Cultivating the steppe in Ukraine’s Gammalsvenskby. Part 1: perspectives on classic agrarian debates

The paper analyses the discussion of Sufism between the representative of different trends in Dagestan – Sufi sheikhs, on the one side, and Islamic reformers on the other. The introduction part provides a brief historical excursus on the history of Sufism dissemination in Dagestan. Initially, before the spread of the ideas of Muslim reformism in Dagestan and even in parallel with the movement of reformism, the discussion about the legitimacy of certain practices took place within different groups of Sufi communities. At the end of the imperial period, the reformers, better known in the scientific literature as the Jadids, joined the discussion. It is noteworthy that among the reformers, the attitude towards Sufism and Sufis was not the same. One group of Jadids considered Sufism to be a legitimate trend in Islam, criticizing in the pages of the Islamic press only contemporary Dagestan Sufi sheikhs. Another group of reformers went further and did not recognize the legitimacy of Sufism at all. This controversy did not end in the early Soviet period, and survived to this day. In the post-Soviet period, the same rhetoric about the illegitimacy of Sufism as a trend, which did not exist during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the first generation after him, was picked up by modern Salafists. In turn, Sufi sheikhs of both the early Soviet and post-Soviet periods also wrote works refuting the views of their opponents. Despite the common rhetoric of the early Soviet Jadids and post-Soviet Salafists, there is still no continuity of traditions between them. The paper is based on the analysis of original Arabic sources, including manuscripts and articles in the local press, many of which have been introduced into scientific circulation for the first time.

This work is the result of studying the modern historiography of the "transitional" era: the Late Imperial (after the adoption of the new University Charter in 1884) and Early Soviet (1920s, the time of experiments with higher education) periods. The turn of the 20th century became a time of destruction of outdated structures in the economy, society and politics. This period was accompanied by rapid social changes caused, among other things, by the activity of students. Historiography has accumulated a significant amount of research on various aspects of student history during this period. Its current state requires rethinking and systematization in order to assess the real potential of research in this area. The research methodology includes comparative-historical and historical-typological methods. The comparative historical method was used to identify various theoretical attitudes in interpretations that allow segmenting the process of developing research ideas about Russian students of the Late Imperial and Early Soviet periods. Using the historical and typological method, the historiographical material was classified according to theoretical criteria. A comprehensive analysis of the scientific literature showed that, in general, Russian students of the Late Imperial and Early Soviet periods received wide coverage in modern Russian historiography. The main perspectives from which student researchers approach the subject of their work were highlighted: students in the context of youth history and university history, students in exile, the relationship of students with the authorities and the teaching staff, the organization of scientific activities, etc. Of course, the anthropological turn in social and humanitarian research has drawn the attention of scientists to man and his daily life. Students are no exception. To date, the most relevant works are those carried out in line with the study of the history of everyday life, a promising direction in modern historical science. Determining the possibilities for further development of the highlighted areas, it is necessary to note the prospect of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of students as a complex socio-cultural phenomenon. The problem of students requires a comprehensive study, which is possible using a wide variety of sources – both personal origin (diaries, letters, etc.) and official documents regulating the situation of students, the relationship between students and professors. Of interest are the transformations in the appearance of students associated, on the one hand, with the introduction of the last University Charter (1884), the collapse of the Russian Empire, and, on the other, the creation of a new state and, accordingly, a new vector of government policy in the field of education.

Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet UnionRobert H. McNeal, General Editor Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974. - The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, 1898–October, 1917Ralph C. Elwood, ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974, Vol. I, pp. xxxi, 306. - The Early Soviet Period, 1917–1929Richard Gregor, ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974, Vol. 2, pp. xi, 382. - The Stalin Years, 1929–1953Robert H. McNeal, ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974, Vol. 3, pp. x, 280. - The Khrushchev Years, 1953–64Grey Hodnett, ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974, Vol. 4, pp. x, 328. - Volume 10 Issue 2

The Holocene vegetation dynamics of the Eurasian steppe are underinvestigated despite its vast extension, chiefly because of the scarcity of suitable sites for palaeoecological research. Here, we present a palaeoecological reinvestigation from Kardashynskyi mire (southern Ukraine), approximately 4 km from a previously cored site. Using pollen, spores and microscopic charcoal, we have reconstructed vegetation dynamics, fire history and land use for the past c. 8300 years. Regionally, steppe vegetation with Poaceae, Chenopodiaceae and Artemisia was always dominant. However, pollen assemblages also reflect the presence of floodplain and upland tree stands. At the beginning of the sequence, c. 8300 years ago, Pinus stands were growing on the sandy terraces of the Dnipro dry upland sites. Later, at c. 7950 cal yr BP, diverse stands with Quercus, Ulmus, Fraxinus, Tilia and Alnus established along the riverbanks, where moisture availability was sufficient. Around 6100 cal yr BP, those deciduous broadleaved stands experienced a severe decline, likely in response to changing water table levels. Cultural indicators suggest land use activities after c. 7900 cal yr BP. During the Bronze Age, human impact intensified. Overall, both climate and humans drove vegetation dynamics in the Pontic steppe for millennia. Nowadays, this once extensive biome has almost completely been converted to cropland. Similarly, the wetland vegetation, the riparian forests and, above all, the pine forests growing on the sandy terraces were strongly reduced by millennial-long land use. Under the current conditions, even the last remnants of these special vegetation types are severely threatened.

At some point in the 1850s, Andrei Gorlov planted several fruit trees on his farmstead. His neighbours in the village of Bol'shoe Kopanoe, situated on the land mass bordered by Crimea to the south and the Dnieper River to the north, responded with disbelief, envy, and ill will. Villagers broke branches off his saplings as they walked by, or otherwise damaged the trees as much as possible. Still others threatened to gather the entire village assembly and destroy his orchard. But sheer perseverance enabled Gorlov to surmount these difficulties and his steady success in planting and production won the grudging respect of his peers. Soon neighbours appeared at his door for advice on how best to plant and manage their own orchards. By the 1880s almost every one of the 457 households had orchards that averaged no less than 60 trees. Such impressive orchards attracted merchants from distant cities to purchase the harvested fruit, a portion of which was also sold in the expanding urban markets of southern Ukraine.' How extraordinary was the village of Bol'shoe Kopanoe in southern Ukraine before 1900? What motivated Gorlov suddenly to engage in commercial fruit production, and what accounted for the initial ill will shown by fellow villagers? Though we cannot answer these questions in Gorlov's specific instance, this article identifies both the obstacles and catalysts to peasant agricultural innovation in southern Ukraine before 1900. I am especially interested in the development of, and motivation behind, market-oriented agricultural specialization in vegetable and fruit production among peasants of New Russia. Until recently, little attention has previously been given to market gardening in Imperial Russia generally, or southern Ukraine specifically, despite its importance to agricultural economies. At first glance, such neglect might seem appropriate. Agriculture in New Russia was successively dominated by sheep breeding and grain cultivation in the nineteenth century, with the latter predominant by the 1850s. Yet beyond the sheep pastures and wheat fields, peasant fruit orchards flourished in the northern hilly reaches of New Russia, lush market gardens in the environs of Odessa and other cities, and vineyards in the Dniester river valley. Apiculture had made rapid gains in counties along the Dnieper river by 1900. In exceptional instances peasant agriculturalists had abandoned grain cultivation altogether. What prompted the development of peasant market oriented fruit and vegetable production, and what does it tell us about the relationship between the region's peasants and colonists, who comprised more than a tenth of the rural population while owning one fifth of all allotment lands? Finally, what role did the access to markets play in peasant agricultural history? The first half of this article explores the role that fruit and vegetable gardening played in peasant economies of New Russia before the late nineteenth century. My findings correspond with James C. Scott's about peasant villages in contemporary Asia: he calls them precapitalist societies in the sense that they are reluctant to risk and introduce innovations and are motivated by a cautious safety-first principle.4 Ironically, much of the initial expansion in vegetable and fruit production in New Russia also reflected this cautious approach. The fact that peasants of New Russia had a conservative attitude toward agricultural innovation does not mean that they maintained static practices. On the contrary, considerable evidence points to steadily expanding contact between peasant producers in New Russia and regional, national, and international markets. This expansion was stimulated by a growing transportation network, the successful modelling of new agricultural practices by the region's foreign colonists and Orthodox sectarians, and increased zemstvo activity in schools and experimental farms. The second half of the article sketches out this interaction, and the resulting transformation in one aspect of peasant agriculture. …

Article Vera Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods. Oxford/New York/Auckland, Oxford University Press 2011 was published on September 1, 2012 in the journal Historische Zeitschrift (volume 295, issue 1).

The article examines theoretical preconditions, as well as the political and ideological priorities of Bolshevik efforts to engineer of the “New Man” in the early Soviet period. The author shows the Marxist origins of the Bolshevik project and their transformation in the works of V.I. Lenin and other leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. It describes the principal mechanisms and tools used to design the New Man, as well as practice of social mobilization and exposure to the political culture of Bolshevism. Emphasis is given to the role of the legacy of World War I in the Bolshevik institutionalization of social engineering, coercion and violence to create new human material . The article also shows disagreements among the Bolshevik leadership during the period from 1917 until the late 1920s regarding the ways of designing the New Man in the context of the proletarian culture, the role of the moral character concept for an ideal communist person as the builder of new society. Analysis is given to the gender aspect of the problem, the Bolshevik vision of the ways to design the New Woman and reshape the old way of life. The article traces the transformation of the Bolshevik leadership’s vision of the New Man and the New Woman throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The author singles out two stages in the Bolshevik engineering of the New Man in the early Soviet period (1917 - mid-1920s, late 1920s - mid-1930s), and describes the project’s evolution.

Robert H. McNeal, general editor. Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Volume 1, The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, 1898–October 1917, edited by Ralph Carter Elvvood; volume 2, The Early Soviet Period: 1917–1929, edited by Richard Gregor; volume 3, The Stalin Years: 1929–1953, edited by Robert H. McNeal.; volume 4, The Khrushchev Years, 1953–1964, edited by Grey Hodnett. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 1974. Pp. xxxi, 306; xi, 382; x, 280; x, 328. $75.00 the set Get access McNeal Robert H., general editor. Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Volume 1, The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, 1898–October 1917, edited by Elvvood Ralph Carter; volume 2, The Early Soviet Period: 1917–1929, edited by Gregor Richard; volume 3, The Stalin Years: 1929–1953, edited by McNeal Robert H.; volume 4, The Khrushchev Years, 1953–1964, edited by Hodnett Grey. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 1974. Pp. xxxi, 306; xi, 382; x, 280; x, 328. $75.00 the set. Robert Paul Browder Robert Paul Browder University of Arizona Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 81, Issue 5, December 1976, Page 1178, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/81.5.1178 Published: 01 December 1976

The paper explores the historical trajectory of Interhelpo, an industrial cooperative from Czechoslovakia, and its role in forging urbanization “from below” in early-Soviet town of Pishpek (now Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan). In light of scarce literature available on the success and failures of Western internationalist communes in the early Soviet period, this paper draws from intensive field work in Kyrgyzstan and understudied sources in Czech, Kyrgyz, Slovak and Russian to offer a novel, bottom-up narrative on the socialist city in Central Asia.Founded 1914 by Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, German internationalists and Ido-learners around the mountaineer and Bolshevik Rudolf Pavlovič Mareček in the Czechoslovakian town Žilina, the cooperative actively shaped urbanization in what would be become known as the capital of Soviet Kyrgyzstan. From 1925 until its liquidation during WWII, the cooperative built from scratch a whole district including the first electric power station of the city, textile and furniture factories, workshops for tailors, shoemakers and joiners, a school, a kindergarten, a tannery, a brewery as well as unique residential district. In the process, the cooperative forged an organic patchwork language referred to as spontánne esperanto to secure translocal collaboration between internationalists from Central Europe, on the one hand, and a heterogeneous mix of workers including Armenians, Kyrgyz, Dungans, Uygurs, Uzbeks, Russians and Ukrainians, on the other.Transcending a purely historical analysis, the paper ultimately turns to the urban landscape of present-day Bishkek. There it argues that while the district built by Interhelpo corresponds today to an exiled site dislocated by the hegemonic ethno-national memory regime, its materiality harbors relicts of another future capable of mobilizing alternative narratives on the city and her socialist and multi-ethnic past.

The Kuyalnykian regional stage is a stage of evolution of the Euxine Basin of the Eastern Paratethys with its own conditions for the existence of biota. During that time, the estuarine-marine conditions in southern Ukraine prevailed, leading to the development of various geological formations. However, to date, the Kuyalnykian does not have the official status of a regional stratigraphic unit, either in the Neogene stratigraphic scheme of the Eastern Paratethys or in the Neogene stratigraphic scheme of southern Ukraine, also there is no generalised (formal) description of it as a separate regional stratigraphic unit. The lowering of the Neogene–Quaternary boundary from 1.8 to 2.595 Ma led to a discussion about tracing it in the middle of the Kuyalnykian deposits. This study provides a comprehensive analysis of lithofacies, biostratigraphy (molluscs, ostracods, nannofossils, small mammals), palaeomagnetic and paleogeographic data to obtain a holistic view of the stratigraphy of the Kuyalnykian deposits in southern Ukraine. As a result, we acquired a generalized description and regional stratigraphic scheme of the Kuyalnykian, introduced new local stratigraphic units, obtained criteria for tracing the Neogene-Quaternary boundary, and clarified which part of the Kuyalnykian deposits are of Pliocene age and remain on the pre-Quaternary geological maps, and which of them are already of Pleistocene age and should be transferred to the Quaternary geological maps. The Euxine Basin of the Eastern Paratethys during Kuyalnykian was characterised by euryhaline brackish water, freshwater mollusc assemblages, brackish water and freshwater ostracods assemblages that existed in estuarine-marine environments. The Kuyalnykian deposits are divided into two regional substages and be determinated in the Northern Peri-Black Sea Region, Northern Azov Region, the northern part of the Crimean Peninsula and the Kerch Peninsula. We established the following lithostratigraphic units of the Kuyalnykian for southern Ukraine: the Zamorske Formation in the central and eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula; The Mysove Formation in the northwestern part of the Kerch Peninsula and the eastern part of the Crimean Peninsula is partly Kuyalnykian; the upper part of the Bekhtery Formation on the Left Bank of the Lower Dnieper in the Skadovsk and Holoprystan districts belongs to the lower regional substage of the Kuyalnykian; the Kuyalnyk Formation in the Northern Peri-Black Sea region and Northern Azov region, in the north of the Crimean Peninsula belongs to the upper regional substage of the Kuyalnykian. The age of the Kuyalnykian deposits has been determined based on palaeomagnetic and faunal data. The lower boundary of the Kuyalnykian regional stage is 3.6 Ma which coincides with the boundary of the Hilbert-Gauss palaeomagnetic epochs. The boundary between the Lower and Upper substages is 2.59 Ma (the Gauss-Matuyama boundary). The upper boundary of the Kuyalnykian is set at different stratigraphic levels; it dates 1.780 Ma (the upper boundary of the Olduvai Subchron) in the Indol structural facies zone and also ~1.500 Ma (perhaps above the Gils Subchron, based on small mammal data) or ~0.990 Ma (above the Jaramillo Subchron, based on palaeomagnetic data) in the Western and Eastern structural facies zones of the Northern Black Sea Region, the Northern Azov Region, and the Sivash structural facies zone. This diachrony of the upper Kuyalnykian boundary is explained by environmental difference: while in more marine and “deep water” conditions (Indol structural facies zone) the Kuyalnykian molluscs have already changed to “Gurian (sensu lato)”, in relatively remote estuaries (the Northern Black Sea Region, Northern Azov Region) the Kuyalnykian fauna still “survived”. In addition, it should be noted that the palaeomagnetic dates obtained from studied sections of the Northern Black Sea region are not “absolute” and therefore may be reinterpreted in the future.

Co‐temporality and <i>Sovremennost'</i>: Late Imperial and Early Soviet Photographs

The late period in Russia was marked by intense debates about how to achieve social, political, and, in some instances, cultural cohesion within the context of the empire's multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism. To use our contemporary terminology, we can define the challenge that faced Russian politicians and intellectuals as a resolution of tension between the country's structures and the forces of modern nationalism. (1) Among the various actors whose role in developing the new thinking about the management of the empire has recently been attracting increasing attention are scholars. Particularly since the 1880s, some of them began advancing, through their research, various integrationist projects as liberal Moscow anthropologists searched for a definable imperial race on the territory of the Russian state, whereas linguists explicitly related their own work on Russian and Ukrainian languages to their visions of the future Russia. (2) The tsarist government, however, often disregarded the opinions of academics, particularly those who were known to be critical of autocracy and of the cultural and administrative Russification of minorities. Thus the main contribution of scholars in facilitating the management of the empire's borderlands in the late period is seen as being limited mostly to the development of the new nationality-based categories of classification of subjects which bureaucrats utilized to control the borderlands more efficiently. (3) It is widely assumed that it was in the early Soviet period that the (former) experts on Russia's ethnic minorities began to play a truly significant role in nation-building (natsional'noe stroitel'stvo in Soviet terminology) among the population of the borderlands. (4) More broadly, it is also widely accepted that, even though the late government began to utilize ethnic markers to organize politics, (5) the process of the formation of nations among eastern and southern minorities (with the exception of Armenians and Georgians) falls within the Soviet period. (6) This article contributes to a still limited body of research that focuses on the ways in which prerevolutionary discourses of nationhood and modernity actually exercised a major impact on the early Soviet nationalities policies. Adeeb Khalid has articulated in a particularly forceful manner the argument that these policies cannot be understood without knowledge of the developments in the last decades of the old regime. His work has challenged the established view that local peoples in Turkestan had not thought in terms before the Bolshevik government initiated the delimitation of Central Asia in the 1920s. (7) Another case of a link between the formation of new identities among non-Russian minorities in the late and the early Soviet periods was noted in 1977 by Isabella Kreindler and further studied recently by Austin Jersild. Both scholars have argued that there was a degree of similarity between Lenin's policies on nationalities and the approach to the Christianization of small minority groups in the Volga region, formulated in the 1860s by the Orthodox missionary Nikolai Il'minskii. Under the influence of Romantic nationalism Il'minskii became convinced that the Christianization and eventual Russification of minorities was possible only if those minorities respected their local customs. (8) The Bolshevik leaders, however, never directly referred to Il'minskii's experiment; and in its essence, the missionary's plans for the minorities differed significantly from the early Soviet visions. The promotion of ethno-cultural distinctions among these minorities by Il'minskii had very narrow limits, particularly in comparison with the Soviet project of sub-state nation-building. Il'minskii intensely feared the appearance among the minorities of people possessing what at the time was called national consciousness (natsional 'noe samosoznanie). …

The focus of this article is on different adaptations of Christianity by the northern indigenous peoples of Russia in the early Soviet period. We shall examine the community of Yup'ik Eskimo maritime hunters who experimented with Christian ritual forms in order to overcome the crisis caused by the intru- sion of the Soviets. Naukan Yup'ik developed a Christian-influenced ritualistic practice to fight back against growing pressure from the Soviets. We propose that the spiritual developments of this community on the edge of Siberia were tightly related to changing economic, social and political conditions. Early Soviet reforms had predominantly a secular and materialistic character. At the same time, these reforms produced unexpected outcomes in the reli- gious attitudes, ideas and behaviour of the state's population. The intensifica- tion of religious feelings as a reaction to the public secular ideology and admin- istrative measures was a common phenomenon from central Russia to the Siberian periphery. It spread amongst different ethnic and social groups from the very beginning of the Soviet period (A Collection 1919). Among others, the radical atheistic turn in Russia also provoked an upsurge of various Protestant groups who acted as conservative, anti-modernist and anti-Communist move- ments. Significantly, there was a period of mutual imitation between Commu- nists and Protestants that has some importance for our analysis below. At the beginning of the 1920s, the competition between secular and spir- itual worldviews was developing rapidly in Siberia like everywhere else in Soviet Russia. The main architect of the anti-religious policies, Emelyan Iaro- slavskii characterised these processes as a search for ideological forms. As Iaroslavskii insisted, the poorest were more empathetic towards the anti-reli- gious propaganda (Iaroslavskii 1922: 141-142). This statement is in accordance with the principle of the Communist ideology that envisions the urban and rural proletariat as a leading force in the socialist development. But besides this formal ideological correctness, Iaroslavskii described the real situation of the contemporary religious front in Siberia differing considerably from the ideological statements he himself made.

Background. The destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant dam by the Russian occupiers led to the emptying of the largest reservoir in Ukraine, the Kakhovka reservoir, which provided up to 40% of the water needs of the South of Ukraine. The purpose of the study is to assess the availability of water resources in the South of Ukraine in the context of climate change and the consequences of military actions (destruction of the Kakhovka reservoir by the Russian army). Methods. The research methodology is based on a study of the water balance of the Lower Dnipro River, taking into account the impact of climate change on the region's water resources based on hydrological modeling of runoff and modern climate projections under two climate scenarios. Results. As a result of the research, an estimate of the availability of water resources in southern Ukraine for the restoration of water infrastructure after the destruction of the reservoir was obtained. It has been established that after the loss of the reservoir, the value of the incoming part of the balance, which is regulated by the inflow of water from the Dnipro reservoir, will not change. However, the amount of water (2.8-4.2 km3 per year) that was spent on evaporation from the reservoir surface and on filtration through the hydroelectric dam will be saved and will be available for use. Another source of replenishment of available water resources is the adjustment of the volume of ecological flow to the Lower Dnipro in winter months by bringing their values closer to natural values (before the construction of the HPP). At the same time, according to the results of the assessment of climate change impacts on the Dnipro water flow in the Kakhovka HPP, in most months of the year under both scenarios (RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5), a decrease in flow will be observed as a result of climate change. The climatic factor can significantly worsen the water situation in a hydrological year with 50% reliability of water flow in September, and in low-water years with 75% and 95% reliability of water flow from July to November. The largest total deficit of water resources due to climatic and water management factors can be formed in low-water years in September and reach 0.8 km3. Conclusions. Studies conducted to assess the availability of water resources in southern Ukraine after the destruction of the Kakhovka Reservoir have shown that under the influence of further climate change and the resumption of the use of the available water resources of the Dnipro River, water shortages may occur in the summer and autumn, especially in low-water years. However, taking advantage of the artificial regulation of the Dnipro's flow and the introduction of modern low-water technologies in both industry and agriculture will allow the water sector in southern Ukraine to meet the needs of the water sector without restoring the Kakhovka reservoir.

"Not Just Tea Drinking"The Red Teahouse and the Soviet State Public in Interwar Uzbekistan Claire Roosien (bio) In April 1928, speaking at the Third Convention of Uzbekistan's Communist Youth League (Komsomol), a young activist registered a serious critique of the Red Teahouse. Red Teahouses were the foremost institution for Marxist-Leninist instruction in Uzbekistan.1 By all accounts, Red Teahouses enjoyed a great deal of popularity, in part because ordinary, "black" teahouses had already been a fixture of Central Asian social life for centuries. But the activist complained that in some Red Teahouses, Uzbekistan's youth were not studying the books that had been sent to them for political education. Instead, the books had been hung from the ceiling with ropes—dusty, torn, and unread.2 To be sure, he added, some Komsomol activists had managed to attract popular participation through other entertainments: he specifically mentioned donkey races and competitions among players of the dutar, a local stringed [End Page 479] instrument. But if teahouses were to become properly Soviet, they needed both to remain popular and to align themselves with party agendas. There is no way of knowing why those communist books ended up on ropes rather than on shelves—or, even better, in the hands of readers. Perhaps teahouse administrators felt the books would be better appreciated as decorations than as reading material. Perhaps, as Komsomol activists complained elsewhere, the books' pages were being used as wrappings for food, and hanging them from the ceiling kept the pages close at hand for patrons in need of a napkin.3 Whatever the reason, the dangling Marxist-Leninist tracts represent the central problem the Bolsheviks faced in creating state-sponsored mass institutions in Uzbekistan. On the one hand, the institutions functioned to assert state control: to promulgate Marxism-Leninism and, more importantly, to mobilize Uzbekistan's masses for collectivization and the cotton monoculture. On the other hand, mobilizing the masses required creating an institution that was truly popular: one that would get Central Asians in the door voluntarily and facilitate enthusiastic participation in state projects. The challenge facing Central Asian activists was to take advantage of the teahouse's popularity while also making the teahouse Red. In this article, I examine the institution of the Red Teahouse in the early Soviet period. Red Teahouses mushroomed in Uzbekistan's countryside especially during the years of the first two five-year plans, totaling more than 3,000 by 1934.4 I take seriously Soviet activists' claim that the Red Teahouse existed [End Page 480] to promote mass participation even as they sought to exert state control. I term this space for popular participation the "state public," foregrounding at once its comparability to the public spheres of interwar Western Europe in an age of mass politics, and the Soviet state's unprecedented aspirations to control. But by promoting participation, the Red Teahouse created the conditions of possibility for forms of public life that the state could neither predict nor control. In particular, the Red Teahouse provided harbor for modes of teahouse sociability that had roots in pre-Soviet practices. Sometimes, these off-label uses of the Red Teahouse supported state agendas; other times, they undermined those agendas. To make this dynamic clear, I begin with a discussion of teahouse culture before the Soviet period. I then proceed to examine the adoption of the Red Teahouse model in the Soviet period, the changing expectations for how Red Teahouses would function during the five-year plans, and the ways that popular participation both facilitated and undermined those expectations. In the conclusion, I pan out to a broadly comparative view, suggesting that the Red Teahouse should be considered neither a communist nor a Central Asian aberration but rather a case study of the tensions inherent in modern projects of mass publicity around the world.5 In examining the Red Teahouse as a Soviet institution, I draw on two main source bases. First, reports housed in the Russian State Archive of Sociopolitical History (RGASPI) and the Uzbekistan National State Archive (O'zMDA) offer the perspective of the primarily Russian-speaking administrators who supervised the construction and functioning of Red Teahouses. Archival sources provide indispensable statistical...