acting on behalf of states; (2) the standard of proof for ‘serious reasons for considering’ under article 1F is lower than a balance of probabilities, the civil law standard; (3) two fundamental tenets on which complicity and culpability are established in international crimes are: (i) no one can commit an international crime without personal and knowing participation; (ii) complicity rests on the existence of a shared common purpose and the knowledge of all the parties involved; (4) Mere membership or passive acquiescence in a group or organization that commits international crimes can never be sufficient to exclude a refugee applicant under article 1F(a); (5) ‘Voluntary, significant and knowing contribution’ does not require formal membership in a group or organization that is engaged in crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity. An accomplice contributes knowingly to those activities of a group or organization that makes them possible. (6) the offence of ‘aiding and abetting’ cannot be made out by mere presence on the scene where an international crime has taken place. What is required is voluntary, significant and knowing contribution in persecutory acts. (7) there is a close affinity between article 1F(a), which deals with those activities that take place in situations of armed conflict, and article 1F(c), which deals with activities irrespective of whether or not they take place in a situation of armed conflict. Article 1F(a) and (c) can overlap in various ways, such as where the sales of illicit narcotics are used to finance the purchase of weapons that are used in armed conflicts and/or for terrorist activities. The new test for exclusion under article 1F(a) in Canada, ‘voluntary, significant and knowing contribution,’ leaves a broad area of discretion for refugee law decision makers. This will cause, undoubtedly, legal contention in the appellate courts as the article 1F(a) cases make their way through the judicial process in Canada. The application and interpretation of international refugee law under article 1F(a) in Canada will continue to evolve with national court judgments as well as the development of international humanitarian and criminal law.

No Longer Lost in the Wilderness:

The article deals with the applicability of apartheid in occupied territory. Rather than assessing whether in specific situation of an occupation an occupying power has established an apartheid regime, the article discusses whether there is anything in the law of occupation or in the international regulation of apartheid that makes them mutually exclusive. On the basis of international human rights law, international criminal law, and international humanitarian law considerations, it is argued that apartheid can be applied to occupied territory following the ordinary rules for the application of international human rights law and international criminal law in occupied territory. Accordingly, international law does not bar the application of apartheid in occupied territory, but rather, the law of occupation and apartheid coincide to strengthen the protection of civilians in occupied territories.

International criminal law does not attempt, as such, to attach criminal liability to environmental damage at present. Although the number of areas of international law concerned with environmental issues has grown significantly over the past three to four decades, such an accommodation has yet to be properly made within international criminal law. Indeed, there is still considerable debate as to whether criminal sanctions are an appropriate form of responsibility for environmental damage at all.Nonetheless, the objective of international criminal law is to provide a means of individual accountability for the most serious atrocities that occur on planet earth. There is no doubt that, whether as a result of naturally occurring phenomena or deliberately induced environmental effects, rapidly changing environmental conditions can cause catastrophic consequences for both human and natural life. As a result, it is certainly possible to discern situations where environmental conditions can or ought to give rise to individual criminal liability. However, given the nature of some environmental damage, international criminal law may not always provide an appropriate or adequate means to account for or remedy the harm caused.The first step in ascertaining the potential for international criminal law to prosecute individuals for environmental damage is a detailed examination of the current framework. This chapter will therefore begin by critically investigating the potential of existing international criminal law to give rise to liability for environmental damage. However, as will be seen, there is a distinct absence of environment-specific provisions in international criminal law at present. As such, there is considerable scope for the amendment of existing ‘core’ crimes, not to mention international criminal law as a whole, to include explicit proscriptions on environmental harm. Therefore, the second part of this chapter will examine possible ameliorations that could be made to existing crimes; the specific example of war crimes will be used to illustrate this point. However, there is always the possibility that international criminal law could expand its scope to accommodate environment-only damage. This chapter will therefore conclude with an appraisal of the proposals that call for the establishment of a separate and distinct category of environmental crimes - often called ‘ecocide’ or ‘geocide’ - within the structure of international criminal law.

The Oxford ILDC online database, an online collection of domestic court decisions which apply international law, has been providing scholars with insights for many years. This casebook introduces key court decisions with brief introductory and connecting texts. An ideal text for practitioners, judges, and government officials, as well as for students of international law courses, the casebook explains the theories and doctrines underlying the use by domestic courts of international law and illustrates the key importance of domestic courts in the development of international law. It consists of five parts. Part I discusses the vertical relationship between international law and domestic law, looking at validity and supremacy, the standing of private parties to invoke it, direct effect, as well as avoidance and contestation. Part II focuses on the structural and procedural areas of international law, specifically statehood, jurisdiction, immunities, and international organizations. In Part III, sources of international law are detailed, looking at the law of treaties, customary international law, jus cogens, soft law, and international court decisions. Part IV addresses responsibility and redress, covering international responsibility and private remedies. Finally, Part V reviews substantive and functional areas of international law, including: terrorism, use of force, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, amnesties, economic and social rights.

Before the 1940's, trends in international human rights, international criminal law and humanitarian law helped develop a rudimentary set of norms, particularly in Europe. These early trends sprang from populist social justice movements and evolving intellectual, religious and social mores. The 1940's saw the landmark intersection of preexisting trends in international human rights, humanitarian and criminal law and provided the bedrock intellectual, legal and historical bases that would incorporate those disparate trends into a collective and vital modern legal rights regime. These advances helped articulate and refine the substantive and procedural guidelines for subsequent international criminal bodies and help drive the revival of the principles of Nuremberg during the 1990's and into the 21st century. The modern international human rights treaty regime has affected international law in more ways than just by growing a sophisticated international jurisprudence, generating more exacting substantive definitions of human rights, and general principles of law.Keywords: International Criminal Law; international human rights; international humanitarian law; international jurisprudence