Crowell’s Account of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s Divergent Interpretations of Phenomenology’s Transcendental Character

Abstract

Turning now to the final variation of the trend that seeks a rapprochement between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger, Steven Crowell’s careful discussion of their relationship will be considered, within the context of the present study. According to Crowell, the issue that divides Husserl and Heidegger does not concern the interpretation per se of phenomenology, that is, of “‘phenomenology: transcendental philosophy or ontology?’”1 Rather, for him the issue is “‘transcendental phenomenology: epistemology or ontology?’”2 Thus for Crowell, “the real issues concern not so much Heidegger’s rejection, as his reinterpretation, of central Husserlian notions.”3 Indeed, Crowell holds that “[t]here is a good sense in which Heidegger can be said to adopt the program of inquiry into ‘transcendental constitution’.”4