Abstract
This chapter examines the restrictions on justification of punishment that result from the claim that human beings lack freedom of the will. The variety of free will at issue is the control in action required for the agent to basically deserve to be blamed or punished. If we lack such free will, the classical retributive justification is undermined. Furthermore, if we lack such free will, one justification for using criminals as means for the purpose of general deterrence is also threatened. Since even if we lack free will, we yet retain the right to harm in self-defense, special deterrence that invokes such a right, and the attendant general deterrence, are in the clear. Finally, ways in which additional general deterrence absent free will might be justified are explored.
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