Abstract
AbstractWhen the cross owners of firms commit environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) as a commitment device to soften competition, environmental cooperation with their managers increases ECSR commitment levels. While lower degree of cross ownership between the firms reduces more emissions by increasing environmental R&D (ER&D) and improves welfare, higher degree of cross ownership causes both owners and managers to decrease ECSR and ER&D, which distorts environment and welfare, and these results can be expanded under environmental cooperation. In a coordination game, coordination failures can increase welfare when degrees of cross ownership are high and product markets are more competitive.
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