Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine: Legality and Legitimacy of Domestic Prosecutions in Third States

Excerpt of table of contents: Chapter I International Criminal Tribunals: Distinctions and Main Features 1. Values and Goals of ICTs 2. The ICTY and ICTR 3. The Origin and Character of the ICC 4. The Emerging Concept of ad hoc Internationalized or Mixed Courts 5. Conclusions: The Legitimacy of ICTs: Selective Enforcement Mechanisms? Chapter II Defining International Crimes 1. Introduction 2. The Proliferation of the Crime of Genocide within the Law of the Tribunals 3. Proliferation of ICTY-ICTR Case Law on the Crime of Genocide 4. The ICTY-ICTR Statutory and Jurisprudential Elements of the Crime of Genocide 5. Crimes against Humanity before ICTs 6. The Concept of War Crimes before ICTs Chapter III The ICC Crime of Aggression: Proliferation or Politicization of International Criminal Law? 1. Introduction 2. Defining the Crime of Aggression 3. Pitfalls of the Jurisdictional Mechanism on the Crime of Aggression 4. The Crime of Aggression and its Impact on Liability Modes 5. Implementation of the Crime of Aggression at Domestic Level 6. Conclusion Chapter IV Jurisdiction and Complementarity 1. Introduction 2. Jurisdiction 3. Admissibility Chapter V Criminal liability Principles Envisioned by ICTs 1. Introduction: Emergence of General Principles 2. Actus Reus and Mens Rea 3. Liability Modes in International Criminal Law Chapter VI International Criminal Law Defenses 1. Introduction 2. Procedural Defenses 3. Duress and Necessity as Defenses before ICTs 4. The Limited Scope of the Defense of Superior Orders under the Law of ICTs 5. The Defenses of Mental Insanity, Diminished Responsibility and Intoxication before ICTs 6. The Jurisprudential and Statutory Self-Defense under the Laws of ICTs 7. Alibi Defenses Chapter VII General Principles of Criminal Evidence envisioned by ICTs 1. Procedural Nature and Characteristics of Proceedings before ICTs 2. Contemporary Procedural Pre-Trial Aspects of ICTs 3. Contemporary Procedural Trial Aspects of ICTs Chapter VIII Principles of Criminal Evidence before ICTs 1. Requisite Standards of Proof before ICTs 2. Requisite Standards of Proof before ICTs 3. Disclosure of Evidence 4. Admissibility of Evidence 5. Presentation and appreciation of evidence by ICTs Chapter IX Due Process Principles before ICTs 1. Introduction 2. Definition of Due Process Rights Relevant to ICTs 3. The Influx of Common Standards of Due Process to ICTs Chapter X International State Cooperation with ICTs: Obtaining Evidence Abroad 1. International State Cooperation with ICTs Obtaining Evidence Abroad Chapter XI The International Criminal Court within the Geopolitical World Order 1. Introduction 2. Geopolitical Effect of ICC Prosecutions 3. The Position of Superpowers vis-a-vis the ICC 4. Conclusion Chapter XII Trials in Absentia 1. Introduction 2. Trials in Absentia

Contents: Part I: The Crime of Aggression from Nuremberg to the Rome Statute: The historical background, Umberto Leanza Origins of the criminalization of aggression: how crimes against peace became the 'Supreme International Crime', William A. Schabas Will aggressors ever be tried before the ICC?, Muhammad Aziz Shukri The debate within the preparatory commission for the International Criminal Court, Mauro Politi. Part II: The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression: Questions of Definition and Jurisdiction: The definition of the crime of aggression and the ICC jurisdiction over that crime, Mohammed M. Gomaa Aggression and the ICC: views on certain ideas and their potential for a solution, Phani Dascalopoulou-Livada Defining the crime of aggression or redefining aggression?, Ioana Gabriela Stancu Definition of the crime of aggression: state responsibility or individual criminal responsibility?, Elizabeth Wilmshurst The crime of aggression: definitional options for the way forward, Hans-Peter Kaul The exercise of the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression: short term and long term prospects, Antonio YA!A+-ez-Barnuevo. Part III: The Crime of Aggression and the Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council: The respective roles of the ICC and the Security Council in determining the existence of an aggression, Giorgio Gaja Reflections on the role of the Security Council in determining an act of aggression, Saeid Mirzaee Yengejeh The ICC and the Security Council on aggression: overlapping competencies?, Paula Escarameia The ICC and the Security Council: about the argument of politicization, Marja Lehto Conclusions generales, Luigi Condorelli. Part IV: Afterword: The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression: From the Preparatory Commission to the Assembly of States Parties and Beyond: An outsider's view, Giuseppe Nesi An insider's view, Silvia A. FernA!ndez de Gurmendi Index.

The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court that was held in Rome to establish the International Criminal Court in 1998 finally adopted the Rome Statute with the participation of 160 countries. The Rome Statute of the ICC entered into force on 1 July 2002 and has been ratified by 100 States. What was considered not so long ago merely a dream of a few people has become a reality after the strenuous efforts of the UN over 50 years. However, one central issue still remains unresolved in the Rome Status. It is the crime of aggression. Countries that participated in the Rome Conference agreed to that compromise just in order to secure the conclusion of the Statute after they had reached a deadlock over the crime of aggression. Adoption of the Rome statute without containing an applicable provision on the crime of aggression, once expressed as the “Supreme International Crime,” was a main defect in the Statute. Without the punishment of the crime of aggression, the ICC would not really have the ultimate, long-awaited international criminal jurisdiction. The definition and jurisdiction of the crime of aggression has always been an extremely difficult issue to settle. The history of the search for an appropriate and effective definition and jurisdiction of the crime of aggression will be reviewed in this paper; it is not a purely legal issue, but it is intertwined with political elements. The research objective of this thesis is to clarify the terms of the ongoing debate over the crime of aggression, and to facilitate a better understanding about the crime of aggression, in an ad hoc working group open to all member states of the U.N. It is important to confirm the current controversial issues of the crime of aggression and present a desirable definition and jurisdiction of it. A credible, carefully discussed, precise definition and jurisdictions of the crime of aggression, one that reflects customary international law and respects the U.N. Charter’s integrity and the Security Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, would enhance the prospects to define the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute and the possibility of other U.N. member states’ ratifying it, including the U.S. Also, it would strengthen the prospects for the eventual successful prosecution of crimes of aggression. First, this paper will review and analyze the general characteristics of the crime of aggression and the historical background of the crime of aggression (from the Nuremberg Military Tribunal to the Rome Statute) in part II. Part III covers the definition of the crime of aggression in light of proposals in the Preparatory Commission (from 1st to 10th) and discussions in the ad hoc working group (from 1st to 4th) and elements of this crime. Part IV discusses the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council from the various points of view concerning the competence of ICC and Security Council, under the U.N. Charter. Finally, through these procedures, this paper will confirm and inquire the current moot issues and suggests desirable a definition and conditions of the crime of aggression in part V. Based on the research outlined above, this paper concludes that concerning the definition of the crime of aggression, first the definition of this crime should follow the “generic approach.” Second, the crime of aggression and the act of aggression should be separately stipulated in the definition. That is, the crime of aggression should contain the provisions included in the Nuremberg Charter and also reflect the general recognition on it developed up the point of current circumstances. The act of aggression should follow the provisions of precedents such as resolution 3314(XXIX) of 1974 and the ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996. Third, the definition of the crime of aggression should comply with the principle of legality. Thus essential material and mental elements of crime should be included in it. Concerning the jurisdiction of the Crime of aggression, this paper concludes that first the Security Council’s primary responsibility for determining the existence of the state aggression should be confirmed. Second, the Security Council’s exclusive right to make such determinations should be denied and there should be a provision which make legally possible for the General Assembly of the UN or the ICJ to make such determinations in case of absence of the determination from the Security Council. Third, to decide whether to give such secondary right to the General Assembly of the UN or the ICJ should be settled by a political compromise through a structured and clear debate and the room for such debate should be opened not only to the state party to the Rome Statute, but also to all UN members.

The author underlines that the crime of aggression has been viewed as the most serious crime against international peace since the Nuremberg Tribunal, which is unambiguously recognized in the Russian and Western doctrine. However, the term «aggression» has long become an instrument of interstate political struggle, although there has not been a single case of real criminal prosecution at the international level for this crime after World War II. In 2010 the Rome Statute was amended, defining signs of aggression as an international crime, as well as clarifying the rules for the exercise of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. This event received rave reviews from most authors. But in reality, these optimistic expectations were destroyed — first of all, in terms of establishing effective jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in relation to the crime of aggression. Establishing of the International Criminal Court jurisdiction by transferring the situation from the UN Security Council becomes practically impossible if the «interested» state is a Permanent member of the Security Council. The establishing of the International Criminal Court jurisdiction by transferring the situation from the state proprio motu is seriously limited (by the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5 of Art. 15-bis of the Rome Statute). As a result, the author concludes that at present it is impossible to speak of effective international criminal prosecution for the crime of aggression. Therefore, it makes sense to revise those norms of the Rome Statute, which cause the most negative reaction from leading states. Only this way the effective international prosecution of the crime of aggression will be possible in the future, together with the consistent development of international criminal justice in general.

The crime of aggression is the criminalisation of the unlawful use of force. This is conduct that has a political dimension by definition and triggers sensitivity in the sense that even the slightest suggestion that the crime has been committed will be hotly debated and may lead to angry reactions. This will certainly be even more the case if it comes to an investigation or prosecution. It is therefore not an easy exercise to embark on writing a monograph on the crime of aggression. Very few books have been published on the extraordinary case of the crime of aggression, which is at the same time an international crime of particular relevance currently and one for which no prosecution has yet taken place. The crime was inserted into the Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2010. The first edition of this book appeared in 2010 just before the Kampala review conference. The book was well received and frequently used. It played a role in the formulation of the definition of the crime. Gerhard Kemp now surprises the reader with a second edition. This second edition fully incorporates the results of the Kampala conference. It has kept the structure of the first edition to a large extent, but expanded on the newly inserted Articles 8 bis , 15 bis and 15 ter ICC Statute. In addition, the author has included a new Part V on the national and regional prosecution of the crime of aggression. That chapter provides case studies of the two European states that have been the most active in applying universal jurisdiction: Spain and Belgium. These examples demonstrate how disputed the use of universal jurisdiction is. States that do prosecute international crimes do not receive only applause, but must anticipate damage to their international relations or even fear reprisals. As may be expected, this risk is even greater where one state passes judgment on the conduct of another in the crime of aggression. Gerhard Kemp acknowledges this in Chapter VIII, Concluding remarks: “The complementarity imperative is supposed to make the application of international criminal law before domestic courts the default option of the international criminal justice project. The crime of aggression poses legal and political complexities that put it in a different category than the other core crimes.

This research article examines the activities of the international community for inclusion in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court a number of amendments, concerning the fixation of the definition of the crime of aggression and the establishment of the Court’s jurisdiction over the international wrongful act. In a view of disputes between the states in the adoption of the Rome Statute concerning the definition of this international crime, set up a special working group whose objective was the development of a project for amendments in the Statute. After a long work at the international conference in the Ugandan capital – Kampala, the Member States of the Rome Statute were considered the amendments to be made to the Statute of the International Criminal Court for its greater efficiency. In considering these amendments were also taken into account the fact that not all states ratified the Rome Statute, respectively, for their adoption it was necessary to consider the national interests of these states. Despite the fact that the introduction of the amendments regarding the crime of aggression was deferred for a certain period, their adoption will strengthen the system of international justice. However, the article notes that it is important to consider the national interests of the states exercising the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over the crime of aggression. This aspect concerns the extradition of persons accused of committing serious international crimes, especially the crime of aggression. In a view of the fact that, in accordance with the constitutions of most States, including the Russian Federation, not allowing the extradition of its citizens to the international judicial authorities, as a result, there is a conflict between the provisions of the Rome Statute and national law of several states. Thus, to prevent the crime of aggression and the development of liability rules for it, it is necessary to maintain joint action between states and international judicial organs.

The article emphasizes that the crime of aggression is considered the most serious crime against peace since the Nuremberg Tribunal,which is recognized by both domestic and Western doctrine. Amendments to the Rome Statute in 2010 defined signs of aggressionas an international crime and clarified the rules for exercising the jurisdiction of the International criminal court. Optimistic expectationsfor establishing effective jurisdiction of the court over this international crime have been dashed. As a result, it is concluded thateffective international criminal prosecution of the crime of aggression is possible only if the norms of the Rome Charter that cause themost negative reaction from the leading States are reviewed.It should be noted that in respect of a state that is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction overthe crime of aggression committed by nationals of that state or on its territory.The International criminal court should serve as a symbol of international justice, which makes just decisions related to violationsof international law. As for the procedure for implementing the proceedings of the International criminal court, it is worth noting thatsuch a procedure for executing the decision of the ISS is double. The dual procedure for the enforcement of decisions of the InternationalCriminal Court is the Foundation of the Rome Charter and represents a new system in the history of public international law inthe field of international responsibility.Thus, it is possible to see that although at first glance the long process of formulating and adopting a unified definition of thecrime of aggression at the international level to succeed, thorough the consideration allows you to comprehend the profound incompletenessof this process. Features of the crime of aggression provided for in the draft edits the Rome Statute, as well as the amendmentmechanism itself, illustrate the real lack of a mechanism for holding individuals internationally responsible for its Commission, as wellas the rather disappointing prospect of positive changes in the near future.Despite the conflicts that arise between the norms of national criminal law and the provisions of the ISS Charter, the procedureitself is an effective legal instrument aimed at maintaining international peace and security. The joint work of the International CriminalCourt and the UN Security Council makes it possible to try cases of international crimes and take effective measures to counter suchcrimes. As a key component of the International criminal justice system, the International criminal Court is one of the most significantinstitutions of international criminal law, which is constantly developing and to a certain extent affects the patterns in the developmentof mechanisms for the investigation of international crimes and the protection of human rights at the international and national levels.

The article emphasizes that the crime of aggression is considered the most serious crime against peace since the Nuremberg Tribunal,which is recognized by both domestic and Western doctrine. Amendments to the Rome Statute in 2010 defined signs of aggressionas an international crime and clarified the rules for exercising the jurisdiction of the International criminal court. Optimistic expectationsfor establishing effective jurisdiction of the court over this international crime have been dashed. As a result, it is concluded thateffective international criminal prosecution of the crime of aggression is possible only if the norms of the Rome Charter that cause themost negative reaction from the leading States are reviewed.It should be noted that in respect of a state that is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction overthe crime of aggression committed by nationals of that state or on its territory.The International criminal court should serve as a symbol of international justice, which makes just decisions related to violationsof international law. As for the procedure for implementing the proceedings of the International criminal court, it is worth noting thatsuch a procedure for executing the decision of the ISS is double. The dual procedure for the enforcement of decisions of the InternationalCriminal Court is the Foundation of the Rome Charter and represents a new system in the history of public international law inthe field of international responsibility.Thus, it is possible to see that although at first glance the long process of formulating and adopting a unified definition of thecrime of aggression at the international level to succeed, thorough the consideration allows you to comprehend the profound incompletenessof this process. Features of the crime of aggression provided for in the draft edits the Rome Statute, as well as the amendmentmechanism itself, illustrate the real lack of a mechanism for holding individuals internationally responsible for its Commission, as wellas the rather disappointing prospect of positive changes in the near future.Despite the conflicts that arise between the norms of national criminal law and the provisions of the ISS Charter, the procedureitself is an effective legal instrument aimed at maintaining international peace and security. The joint work of the International CriminalCourt and the UN Security Council makes it possible to try cases of international crimes and take effective measures to counter suchcrimes. As a key component of the International criminal justice system, the International criminal Court is one of the most significantinstitutions of international criminal law, which is constantly developing and to a certain extent affects the patterns in the developmentof mechanisms for the investigation of international crimes and the protection of human rights at the international and national levels.

The principle of complementarity undergirds the International Criminal Court’s admissibility regime. And yet, in the negotiations leading up to the 2010 Review Conference in Kampala, Uganda, delegates did not fully focus on the potential for the addition of the crime of aggression to destabilize the Court’s complementarity regime. The only guidance from the ASP came in the form of two interpretive Understandings that express a subtle preference that States Parties not incorporate the crime into their domestic codes. If States Parties heed this call - which they should - the Court will inevitably be faced with situations in which there is incomplete concurrence between the prosecuting state’s domestic law and the ICC Statute given that few states have codified the crime of aggression. Under prevailing interpretations of the principle of complementarity, however, a case would be admissible before the Court if a domestic court were prosecuting atrocity crimes, but not the crime of aggression. This paper argues that the Prosecutor should announce in advance of the amendments’ activation the intention to stay his or her hand in the event that genuine domestic prosecutions are going forward on the basis of charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, even if potential domestic aggression charges are not available, are legally barred, or are not forthcoming. The only exception to this general approach should be in cases in which the crime of aggression is the primary or central charge to arise out of a particular situation, such that atrocity crimes are non-existent or largely peripheral. This paper thus advocates that the ICC be allowed to exercise a de facto primacy over the crime of aggression vis-a-vis domestic courts, which will retain the ability to take the lead on prosecuting the atrocity crimes. Such a division of labor between the ICC and domestic courts will obviate a number of concerns associated with domestic prosecutions of the crime of aggression, encourage domestic prosecutions in keeping with the ideal of positive complementarity, reinforce the recognized duty of states to prosecute international crimes, and avoid over-burdening the ICC with cases that could otherwise proceed effectively in a domestic court. It will also ensure that to the extent that the crime of aggression is ever prosecuted, it is done in an international, rather than domestic, forum pursuant to a consensus definition of the crime and a negotiated jurisdictional regime.

On June 11, 2010, in Kampala, Uganda, in a completely unexpected turn of events, the States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) reached a consensus on the details of the crime of aggression. Criminal proceedings concerning the crime of aggression were conducted for the first time in Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II-thereafter little was heard about this particular international crime. Many delegations were committed to a consensus decision for political reasons, although pursuant to Art. 121, para. 3 ICC Statute, the States Parties can amend the Statute by a two thirds majority. The efforts to reach an agreement in Kampala focused on the disputed authority of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction, while the definition of the crime of aggression receded into the background. There is no doubt that the ICC will hardly glean useful insights from the decision-making process in Kampala. Keywords:Art. 121; crime of aggression; International Criminal Court (ICC); Kampala; Nuremberg

It is indicated that the issue of delimitation and interconnection of the legal concepts of «international» and «transnational crimes» is gaining particular importance today and requires an urgent solution. After all, along with the positive consequences of the growth of cross-border mobility and the rapid development of information technologies, negative trends are also observed. In particular, fundamentally new hybrid forms of armed confrontations are emerging and spreading, which are radically different from traditional conflicts and create additional threats to international and national security. The article examines theoretical and practical aspects of distinguishing between international and transnational crimes, using the crimes of aggression and terrorism as illustrative examples. The author analyzes the essential characteristics of these legal phenomena to clearly define the boundaries between the categories and to develop a conceptual framework for their interrelation. Special attention is given to the role of terrorism as a method and instrument of armed aggression, as well as to the current debate on whether terrorism can be classified as international crimes, highlighting the need to refine criteria for their qualification. Despite the historical persistence of aggression and terrorism, the study of preventive measures, legal regulation, and mechanisms for countering these phenomena remains highly relevant in the context of globalization and hybrid conflicts. The author emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach, including the development of international cooperation in evidence collection, strengthening legislative and law enforcement mechanisms, and implementing preventive programs and research into the causes of radicalization. Such an approach provides a scientific basis for further research, the development of practical recommendations, and the improvement of counteraction mechanisms, ensuring effective differentiation between international and transnational crimes and preventing the misclassification of acts within national and international jurisdictions. It is concluded that this issue remains highly relevant and controversial, requiring continued scholarly investigation and the advancement of legal and preventive instruments in a globalized and hybrid context.

In 1946, the judges at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared 'crimes against peace' - the planning, initiation or waging of aggressive wars - to be 'the supreme international crime'. At the time, the prosecuting powers heralded the charge as being a legal milestone, but it later proved to be an anomaly arising from the unique circumstances of the post-war period. This study traces the idea of criminalising aggression, from its origins after the First World War, through its high-water mark at the post-war tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, to its abandonment during the Cold War. Today, a similar charge - the 'crime of aggression' - is being mooted at the International Criminal Court, so the ideas and debates that shaped the original charge of 'crimes against peace' assume new significance and offer valuable insights to lawyers, policy-makers and scholars engaged in international law and international relations.

INTRODUCTION The crime of aggression, or crime against peace, has been famously labeled as the “supreme international crime” by Robert H. Jackson, the Chief American Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials. Of the twenty-two former Nazi leaders tried in Nuremberg, twelve were convicted for crimes against peace. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the “Tokyo Tribunal”) had an even stronger focus on aggression. It prosecuted only those military and political leaders whose crimes included aggression. Twenty-four of them were convicted of this crime. The crime of aggression is, in essence, the crime of waging an illegal war, in order words, a war in contravention of the United Nations Charter. It is, thus, the criminal law corollary to state responsibility for the most serious cases of illegal use of armed force. The Charter prohibits the threat or use of force except in the case of self-defense or when authorized by the Security Council. But while there have been many instances of such illegal use of force since the founding of the United Nations, no international (or domestic) trials for a crime of aggression have been conducted during the last six decades. This is due to two basic reasons: a longstanding controversy over a legally binding definition of aggression, and the lack of an international court effectively empowered to prosecute aggression. Both of these issues, however, have recently been resolved for the purpose of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC): In June 2010, a Review Conference held in Kampala, Uganda, adopted amendments to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression by a consensus decision. The amendments contain a legally binding definition of the crime and the precise conditions under which the ICC will be empowered to prosecute those responsible for crimes of aggression committed no earlier than 2017. Already prior to the Review Conference, it was generally accepted that the crime of aggression was indeed an existing crime under international law. In 2006, this view was confirmed by the British House of Lords. Furthermore, some two dozen countries worldwide (including Germany and the Russian Federation) have incorporated the crime of aggression into their domestic criminal codes.

Summary The article focuses on contemporary challenges concerning the domestic prosecution of the crime of aggression. These challenges have one common feature, that they deal with the scope of jurisdiction over crime of aggression at a domestic level. The author analyses applicability of jurisdictional immunity (based on the principle pars in parem non habet iurisdictionem), immunity of State officials, both personal (ratione personae) and material (ratione materiae), and finally also the availability of universal jurisdiction in relation to the crime of aggression. The contribution is built on the presumption that even though each category of crimes under international law has its unique characteristics, they all share some common definitional features, reflected among else in the famous Cassese’s definition of crime under international law. The author argues that all crimes under international law are to be treated uniformly as much as possible, and therefore – relatedly – there should not be any unsubstantiated differences in standing of the crime of aggression comparing to standing of remaining categories of crimes under international law.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine is concerned with the protection of civilian populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. What these international crimes have in common is that they are usually perpetrated by governments or non-State actors against their own populations. The crime of aggression is excluded from R2P’s scope. This seems to be explained by the fact that the threat posed to a population is external, as the crime is perpetrated by a foreign State. However, the inherent gravity of this crime makes it necessary to consider whether aggression ought to find a place in the doctrine. The aim of the paper is to discuss de lege ferenda the scenario of a broadened R2P doctrine that would encompass aggression. Two main points are made in this respect. First, it is argued that the protective purpose of R2P supports its extension to the crime of aggression. Second, that R2P may offer a useful framework for coordinating decentralised State reaction against acts of aggression. The main argument is that this doctrine may assist in coordinating decentralised State reaction to acts of aggression. The analysis’ assumption is that what marks the relationship between R2P and international law is interaction: each enacts changes upon and is changed by the other, in a relation of mutual influence. Including the crime of aggression within R2P would mean significantly broadening and modifying the original scope of the doctrine, thereby extending the protection of civilian populations. This, in turn, would allow coordination and improved application of the law of State responsibility and collective self-defence when the crime of aggression is committed. R2P is understood to have a transformative power in that it may cause major changes to the effectiveness of decentralised State reaction to acts of aggression.