Critical Discussion of David Velleman, Foundations for Moral Relativism, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2013. Pp. x +109. Price: £12.95.

Abstract

Foundations for Moral Relativism consists of five self-standing, though loosely related, essays on the nature of agency and its metaethical foundations. The essays do not aspire to offer any grand theory of agency or metaethics, but only to lay out some of the foundations for such theories. These foundations portray how agency in general is constructed in the social context of a community, how moral agency in particular is constructed in the social context of a community, and how a derivative relativist account of morality can be not only intellectually respectable but also plausible. In paving the way for moral relativism, Velleman clarifies popular confusions about relativism, responds to a number of traditional objections and sketches a sophisticated version of moral relativism that is meant to improve on more simplistic versions. There is much to praise in these thought provoking essays and they are highly recommended to anyone working on agency and metaethics. They are lucid, succinct and full of novel insights about how best to understand agency and moral relativism. Unfortunately, due to scarcity of space, I have to restrict critical discussion to some aspects of the sketch of the foundations of moral relativism. My goal is to present some worries and questions for Velleman’s sophisticated version of moral relativism that any plausible theory of moral relativism should address. Before moving on to this goal, let us first offer a very brief overview of the content of the essays, so that interested readers may get a sense of the content of the essays, and then we shall sketch Velleman’s sophisticated moral relativism. In Chapter I, ‘Introduction’, the central goal of the book is laid out, namely, to outline a theory of agency and a plausible version of moral relativism. The content of the rest of the five essays is also introduced. In Chapter II, ‘Virtual Selves’, an analysis of the construction of agency is offered by means of the Second Life virtual world game. In Second Life, users live a second virtual life in the digital frame of the game and do all that we do in real life (buy, invest, love, get married etc.). Velleman argues that in the context of the game we live a real second life and we are not merely engaging in make-believe. In Chapter III, ‘Doables’, an analysis is offered of how certain actions are constructed as doables and some other as non-doables in light of what is considered ordinary action in the context of a community. Velleman argues that almost always we act on the basis of what is considered an ordinary, open alternative of action Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2015) 18:209–214 DOI 10.1007/s10677-014-9527-7